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Conclusions and recommendations 
Introduction  
1. We are satisfied that schools should be held publicly accountable for their 
performance as providers of an important public service. We concur with the views 
expressed in evidence to us that the two major consequences of the accountability 
system should be school improvement and improvement in broader outcomes for 
children and young people, including well-being. (Paragraph 15) 
2. The New Relationship with Schools policy was a laudable attempt by the 
Government to simplify the school accountability system, particularly in relation to 
inspection. However, the Government has continued to subject schools to a 
bewildering array of new initiatives and this has in many ways negated the good 
work started in New Relationship with Schools.  (Paragraph 24) 
3. We are concerned that the Government’s 21st Century Schools White Paper signals 
even greater complexity in an already overly complex system of school accountability 
and improvement initiatives. There is a real danger that schools may become 
overwhelmed by the intricacies of the proposed reforms and that School 
Improvement Partners and local authorities may not have sufficient time or 
resources to mediate effectively between schools and the myriad providers of school 
improvement support. (Paragraph 36) 
Schools’ Self-Evaluation, Self-Improvement Partners and Local Authorities 
4. We note that Ofsted is actively considering ways of involving governing bodies more 
in the inspection process, particularly where inspections are conducted without 
notice. However, it would have been preferable had the 2009 inspection framework 
been introduced following a satisfactory resolution of this issue. We recommend that 
Ofsted bring forward at the earliest opportunity firm proposals setting out how 
governing bodies will be appropriately involved in all inspections. (Paragraph 45) 
5. We urge the Government to reconsider the proposals to place additional statutory 
duties on governors. We support the principle of better training for governors, but 
we recommend that the Government set out a detailed strategy for encouraging 
governors to take up training opportunities without training requirements becoming 
a barrier to recruitment. (Paragraph 47) 
6. We are persuaded that self-evaluation—as an iterative, reflexive and continuous 
process, embedded in the culture of a school—is a highly effective means for a school 
to consolidate success and secure improvement across the full range of its activities. 
It is applicable, not just to its academic performance, but across the full range of a 
school’s influence over the well-being of the children who learn there and the 
community outside.  (Paragraph 53) 
7. We believe that Ofsted should do more to encourage schools to be creative and 
produce evidence of the self-evaluation process which works for them and speaks to 
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the true culture and ethos of their own school. Ofsted should ensure that its own 
inspection processes are flexible enough to accommodate and give appropriate 
weight to alternative forms of evidence of self-evaluation. (Paragraph 59) 
8. We are attracted to a model of accountability which encourages and supports schools 
towards a meaningful, continuous self-evaluation process, evidenced in a form which 
the school considers most appropriate and verified through inspection. We are 
persuaded that true self-evaluation is at the heart of what a good school does. For a 
school which is performing at a good level, embedding processes which encourage 
continuous self-improvement are likely to be of far more practical benefit than an 
inspection every few years. The latter is necessary mainly as a check to see that a 
school is performing at the appropriate level. Inspection should be a positive 
experience, reinforcing good practice and fostering dialogue with schools in relation 
to areas where further improvement can be made. The Government and Ofsted 
should endeavour to do more to help schools which have not yet come to terms with 
the concept of self-evaluation in its fullest sense. (Paragraph 63) 
9. We welcome the fact that the National College for Leadership of Schools and 
Children’s Services is being asked to review its training and accreditation procedures 
to support School Improvement Partners in their new role.  (Paragraph 76) 
10. The Government must take care that it does not exacerbate the existing problems 
with recruitment of School Improvement Partners by increasing the training burden 
and introducing requirements that existing School Improvement Partners be re-
accredited and that they all carry an ongoing licence to practice. (Paragraph 77) 
11. We recommend that the Government produce clear plans to show how and from 
where enough School Improvement Partners (SIPs) with appropriate skills and 
experience will be recruited with sufficient time to dedicate to the expanded remit for 
SIPs which is proposed in the Government’s White Paper. (Paragraph 84) 
12. We agree with the Audit Commission that local authorities should be more involved 
with monitoring, supporting and, where necessary, intervening in school budgets 
and finance. It is indefensible that the expenditure of such vast sums should attract 
so little scrutiny. Central government should make clear that schools must make a 
proper accounting of their expenditure to local authorities; and that local authorities 
should be as engaged with the monitoring of finance as they are expected to be with 
the monitoring of performance and standards. We do not advocate an erosion of 
schools’ autonomy, but we consider it important that the correct level of financial 
support is available to them in order to derive maximum value for money from the 
schools budget. (Paragraph 91) 
13. We approve of the collaborative approach to school improvement taken by some 
local authorities; and we consider that partnership working between local authorities 
and all schools in the local area is a valuable means of providing support and 
spreading best practice. We urge central and local government to work together to 
ensure a more consistent approach across local authorities in this regard. (Paragraph 
96) 
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14. We urge the Government to recognise the good work done in the local authorities 
which demonstrate a systematic, collaborative approach towards the identification of 
schools in need of improvement and the provision of support in raising their 
standards of performance. We recommend that the Government should be sparing 
in the use of its extended statutory powers to intervene in relation to school 
improvement. We consider that these powers should be used only in cases where the 
relevant local authority has failed in its duty to secure school improvement. They 
should not be used as a mechanism for central government to increase its control 
over the way in which schools are managed. (Paragraph 102) 
The Inspectorate 
15. In general terms, we support the approach to inspection set out in the 2009 
inspection framework. We consider that a frequency of inspection in proportion to a 
school’s current levels of performance is sensible, although some concerns remain 
about identification of schools where there is an unexpected slide in performance. 
We consider that a short notice period for inspection is sensible, but schools must be 
given sufficient time to collate all the necessary evidence and ensure attendance of 
key personnel. Without-notice inspection is appropriate where there are particular 
concerns about performance, and safeguarding in particular, but this approach 
should not be used without good reason. (Paragraph 111) 
16. If visits to schools are to be as short as two days—and bearing in mind that some of 
those days will be taken up by preliminaries rather than by inspection itself—
inspectors will need to be highly trained and well qualified if they are to make an 
accurate evaluation of school provision (Paragraph 112) 
17. We remind Ofsted of the need for transparency and publicity for the way in which 
inspection data are combined to form final judgments on schools. (Paragraph 113) 
18. We support the principle of increased emphasis on the views of pupils and parents, 
but we have some reservations about the level of responses to questionnaires, 
particularly for schools with a challenging intake. We urge Ofsted to make 
transparent the approach that inspectors will take when forming judgements on 
schools where there has been a low level of response to questionnaires from parents; 
and it should not rule out the possibility of meetings with parents. (Paragraph 114) 
19. We are persuaded of the need for an inspectorate, independent of government, 
which can assure the quality of provision in individual schools, as well as producing 
more general reports on aspects of the education system at a national level. We 
consider that the latter are particularly important, not least because they should 
provide a sound evidential basis for policy-making by the Government. (Paragraph 
121) 
20. Both Ofsted and the Government should be alert to any sign that the growth of 
Ofsted’s responsibilities is causing it to become an unwieldy and unco-ordinated 
body. (Paragraph 122) 
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21. We believe that Ofsted should aspire to have HMIs lead all inspections. Schools 
causing concern should always be inspected by a team headed by an HMI. 
(Paragraph 127) 
22. We note that Ofsted has a duty to encourage improvement in schools. However, we 
do not accept that Ofsted necessarily has an active role to play in school 
improvement. It is Ofsted’s role to evaluate a school’s performance across its many 
areas of responsibility and to identify issues which need to be addressed so that a 
school can be set on the path to improvement. Ofsted has neither the time nor 
resources to be an active participant in the improvement process which takes place 
following inspection, aside from the occasional monitoring visit to verify progress.  
(Paragraph 137) 
23. We recommend that Ofsted’s role in school improvement be clarified so that the 
lines of responsibility are made clear to all those involved in the school system. 
Ofsted’s function is a vital one: it is, in the purest sense, to hold schools to account 
for their performance. It is for others—schools themselves, assisted by School 
Improvement Partners, local authorities and other providers of support—to do the 
work to secure actual improvement in performance. The Chief Inspector already has 
a wide and important remit: she should feel no compulsion to make it wider. 
(Paragraph 138) 
24. We recommend a review of the data underlying comparator measures or sets of 
measures to ensure that they accurately reflect the range of factors that can impact on 
school performance. (Paragraph 150) 
25. We consider that the quality of school provision beyond the teaching of academic 
subjects is extremely important and that Ofsted has a duty to reflect this in a fair and 
balanced manner in its inspection reports. (Paragraph 157) 
26. We urge Ofsted to rebalance its inspection framework in two ways, in order to reflect 
better the true essence of the school. First, when evaluating academic attainment, we 
recommend that Ofsted gives less evidential weight given to test results and 
derivative measures and gives more weight to the quality of teaching and learning 
observed by inspectors in the classroom. Second, when evaluating a school’s 
performance in terms of pupil well-being and other non-academic areas, we 
recommend that Ofsted should move beyond the search for quantitative measures of 
performance and that it should focus more effort on developing qualitative measures 
which capture a broader range of a school’s activity.  (Paragraph 161) 
Achievement and Attainment Tables and the School Report Card 
27. Performance data have been a part of the educational landscape in England for some 
years. Like it or not, they are a feature of the school accountability system and we 
recognise the manifest difficulties in retreating from that position, even if a watchful 
eye should be kept on the consequences of the abandonment of performance tables 
linked to test results in other parts of the United Kingdom. If such data is to be 
collected, much can be done to mitigate the more unfortunate aspects of the 
publication. We take a pragmatic view and believe that the focus of debate should 
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move towards a more fruitful discussion of the types of data and information 
collected and the method of presentation. (Paragraph 167) 
28. The Achievement and Attainment Tables present a very narrow view of school 
performance and there are inherent methodological and statistical problems with the 
way they are constructed. For instance, they are likely to favour independent and 
selective schools, which have a lower intake of deprived children or of children with 
Special Educational Needs. It is unsurprising, therefore, if such schools consistently 
top the academic league tables. Yet most of those who may wish to use the Tables, 
particularly parents, remain unaware of the very serious defects associated with them 
and will interpret the data presented without taking account of their inherent flaws. 
As a result, many schools feel so constrained by the fear of failure according to the 
narrow criteria of the Tables that they resort to measures such as teaching to the test, 
narrowing the curriculum, an inappropriate focusing of resources on borderline 
candidates, and encouraging pupils towards ‘easier’ qualifications, all in an effort to 
maximise their performance data. There is an urgent need for the Government to 
move away from these damaging Achievement and Attainment Tables and towards a 
system which gives a full and rounded account of a school’s provision.  (Paragraph 
176) 
29. We urge the Government to work closely with Ofsted in order to produce a model of 
the school report card appropriate for use by the inspectorate. However, if in Ofsted’s 
view the school report card ultimately takes a form which is unsuitable for the 
purpose of risk assessment, as an independent regulator, Ofsted should not feel 
compelled to adopt the school report card as a replacement for its interim 
assessment.  (Paragraph 184) 
30. We welcome in principle the introduction of the school report card as a 
rationalisation of current accountability mechanisms and an attempt at providing a 
broader evidence base for assessing schools’ performance. However, the Government 
must take care in developing its proposals that it tailors the school report card to the 
particular needs of the English schools system. Lessons can be learned from 
international practices and the case of the New York school report card will be 
particularly relevant; but the Government should not assume that what works 
elsewhere will necessarily work in the English system. (Paragraph 196) 
31. Schools should be strongly incentivised by the accountability system to take on 
challenging pupils and work hard to raise their levels of attainment. To this end, we 
support the proposals to introduce credits on the school report card for narrowing 
the gaps in achievement between disadvantaged pupils and their peers. However, we 
strongly caution the Government against the introduction of any penalties for 
increasing gaps in achievement. If the Government were to attach such penalties, it is 
likely that schools would seek to deny school places to challenging pupils in order to 
avoid the risk of a lower school report card score. They might also create incentives 
for schools not to push gifted and talented students to reach really high levels of 
achievement. (Paragraph 206) 
32. We have been struck by the weight of evidence we have received which argues 
against an overall score on the school report card. It is true that Ofsted comes to an 
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overall judgement on a four point scale, but this judgement is meant to be the result 
of a very extensive analysis of a school’s provision across the board, relying on 
quantitative and qualitative evidence and first-hand experience of the school at work. 
A school report card is not, and in our view never can be, a full account of a school’s 
performance, yet the inclusion of an overall score suggests that it is.  (Paragraph 211) 
33. The range of discrete measures proposed for inclusion in the school report card 
certainly present a broader picture of a school than the current Achievement and 
Attainment Tables; but they cannot be the basis for a definitive judgement of overall 
performance in the same way as we are entitled to expect an Ofsted judgement to be. 
On balance, we think that parents and others should be able to decide for themselves 
those measures of performance most important to them. We approve of the proposal 
both to grade and rate performance in each category on the school report card, but 
we are not persuaded of the appropriateness of and need for an overall score.  
(Paragraph 212) 
34. We recommend that the Government guards against serial changes to reporting 
criteria for the school report card once it is introduced nationally. The ability to track 
school performance on a range of issues over time is potentially a valuable feature of 
the reformed system, but this will not be possible if the reporting criteria are in a 
constant state of flux.  (Paragraph 216) 
35. There is potential for substantial confusion to be introduced if the reasons for 
differences between scores on the school report card and Ofsted judgements are not 
clear, leading to a perception of incoherence in the accountability system. This would 
be unfortunate, as the success of any accountability system depends on the extent to 
which users have confidence in it. We recommend that DCSF and Ofsted work 
together to find a way to eradicate, or at least minimise the impact of, this problem. If 
the Government accepts our recommendation not to include an overall score in the 
school report card, the potential for conflicting accounts of school performance 
would be greatly reduced. (Paragraph 217) 
36. The Government must address the methodological problems inherent in basing 
important indicators on survey evidence. It is unacceptable that schools with the 
most challenging intakes might suffer skewed performance scores because of a low 
response rate to surveys for the purposes of the school report card.  (Paragraph 222) 
37. Academic research in the field of school effectiveness is lacking in the field of pupil 
well-being and wider outcomes beyond assessment results. In the absence of robust, 
independent research evidence, the Government should exercise great caution in 
pursuing its otherwise laudable aim of widening the accountability system beyond 
simple test scores. (Paragraph 223) 
38. We do not believe that the indicators based on parent and pupil surveys, together 
with data on attendance, exclusions, the amount of sport provided and the uptake of 
school lunches, provide a balanced picture of a school’s performance. In the absence 
of a set of performance indicators which are able to provide a fully rounded and 
accurate picture of how well a school is supporting and enhancing the well-being and 
outcomes of its pupils, the school report card should not purport to give a balanced 
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view of a school’s overall performance in this or any other area. The Government 
should make clear on the face of the school report card that its contents should only 
be considered as a partial picture of the work of a school. This is not to say that we do 
not consider the inclusion of well-being indicators to be a welcome development: we 
are merely concerned that parents and others should understand the limits of the 
information which is presented to them on the school report card. (Paragraph 224) 
39. We are pleased that the Government is now moving away from the Achievement 
and Attainment Tables based on a narrow set of measures of academic achievement 
derived from test results. We believe that the move towards the broader evidence 
base proposed for the school report card is a step in the right direction. However, we 
reiterate our warning to the Government that it should not make claims for the 
school report card which do not stand up to scrutiny. It will never constitute a 
definitive view of a school’s performance but it might, if properly constructed, be a 
useful tool in assessing a broader range of aspects of a school’s performance than is 
possible at present. (Paragraph 225) 
40. At the start of the pilot study of the school report card, it is too early for us to make 
detailed recommendations about its precise contents. At this stage, we simply urge 
the Government to take account of the concerns raised by witnesses to this inquiry. 
There is still much work to be done in developing the school report card into a 
workable format. (Paragraph 226) 
Conclusion: complexity, consistency and coercion 
41. The complexity of the school accountability and improvement system in England is 
creating a barrier to genuine school improvement based on the needs of individual 
schools and their pupils. We support the message in the 21st Century Schools White 
Paper, that schools should be empowered to take charge of their own improvement 
processes. However, the Government’s continuing tendency to impose serial policy 
initiatives on schools belies this message and the relentless pace of reform has taken 
its toll on schools and their capacity to deliver a balanced education to their pupils. 
We urge the Government to refrain from introducing frequent reforms and allow 
schools a period of consolidation. (Paragraph 239) 
42. Inconsistencies in the approach to school accountability and improvement and 
inconsistencies in the judgments which are made in different parts of the 
accountability system are both confusing and damaging. Confusion undermines the 
credibility of the accountability system and schools which find themselves pulled in 
different directions are unlikely to be able to give their full attention to the 
fundamental task of providing their pupils with a broad and balanced education. 
(Paragraph 249) 
43. We recommend that the Government revisits the proposals for reform of the school 
accountability and improvement system set out in the 21st Century Schools White 
Paper with a view to giving more substance to its claims that schools are responsible 
for their own improvement. We have received strong evidence that schools feel 
coerced and constrained by the outcomes of Ofsted inspection and programmes set 
up by central government, such as National Challenge. We have consistently noted 
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the adverse effects that targets have had on the education of children and young 
people. The Government should seek means of delivering support and challenge to 
schools without what many witnesses perceived as a harmful ‘naming and shaming’ 
approach endemic in the current system. (Paragraph 260) 
44. The problem with the Government’s assessment of the accountability system is that 
it implies that schools welcome the opportunity to take “ownership of their own 
improvement” but then provides the perfect example of how they have been 
prevented from doing just that. The “flexibility” of the system, allowing a constant 
shift in priorities by central government, is precisely the reason why schools are 
struggling to engage with the accountability regime and myriad school improvement 
mechanisms. The Government refers to the flexibility of the accountability system as 
if this is an inherent benefit. The opposite is true. Schools and, indeed, local 
authorities are in sore need of a period of stability so that they can regroup, take the 
necessary time to identify where their priorities lie and then work, with appropriate 
support, to secure the necessary improvements. (Paragraph 262) 
45. It is time for the Government to allow schools to refocus their efforts on what 
matters: children. For too long, schools have struggled to cope with changing 
priorities, constant waves of new initiatives from central government, and the 
stresses and distortions caused by performance tables and targets.  (Paragraph 265) 
46. The Government should place more faith in the professionalism of teachers and 
should support them with a simplified accountability and improvement system 
which challenges and encourages good practice rather than stigmatising and 
undermining those who are struggling. In doing so, it is vital for effective 
accountability that the independence of HM Inspectorate be safeguarded and 
maintained at all times. We believe that the Government should revisit the plans set 
out in its 21st Century Schools White Paper and simplify considerably the 
accountability framework and improvement strategies it proposes. (Paragraph 266) 
School Accountability    11 
 
Summary 
A parent or carer who sends a child to school expects that the school will help that child to 
learn to the best of his or her ability, in a caring environment. Anyone who funds a school, 
whether through payment of taxes, fees or sponsorship, will expect that school to 
demonstrate good value for money. Employers, colleges and universities rely upon schools  
to lay the foundations for their pupils to become able and productive members of the 
workforce.  
Schools therefore bear heavy responsibilities, and they need to be held publicly accountable 
for the services which they provide. Any system of accountability should in turn lead to 
improvement in those services, in terms of both education and broader outcomes, 
including wellbeing. 
Self-evaluation by schools is widely recognised as an essential element of accountability. 
For a school which is performing at a good level, embedding processes which encourage 
continuous self-improvement is likely to be of far more practical benefit than an infrequent 
inspection. Self-evaluation is a starting point for Ofsted in inspecting a school; but we 
believe that Ofsted should do more to encourage schools to be creative and produce 
evidence of the self-evaluation process which works for them rather than allow schools to 
gain the impression that the standard Self Evaluation Form (SEF) provided by Ofsted is 
mandatory. 
There are now nearly 5,000 School Improvement Partners (SIPs), principally serving or 
former head teachers, appointed to help school leaders evaluate their school’s performance. 
Many witnesses welcomed SIPs’ work in providing the support and challenge necessary to 
support school improvement; but others found their effectiveness to be variable. The 
Government now proposes an enhanced role for SIPs, who would become in effect 
gatekeepers for all those who wished to engage in supporting and improving schools. 
However, the Government needs to do more work to ensure that there will be enough SIPs 
with the appropriate skills and experience and with enough time to fulfil this expanded 
role. 
We are persuaded of the need for an inspectorate which is independent of government and 
which can assure the quality of provision in individual schools. However, Ofsted has grown 
enormously. Its responsibilities now encompass inspection of not just schools but also 
early years settings, colleges, initial teacher education, adult education, children’s social 
care and local authority children’s services. Whether this is sustainable for a single 
organisation in the long term is debatable, and both Ofsted and the Government should be 
alert to any sign that the growth of Ofsted’s responsibilities is causing it to become 
unwieldy or unco-ordinated. 
Ofsted is now using a new inspection framework. In general, we support the approach 
which it takes, matching frequency of inspection to levels of performance. Short notice 
periods for inspection are sensible and reduce the stress of preparation; without-notice 
inspection is appropriate where there are particular concerns about performance—
particularly in relation to safeguarding—but it should not be used without good reason.  
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We do, however, recommend that Ofsted should rebalance its inspection framework in 
two ways. In evaluating academic attainment, Ofsted should give less evidential weight to 
test results and give more weight to the quality of teaching and learning observed by 
inspectors in the classroom. Also, when evaluating performance in non-academic areas 
such as pupil well-being, Ofsted should focus on developing qualitative measures which 
capture a broad range of a school’s activity. 
Ofsted employs some 200 HMI inspectors. Approximately 1,000 more inspectors are 
supplied by contractors to work full-time or part-time. Although there was little direct 
evidence of a major gulf in quality between the two types of inspector, HMI inspectors are 
generally better respected and are rated highly. We believe that Ofsted should plan to have 
HMIs lead all inspections. Schools causing concern should always be inspected by a team 
headed by an HMI. We believe that all inspectors should be rigorously trained to the 
highest standard. 
The Government intends to replace Achievement and Attainment Tables with a School 
Report Card for each school, published annually and setting out key outcomes in pupil 
attainment, wellbeing, reducing the impact of disadvantage, perceptions of the school, and 
possibly partnership working. How the Report Card would mesh with the interim 
assessments by Ofsted of high-performing schools—which only receive inspections 
approximately every five years under the new inspection framework—is unclear. The 
Government and Ofsted should work closely to produce a model of a School Report Card 
which can be used by Ofsted to make decisions on which schools should undergo a full 
inspection within the five year period. 
We welcome the introduction of a School Report Card which provides a broader evidence 
base for assessing schools’ performance. We support the proposal to introduce credits for 
narrowing the gaps in achievement between disadvantaged pupils and their peers; but 
there should not be penalties for increasing gaps in achievement. Such a policy would 
discourage schools from admitting challenging pupils and might create perverse incentives 
for schools not to push gifted and talented students to reach really high levels of 
achievement.  
We are not persuaded that an overall score on a School Report Card is either needed or 
appropriate. A Report Card is unlike an Ofsted inspection, which is based upon extensive 
analysis of a school’s provision across the board, and based upon quantitative and 
qualitative evidence as well as first-hand experience. It can never be a full account of a 
school’s performance, yet the inclusion of an overall score would suggest that it was. 
The main message in this Report is a warning against the complexity which results from 
overlapping accountability structures and serial policy initiatives. The Government is 
correct in saying in the 21st Century Schools White Paper that schools should be 
empowered to take charge of their own improvement processes; but shifting Government 
priorities and the pressures of inspection, targets and Government programmes for school 
improvement combine to prevent schools from having the freedom to take ownership of 
their improvement. The “flexibility” of the accountability system, championed by the 
Government, may not be quite the benefit which it appears to be. Schools and local 
authorities now need a period of stability so that they can regroup, take time to identify 
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1 Introduction 
Context for the Inquiry and Report 
1. Since its establishment in the autumn of 2007, this Committee has been engaged in a 
series of inquiries which have looked at the pillars on which the national management of 
our school education system is founded. In May 2008, we published our report on 
Testing and Assessment in schools and the wide-ranging and often damaging 
consequences of our national testing regime.1  Then, in April 2009, we reported on our 
inquiry into the National Curriculum, which we found to be overly prescriptive of what 
teachers could do with their class time.2  This inquiry into School Accountability is the 
third and last in the series. Our Report considers the roles of a variety of different agents 
for accountability in the English school system: schools themselves, including their 
governing bodies; local authorities and the School Improvement Partners they appoint; 
the main schools inspectorate, Ofsted; and central government, which sets policy and 
compiles information on each school which is made publicly available by way of the 
Achievement and Attainment Tables. 
2. This Report considers accountability arrangements for mainstream primary and 
secondary provision in the maintained sector in England. It does not consider early 
years, sixth form or further education provision, or provision by independent schools 
not inspected by Ofsted; nor, except insofar as they are referred to specifically, does it 
consider the particular circumstances of Academies, which are accountable to the 
Secretary of State through the Young People’s Learning Agency. The Committee noted 
that there were some additional serious accountability issues associated with Academies, 
not least those arising from the limited role of local authorities and the central 
involvement of Academy sponsors.3 In its report on the National Curriculum, the 
Committee raised concerns about the different requirements on Academies in relation to 
the National Curriculum.4 In the current inquiry, the Committee chose to focus on issues 
relevant to all schools rather than those that apply specifically to academies. 
3. It is difficult to draw the line between accountability and arrangements for school 
improvement. Although this Report is primarily concerned with the mechanisms of 
school accountability, we also discuss the processes which are in place to promote school 
improvement because the two areas are in some respects inextricably linked. We will not, 
however, undertake an exhaustive account of school improvement policy and practice as 
this is largely outside the remit of our inquiry. 
4. We issued our Terms of Reference and Call for Evidence on 18 December 2008. Since 
then, we have taken a broad range of evidence, both written and oral, on school 
accountability from a wide variety of stakeholders. In addition, we travelled to New York 
 
1 Testing and Assessment, Third Report of the Children, Schools and Families Committee, Session 2007–08, HC 169-I 
and HC 169-II 
2      National Curriculum, Fourth Report of the Children, Schools and Families Committee, Session 2008–09, HC 334-I 
and HC 334-II 
3      Curtis A., Exley S., Sasia A., Tough S., and Whitty G., The Academies programme: Progress, problems and 
possibilities, Sutton Trust and Institute of Education, University of London, December 2008 
4 National Curriculum, Fourth Report from the Committee, Session 2008–09, HC 344-I, paragraphs 70–75 
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and Washington, DC to see for ourselves how school accountability policy is formulated 
and practised at both federal and state level in the United States. New York uses a school 
report card as part of its accountability system, and it was the model to which the 
Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families referred when he announced the 
new school report card proposed by the Government for implementation in England.5  
We were grateful to the many organisations and individuals we met on our visit for being 
so generous with their time, views and information. They provided us with a broader 
context for our assessment of the strengths and weakness of the accountability system in 
England and helped us to formulate our views on the fundamental principles of 
accountability. The following paragraphs will outline the aspects of the school 
accountability system which we will consider in detail in this Report. 
Self-evaluation, School Improvement Partners and Local Authorities 
5. We start by considering the context in which schools operate. Schools are, first and 
foremost, responsible for their own improvement, with the governing body setting the 
strategic framework.6  In recent years, schools have increasingly been encouraged to 
formalise the self-evaluation process as part of their improvement strategy, culminating 
in the requirement by Ofsted that they provide a written self-evaluation form to 
inspectors as evidence of their work in this area. Schools are assisted in their self-
evaluation and improvement processes by School Improvement Partners (SIPs) who are 
appointed by the local authority. SIPs provide support and challenge to schools and help 
them to commission the services they need to improve their performance.  
6. School provision is commissioned by local authorities, who also have a remit to 
monitor local schools’ performance. Local authorities monitor the performance of 
schools in their area using a variety of sources of information, including the SIPs they 
appoint, data provided by the school and Ofsted inspection judgements. Local 
authorities often use informal mechanisms to challenge schools and support them in 
making necessary improvements. However, local authorities can, and sometimes must, 
use their statutory powers of intervention where there are concerns that a school is not 
performing to an expected standard.7 
The Inspectorate 
7. In this inquiry, we have focused on the work of Ofsted in the maintained schools 
sector and have not considered the work of other inspectorates, such as the Independent 
Schools Inspectorate. The remit of Ofsted was broadened significantly from 1 April 2007 
when it became The Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills. 
HM Chief Inspector is now responsible both for school inspection and for inspection of 
a very wide range of settings and services connected with children and skills more 
generally. We take regular evidence from HM Chief Inspector on the full range of her 
responsibilities. This Committee and its predecessor have published a series of evidence 
 
5 Statement by Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families to the House, HC Deb, 14 Oct 2008, Col 677 
6 DfES and Ofsted (2004) A New Relationship, our future with Schools: Improving Performance through School Self-
Evaluation; DCSF (June 2009) Your child, your schools: building a 21st century schools system, Cm 7588, para 4.1 
7 Local Authorities and School Improvement: The Use of Statutory Powers, NFER, March 2009 
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and reports setting out findings on the details of Ofsted’s work and practice.8  It is not 
intended, therefore, to duplicate some of this work here: this inquiry has focused more 
on whether a school inspectorate is a necessary component of an accountability system, 
what its role should be, what its aims should be and what outcomes should be expected. 
School inspection reports are a major source of information about a school’s 
performance, and inspection is often the trigger for a school to address its performance 
issues. It is in this context that we examine the role of the inspectorate in the 
accountability system.  
Achievement and Attainment Tables and the school report card  
8. Other major sources of information about schools are the Achievement and 
Attainment Tables, formerly known as performance tables, compiled and published by 
the Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF). The tables contain statistical 
information on the school cohort, test results, a contextual value added measure,9 a series 
of comparative annual data on test scores, statistics on absence, and statistics on pupils 
with special educational needs (SEN). The tables have been the subject of controversy for 
many years because, although they do not actually rank schools according to their 
performance in national examinations, they permit others, especially the media, to do 
so.10  This is considered unfair by those who argue that the Achievement and Attainment 
Tables in general, and test scores in particular, give only a partial view of a school’s 
overall performance.11  The Government’s proposal for a new school report card is an 
attempt to address this issue, amongst others, by providing more information on a wider 
range of performance indicators. We consider the consequences of the Achievement and 
Attainment Tables, how the school report card might change the accountability 
landscape, and how useful these tools are for parents and others who are interested in a 
school’s performance. 
Conclusion: complexity, consistency and coercion 
9. The final part of our analysis considers some cross-cutting issues which are relevant to 
all three of the preceding areas of discussion. A number of messages have emerged from 
the evidence submitted to this inquiry. First, the school accountability and improvement 
system has become extremely complex, with new programmes and policies emerging 
piecemeal from central government over a number of years to produce an intricate 
accountability system, with multiple lines of accountability to different bodies for 
different purposes. Linked to this is the impression that some major elements of the 
accountability system are giving conflicting messages, leading schools, parents and 
 
8 The most recent of these are: Oral and Written Evidence taken on 12 December 2007, 14 May 2008, 10 December 
2008 and 9 February 2009, published together as HC 70, Session 2008–09; Sixth Report of the Education and Skills 
Committee, Session 2006–07, HC 165. 
9 CVA is a measure which allows comparisons to be made between schools with differing intakes. Data derived 
from test results are adjusted to take account of prior attainment (hence ‘value added’) and ‘contextual’ factors 
such as gender, mobility and measures of deprivation. It is essentially a progression measure which shows how 
much actual progress a school has made with pupils with certain characteristics by comparison with the progress 
predicted for those pupils by the CVA model based on progress of pupils in all other schools. 
10 See, for example, the top 50 primary schools in England in 2008 as ranked by The Times at 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/multimedia/archive/00513/school_table_513406a.pdf  
11 See Testing and Assessment, Third Report of the Children, Schools and Families Committee, Session 2007–08, HC 
169-I and HC 169-II 
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others to worry about the consistency of the various mechanisms which are supposed to 
hold schools to account and support them towards better performance. Finally, schools 
are receiving mixed messages from the Government and Ofsted about who and what is 
driving school improvement. The language of self-evaluation and schools taking charge 
of their own improvement processes permeates many official documents, yet the reality 
is rather different. Schools in need of improvement are still subject to programmes 
devised and applied by central government through its agencies and have limited control 
over the improvement programmes to which they are subject.  
The need for an accountability system 
10. In setting the scene for this inquiry, the first, and most obvious, question is whether 
we need an accountability system at all. We found a general consensus in the evidence 
submitted to us that schools should be held accountable for their performance. We 
received no evidence from witnesses arguing that there should be no accountability 
system, nor have we received evidence arguing against an independent regulator charged 
with inspecting schools and reporting on standards. Indeed, there were some 
unfavourable references to the situation which obtained prior to the introduction of the 
National Curriculum, with its associated tests and performance reporting, introduced in 
the Education Reform Act 1988; and of the modern, centralised inspectorate, constituted 
under the Education (Schools) Act 1992.12  A survey of parents by the National 
Confederation of Parent Teacher Associations (NCPTA) found that 96% agreed that it 
was important for parents to know how well each school performs;  87% of parents 
wanted to be able to compare schools; and 90% wanted to be able to compare the 
performance of schools that were alike in terms of context, location and circumstances. 
78% thought that Ofsted inspections were of value to parents.13   
11. Many witnesses stated that it is appropriate that schools should be held accountable, 
not only for their academic standards, but also for their wider contributions, especially in 
terms of child welfare and the Every Child Matters outcomes.14  The NCPTA survey 
found that 78% of parents considered test results to be an important measure of school 
performance, but 96% wanted test results to be part of a wider range of information, 
including pupil health and other outcomes.15   
12. It is worth noting the reasons given in the evidence for having an accountability 
system. Many witnesses stated that the fact that schools were funded with public money 
and provided an important public service was reason enough that they should be held 
publicly accountable.16  The NASUWT echoed the views of other witnesses in saying 
that: 
 
12 Q 145; Q 146 
13 Ev 34 App 1 
14 Audit Commission response to DCSF/Ofsted consultation on the School Report Card, para 7; Ev 185; Ev 187; Ev 62; 
Ev 113; Ev 190; Ev 146; these outcomes were introduced in the eponymous green paper published by the 
Government in September 2003 and have achieved wide significance in children’s services ever since. The 
outcomes are: being healthy, staying safe, enjoying and achieving, making a positive contribution, and economic 
well-being. 
15 Ev 34 App 1 
16 Mathematics in Education and Industry; Ev 176; Ev 9; Ev 187; Ev 113; Ev 189; Ev 145; Q 1; Q 2 
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As a publicly-funded universal state service, the education system is held and 
managed in the public interest and must, therefore, be accountable at national and 
local level to those democratically elected by the public. 
In a similar vein, Keith Bartley, Chief Executive of the General Teaching Council for 
England (GTCE), told us that: 
Education is a major public service affecting the life chances of every child and 
young person, and it must therefore be held to public account.17 
This last statement also points towards other justifications for the accountability system, 
which look to its purposes over and above the basic proposition that public services 
ought to be run properly. Schools are viewed as providing a critical public service in that 
they are concerned with the fundamentally important task of educating and shaping 
children and young people. For this reason, public accountability is seen as the means by 
which to secure the standards of service which are considered necessary to assure the 
welfare of pupils and the best possible educational and social outcomes for individuals.18  
However, the current accountability system remains focused on test results and 
contextual value added measures derived from them. Even Ofsted places heavy emphasis 
on test results when coming to an inspection judgement. The accountability system will 
require significant development and reform before it is to move beyond the current, 
academic attainment-based system and become broad enough to take significant account 
of the welfare of and outcomes for pupils, as suggested in the 21st Century Schools White 
Paper.19 
13. The final group of justifications for a school accountability system focuses more 
specifically on school improvement than on pupil outcomes. Put another way, 
accountability mechanisms are a means to draw attention to the need for improvement 
and to unlock the available resources for supporting that improvement. The Royal 
Statistical Society presented a vision of an accountability system which supported teacher 
and school improvement rather than identifying failure. It stated: 
Every child needs to attend a good school so a key purpose of the accountability 
system should be to identify what schools need to improve and what support (if 
any) they require.20  
The GTCE considered that, given the resources necessarily invested in meeting 
accountability requirements, an accountability framework should serve both the aims of 
scrutiny and practice improvement.21  Ofsted explained its role in the current system as 
inspecting and regulating in order to promote excellence and considers that it has been 
 
17 Q 1 
18 Ev 170; Ev 171; Audit Commission response to Ofsted consultation A focus on improvement: proposals for 
maintained school inspections from September 2009; Ev 183; Ev 62; Ev 114;  
19 Your child, your schools, our future, Cm 7588, DCSF, chapter 4 
20 Ev 180 
21 Ev 2 
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successful in this respect in that the proportion of good and outstanding schools, as 
judged by Ofsted, has increased from 59% in 2005–06 to 64% in 2007–08.22   
14. However, we should maintain a clear distinction between the accountability of a 
school for its performance and the consequences of its being held to account which, 
according to many witnesses, should include improvements in school performance, 
pupil well-being and outcomes. Insofar as these latter considerations are used as a 
justification for an accountability system, it is very much a functional, rather than a 
principled, justification. 
15. We are satisfied that schools should be held publicly accountable for their 
performance as providers of an important public service. We concur with the views 
expressed in evidence to us that the two major consequences of the accountability 
system should be school improvement and improvement in broader outcomes for 
children and young people, including well-being. 
16. If there has been broad consensus in principle on the need for an accountability 
system which leads to school improvement and enhanced well-being and other 
outcomes for pupils, there has been considerable disagreement about the details of how 
the accountability system should work and the precise effect the current system has on 
schools. In the next section, we outline the current accountability system, before moving 
on in the following chapters to consider in turn the different elements of that system. 
Overview of the accountability system 
17. Prior to the major reforms of the education system started in the late 1980s, schools 
were largely responsible for their own curricula and national testing was limited to the 
16+ age group. Inspection was carried out by Local Education Authority-employed 
inspectors. In 1988, the Education Reform Act started a process of  centralisation of the 
schools system by introducing the National Curriculum and allowing for national testing 
at regular intervals for younger children and associated national performance reporting 
on the basis of these test results. Later, the Education (Schools) Act 1992 reformed the 
inspectorate into a national institution under Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Schools in 
England. The Chief Inspector’s office became known as Ofsted and it has overseen a 
national set of standards across England ever since. 
The New Relationship with Schools 
18. The recent background to the current school accountability system is largely 
provided by the Government’s New Relationship with Schools reforms, introduced in 
2004.23  The centralisation of the schools system had, over time, produced an increasingly 
complex system of regulation and requirements for schools. As a result of this, the 
Government stated that, under the New Relationship with Schools:  
 
22 Ev 114; Ev 115 
23 DfES and Ofsted (2004) A New Relationship with Schools 
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We set ourselves the task of delivering an intelligent accountability framework, a 
simplified school improvement process and improved data and information 
systems.24   
19. In essence, the New Relationship with Schools was intended to help schools raise 
standards, with clearer priorities and less bureaucracy, and to provide more information 
for parents. It was also intended to support schools as they implemented the Every Child 
Matters agenda, facilitating schools’ involvement with local children’s trusts and helping 
schools adapt to the multi-agency working and joint-commissioning structures being 
put in place. Major points of the New Relationship with Schools were: 
• School Improvement Partners (SIPs): introduced to help school leaders to evaluate 
their school’s performance, identify priorities for improvement and draw up  
improvement plans. 
• The reduction of unnecessary bureaucracy: multi-year school budgets were 
introduced, with fewer distinct funding streams, to promote greater certainty and 
predictability for schools in their future funding. Schools were allowed to produce a 
single school plan to use for multiple purposes. The monthly mailing of paper to 
schools was stopped and a more modern system of communication put in place. 
• Building the capacity of schools to drive their own improvement: more emphasis was 
placed on self-evaluation, which was to form the basis for planning, inspection and 
SIPs’ work with schools. Schools were required to ensure that their approach to self-
evaluation was appropriate. To this end, the DfES and Ofsted jointly published high-
level guidance for schools, A New Relationship with Schools: Improving performance 
through school self-evaluation and development planning. The Implementation 
Review Unit also published guidance on completing the self-evaluation form. 
• Establishing a more intelligent, coherent, evidence-based accountability framework. 
This included the goal of providing to parents and the general public a broad and 
balanced view of a school. The chosen tool was the new School Profile, which 
combined standardised data with a school’s description of its own work. The School 
Profile was intended to replace the need for the statutory requirements for governors 
to hold an annual meeting with parents and to produce an annual report to parents. 
In addition, given that the School Profile was supposed to promote a balanced 
picture of a school, the requirements for the school prospectus were simplified to 
allow greater flexibility over what was included. 
• Making better use of data: use of the latest electronic data and information systems 
was intended to make interpretation of pupils’ progress fairer and reflect the context 
of the school. These systems were also intended to help schools make contact more 
easily with other practitioners to support individual children with additional needs. 
• Securing better alignment between schools’ priorities and the priorities of local and 
central government.25 
 
24 DfES and Ofsted (2004) A New Relationship with Schools, p1 
25 DfES and Ofsted (2004) A New Relationship with Schools 
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20. The New Relationship with Schools was also meant to facilitate schools’ involvement 
with local children’s trusts and help schools adapt to the multi-agency working and joint-
commissioning structures being put in place under the Every Child Matters: Change for 
Children programme.26  The Common Assessment Framework being introduced under 
that programme was intended to help schools to identify their role in meeting pupils’ 
needs and to target referral to other specialist services when needed. Schools would be 
able to work with local children’s trusts to find places for hard-to-place pupils. In that 
sense, the New Relationship with Schools was intended to support the five Every Child 
Matters outcomes for all children: 
• being healthy; 
• staying safe; 
• enjoying and achieving; 
• making a positive contribution; and 
• achieving economic well-being. 
21. The elements of the New Relationship with Schools which pertain to inspection were 
backed up with the necessary primary legislation under the Education Act 2005. This 
inspection framework has been operational since September 2005 and is the system to 
which most evidence submitted to this inquiry refers. The 2005 regime introduced 
shorter and more regular inspections, known as Section 5 inspections;27 shorter notice of 
inspection; and an inspection time of no more than two days. In addition, more 
emphasis was placed on a school’s self-evaluation which, since 2005, has formed part of 
the evidence base which a school must provide to inspectors as part of the inspection. 
The categories of schools causing concern were simplified, so that a school would either 
be placed in special measures or be issued with notice to improve. The stated aim of this 
regime was to lighten the burden on schools while retaining a rigorous inspection 
system.  
22. Despite the aim of simplification underlying the New Relationship with Schools, the 
Government has nevertheless introduced myriad initiatives over the intervening years 
which were aimed at specific problems. Many of these have been delivered through the 
National Strategies, set up in 1998 as a professional development programme, but 
expanded since to cover a wide remit which includes support for and initiatives aimed at 
school improvement. A high-profile example of such an initiative is the National 
Challenge, a programme which targets schools which fall below the threshold of 30% of 
pupils achieving five A*–C grades at GCSE (including English and mathematics). The 
large number of new initiatives has led to the charge that accountability mechanisms 
operating on schools have become overly complex, leaving school leaders and others 
confused about which, sometimes conflicting, measures they should focus on, where the 
 
26 Department for Education and Skills (2004) Every Child Matters: Change for Children 
27 Under the previous regime, inspections had been longer and were carried out at four- and then six-yearly 
intervals. 
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most suitable help might be available, and which initiatives are effective in promoting 
school improvement.28   
23. Professor Peter Tymms of Durham University pointed to another aspect of this 
problem of complexity which goes to the heart of policy-making. He told us that the 
questions set out in the call for evidence to this inquiry were “vital to the future of our 
educational system” but that satisfactory answers to these questions would be difficult to 
achieve, “given our present state of knowledge”. He argued that the true consequences of 
using certain measures such as test scores and CVA for accountability purposes were 
impossible to ascertain: 
This is because so many other things are happening simultaneously in our society 
and in our schools. There have been numerous initiatives: inspections have 
changed, the nature of the tests has changed, the population of school children has 
changed and so on. We are seeing changes in the schools but what has caused 
what? We simply cannot know, and that is a problem that faces us nationally and 
internationally.29 
He urges policy makers to take an experimental approach to reform, testing different 
initiatives systematically in order to ascertain the precise effects they have on the 
education system. This would allow policies to be formulated on the basis of firm 
evidence of what works and what is less effective.30 
24. The New Relationship with Schools policy was a laudable attempt by the 
Government to simplify the school accountability system, particularly in relation to 
inspection. However, the Government has continued to subject schools to a 
bewildering array of new initiatives and this has in many ways negated the good work 
started in New Relationship with Schools.  
The 21st Century Schools White Paper and the new Ofsted inspection 
framework for 2009 
25. The Government’s recent 21st Century Schools White Paper sets out the 
Government’s current proposals for reform of the schools system and details plans in a 
number of different areas:   
• preparing children for the challenges of the 21st Century; 
• excellent teaching and additional help for children who need it; 
• partnership working for schools; 
• strong school accountability and rapid intervention where necessary; 
• the roles of local and central government in supporting and challenging schools; and 
 
28 Ev 170; Ev 186; Q 79; Q 144 
29 Ev 170 
30 Ev 170 
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• the provision of a skilled workforce with good leadership.31 
For those parts of the White Paper concerned with accountability and school 
improvement, the Government’s starting position is that every school is responsible for 
its own improvement and should be seeking to improve continuously. The Government 
wishes to move towards a “more differentiated approach, in which every school receives 
tailored challenge and support”, to which end it proposes further reform of the 
accountability system with increased emphasis on progression in attainment and the 
wider aspects of school performance.32  The essential components of the accountability 
regime under the proposed reforms are school self-evaluation, the school report card, 
Ofsted inspection and School Improvement Partners. The associated mechanisms are 
represented in Figure 1.33 
Figure 1 
 
Source: DCSF (June 2009) Your child, your schools: building a 21st century schools system, Cm 7588, p61 
26. There have already been some moves towards a “differentiated approach” and the 
White Paper gives the example of the secondary school improvement strategy Promoting 
Excellence for All, published in June 2008. Within this strategy: the National Challenge is 
applied to schools with GCSE results which do not meet the minimum standard of 30% 
of pupils achieving five A*–C grades at GCSE including English and maths; and Gaining 
Ground addresses those schools whose pupils’ achievement is above this threshold but 
who “are not making fast enough progress”.34 
 
31 DCSF (June 2009) Your child, your schools: building a 21st century schools system, Cm 7588 
32 DCSF (June 2009) Your child, your schools: building a 21st century schools system, Cm 7588, p55 
33 DCSF (June 2009) Your child, your schools: building a 21st century schools system, Cm 7588, para 4.19 
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27. The White Paper proposes a further range of initiatives aimed at school 
improvement, including: 
• The Good and Great Schools programme: to include ‘open door’ visits so that schools 
can learn from each other’s good practice; help for local authorities and schools to 
establish local groups to share expertise and key staff, and develop centres of 
excellence; and work with key stakeholders to build on the High Performing 
Specialist Schools programme to identify and reward the best schools. Consultation 
on these proposals will start in autumn 2009.35 
• Investigation into the causes of high in-school variance and volatility in performance. 
Work with some local authorities and schools to develop a voluntary collaborative 
programme to address these issues will begin in autumn 2009.36 
• More focus on primary schools which, whilst performing at or above the minimum 
target standard, show poor rates of progression or inconsistent results. Local 
authorities will be asked to develop tailored plans for primary school improvement 
and schools will be encouraged to work in partnership, with the best schools assisting 
others to improve. Relevant existing programmes will be expanded to help with 
primary school improvement.37 
• Extension of the Families of Schools approach nationally.38  This is intended to 
encourage schools to visit each other and share best practice.39 
28. The White Paper states that the Department will largely cease to provide or fund 
directly the provision of school improvement support. The Department will assure a 
sufficient supply of improvement support from a range of different providers across the 
country. Individual schools will be enabled to identify for themselves, on the basis of self-
evaluation and advice from their School Improvement Partner (SIP), the type of support 
they require and the resources they intend to invest.40  The current, central contract for 
National Strategies will not be renewed and the funding will be delegated to schools; and 
it is intended that they, with their SIPs, will use it to invest in improving literacy, 
numeracy and other core skills.41  The current centralised support for certain subject 
areas will continue only where there is a need for it, for example, to address a national 
shortage of teachers in a particular subject. Funding will be devolved where possible, in 
accordance with the new model, as current contracts come up for renewal.42 
 
35 Your child, your schools, our future, DCSF, Cm 7588, para 4.3 
36 Your child, your schools, our future, DCSF, Cm 7588, para 4.4 
37 The Improving Schools Programme, the Leading Teacher programme and the Local Leaders of Education 
programme; paras 4.5–4.7 
38 Families of Schools is currently operating in City Challenge areas and groups schools according to prior 
attainment and socio-economic factors, enabling them to draw comparisons and share good practice with schools 
in similar circumstances 
39 Your child, your schools, our future, DCSF, Cm 7588, para 4.10 
40 Your child, your schools, our future, DCSF, Cm 7588, paras 4.8–4.9 
41 Your child, your schools, our future, DCSF, Cm 7588, para 4.11 
42 Your child, your schools, our future, DCSF, Cm 7588, para 4.12 
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29. To draw all of these measures together, the White Paper states that local authorities 
will be asked to draw up a costed menu of school improvement support services to cover 
all five Every Child Matters outcomes. The range of services should take into account the 
particular needs of local schools. The commissioning and brokering of support from a 
range of providers would gradually replace the employment of local consultants; and  
schools and SIPs would then be able to choose which services they require, regardless of 
provider.43 Irrespective of the possible merits of this proposal, it seems to us that there is 
a distinct risk that it will add complexity to the process of school improvement and could 
place new burdens on local authorities. 
30. The Government states that, under the proposed reforms, externally-marked, 
national tests will remain central to the accountability system. Primary schools will be 
judged on Key Stage 2 test results (or single-level tests if, as intended, they replace Key 
Stage 2 tests) and secondary schools will be judged on their GCSE and Diploma results.44  
These performance measures have, until now, been reported in the Achievement and 
Attainment Tables. However, it is intended that these will be replaced by the school 
report card as the main source of accountability information from 2011. The school 
report card will set out the key outcomes expected of schools, to include pupil 
attainment, progress and wellbeing; reducing the impact of disadvantage; parents’ and 
pupils’ perceptions of the school and the support they receive; and, possibly, partnership 
working.45  The legal requirement on schools to produce a School Profile, introduced 
under the New Relationship with Schools reforms, will be removed with the introduction 
of the school report card.46 
31. It is envisaged that the school report card and Ofsted inspection report will be 
“complementary and different evaluations of the school’s work”.47  DCSF and Ofsted are 
working together to establish a consistent set of priorities for schools which will be 
reflected in the school report card, Ofsted inspection report and school self-evaluation 
form (SEF). The school report card will present quantitative information on an annual 
basis; the normally less frequent Ofsted report will present more qualitative information 
resulting from an inspection which is a snapshot of a school’s performance. The latest 
Ofsted judgement will be reported on the school report card.48 
32. These proposed reforms tie in with Ofsted’s new inspection framework, which took 
effect in September 2009.49  This new framework applies to school provision for all age 
groups up to age 19, including all maintained schools, Academies, City Technology 
 
43 Your child, your schools, our future, DCSF, Cm 7588, para 4.13 
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46 Your child, your schools, our future, DCSF, Cm 7588, para 4.24 
47 Your child, your schools, our future, DCSF, Cm 7588, para 4.27 
48 Your child, your schools, our future, DCSF, Cm 7588, paras 4.26–4.27 
49 Ofsted (July 2009) The framework for the inspection in England under section 5 of the Education Act 2005, from 
September 2009 
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Colleges, City Colleges for the Technology of the Arts and some non-maintained special 
schools in England.50   
33. The new framework is intended to focus inspection resources where they are most 
needed. It extends the principle of proportionality, in that frequency of inspection will be 
proportionate to the need for inspection according to measures of past and present 
performance, including the result of a school’s previous inspection and annual 
assessments of subsequent performance:   
• Schools judged good or outstanding in the previous Ofsted inspection will, subject to 
certain exceptions, be inspected at approximately five-year intervals. Ofsted will 
produce an interim report if a school is not to be inspected within a three-year 
period.  
• Schools judged satisfactory at the previous inspection will be inspected within a 
three-year period and about 40% of satisfactory schools will be subject to additional 
monitoring inspections to check on progress.  
• Schools previously judged inadequate will either have been placed in ‘special 
measures’ or given ‘notice to improve’. They will receive monitoring visits and will be 
re-inspected following a specified period.51     
34. Schools will receive between zero and two days’ notice of inspection; no notice is 
given of monitoring visits.52  Before inspection, inspectors brief themselves with a range 
of information about the school, including previous inspection reports, the school’s self-
evaluation, Contextual Value Added data, and examination and survey data. Inspections 
will not normally last more than two days and more emphasis is now being placed on 
classroom observation than has been the case under the previous framework.53 
35. If the goal of simplifying the accountability system under New Relationship with 
Schools was never quite achieved, that goal is arguably even further away under the 
proposals in the White Paper. Even if the School Improvement Partner remains central 
to the accountability system, the sheer diversity of programmes inherent in the “more 
differentiated approach” signalled in the White Paper presents a barrier to simplicity.  
36. We are concerned that the Government’s 21st Century Schools White Paper 
signals even greater complexity in an already overly complex system of school 
accountability and improvement initiatives. There is a real danger that schools may 
become overwhelmed by the intricacies of the proposed reforms and that School 
Improvement Partners and local authorities may not have sufficient time or 
resources to mediate effectively between schools and the myriad providers of school 
improvement support. 
 
50 Early Years provision is inspected under the Childcare Act 2006 and is not considered part of this inquiry, 
although such provision within a school is inspected by Ofsted at the same time as provision for older children 
under the Education Act 2005. 
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2 Schools’ Self-Evaluation, Self-
Improvement Partners and Local 
Authorities  
37. We start by considering the context in which schools operate. Both the New 
Relationship with Schools and the 21st Century Schools White Paper underscore the 
position that schools are, first and foremost, responsible for their own improvement, so 
that teachers and governing bodies work together to assure the standards of performance 
attained by their school.54  Self-evaluation, supported by School Improvement Partners 
(SIPs), is meant to be a fundamental part of a school’s management processes, to the 
extent that evidence of the self-evaluation must now be submitted to Ofsted to be 
considered as part of the inspection. As well as assisting with a school’s self-evaluation, 
local authority-appointed SIPs provide support and challenge to help the school improve 
its performance and to commission the necessary services to assist in that goal.  
38. Local authorities have a remit to monitor local schools’ performance using a variety 
of sources of information, including the SIPs they appoint, data provided by the school 
and Ofsted inspection judgements. Local authorities may use informal mechanisms to 
challenge schools and support them in making necessary improvements, but they also 
have statutory powers of intervention where there are concerns that a school is not 
performing to an expected standard.55  These issues are discussed in greater detail below. 
School governance 
39. The National Governors’ Association states that governing bodies are currently the 
front line in school governance, as school accountability is “fully devolved to school 
level”.56  Section 21 of the Education Act 2002 provides that the conduct of a maintained 
school shall be under the direction of its governing body and that the governing body 
shall conduct the school “with a view to promoting high standards of educational 
achievement”. The governing body sets the vision, values and aims for its school and is 
responsible for setting the strategic framework, then monitoring and evaluating the 
progress of this strategy. The governing body appoints and performance manages the 
headteacher, who is responsible for the executive functions of the school, within the 
framework set by its governors.57  In this sense, the headteacher is accountable to the 
governing body for the performance of the school. The SIP oversees the performance 
management process. 
40. Despite the crucial role played by the governing body, we were told that governing 
bodies are not always involved fully in accountability and improvement processes 
 
54 DfES and Ofsted (2004) A New Relationship with Schools: Improving Performance through School Self-Evaluation; 
DCSF (June 2009) Your child, your schools, our future: building a 21st century schools system, Cm 7588, para 4.1 
55 NFER (March 2009) Local Authorities and School Improvement: The Use of Statutory Powers 
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57 DCSF (April 2009) A guide to the law for school governors, at 
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external to the school. For example, the National Governors’ Association cites highly 
variable practices by both SIPs and local authorities in relation to the degree to which 
governing bodies are involved in decisions and the information they provide direct to 
governing bodies. Ofsted has also been criticised for not involving governing bodies in 
the inspection process to an appropriate degree, and there are concerns that this 
situation may become worse with any increase in no-notice inspections under the 2009 
inspection framework.58  Even HM Chief Inspector acknowledges that this is an issue 
about which Ofsted is “thinking hard”.59  The National Governors’ Association believes 
that all the other organisations involved with school accountability should recognise the 
governing body as the primary accountable body and involve it fully in the school 
improvement process.60 
41. However, it was put to us that governing bodies are not always well equipped to deal 
with the complexities of accountability and school improvement. The Local Government 
Association argued that “the complexity and analysis around performance management 
can be an area not well understood by governing bodies”, and it expressed concern over 
the quality and capability of some governors in relation to difficult areas such as 
safeguarding, SEN pupils and employment.61  The Audit Commission noted that 
governors and headteachers are responsible for large budgets and are in need of ongoing 
training to enhance financial management skills.62  Where training for governors is 
available, the level of take-up can be low and there is currently no requirement for 
governors to undertake any training. To a certain extent, a School Improvement Partner 
(SIP) who is engaged and working closely with a school and its governing body can 
mitigate some of these problems. The National Governors’ Association told us that:  
The role of the SIP is vital to [governing bodies] who need the professional input 
for validating judgements. [Governing bodies] can also be less than realistic about 
the impact of unexpected results and CVA scores which fail to improve, offering 
reasons which stray into the realm of excuses. … some can lack the confidence to 
insist that regular updates on the quality of teaching are made available, and to 
challenge the head on the appropriateness of the curriculum.63 
42. Several witnesses have described a vision of effective accountability which relies on 
strong intra-school accountability.64  However, such a vision is difficult to realise if 
governing bodies are lacking in the requisite skills. In addition, as recognised in the 21st 
Century Schools White Paper, there are concerns about the number of vacancies for 
volunteer governors on schools’ governing bodies.65  In particular, schools classified as 
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“causing concern”, which are possibly most in need of strong governance, can find it 
difficult to attract governors of sufficient calibre to help with the improvement process.66   
43. The 21st Century Schools White Paper acknowledges the importance of school 
governors in improving school performance by holding headteachers to account. The 
Government intends to enshrine in legislation a governing body’s duty to ensure the 
education, development and wider well-being of the school’s pupils; to promote the 
education, development and wider well-being of all children in their area; and to support 
the needs of the wider community.67  In addition, the White Paper proposes improved 
governor training and more highly-skilled governing bodies, advised by a trained clerk, 
in order to raise the standard of school governance. All chairs of governing bodies will be 
expected to have specific training for this role. The existing rules on the composition of 
governing bodies will be relaxed to allow for more flexibility.68   
44. We expressed concern to the Minister for Schools and Learners, Vernon Coaker MP, 
that adding to the responsibilities of governors and increasing the training requirements 
would exacerbate the current problems with recruitment of governors. The Minister 
accepted this concern to a certain extent, but he considered that the proposals in the 
White Paper would make governors feel more valued than they do at present. He 
undertook to encourage governors, praise them for their good work and, thereby, put the 
role of governor in a positive light in order to encourage recruitment.69 
45. We note that Ofsted is actively considering ways of involving governing bodies 
more in the inspection process, particularly where inspections are conducted without 
notice. However, it would have been preferable had the 2009 inspection framework 
been introduced following a satisfactory resolution of this issue. We recommend that 
Ofsted bring forward at the earliest opportunity firm proposals setting out how 
governing bodies will be appropriately involved in all inspections. 
46. The proposals set out in the Government’s 21st Century Schools White Paper place 
additional burdens on governors in terms of both responsibility and training. Given the 
serious concerns which exist in relation to the recruitment of governors, these proposals 
have the potential to deter individuals who may otherwise consider volunteering as a 
school governor. In particular, potential governors may be daunted by the introduction 
of statutory duties relating to matters outside their immediate control, including duties 
in relation to all children in their area, not just those on the school roll, and the needs of 
the wider local community outside their school.  
47. We urge the Government to reconsider the proposals to place additional statutory 
duties on governors. We support the principle of better training for governors, but 
we recommend that the Government set out a detailed strategy for encouraging 
governors to take up training opportunities without training requirements becoming 
a barrier to recruitment. 
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Self-evaluation 
48. All systems designed to assess school quality are constantly striving for the 
appropriate balance between internal and external evaluation. At one extreme is the view 
that only schools have the detailed knowledge to assess their own performance; at the 
other extreme is the view that only an external, objective body can provide a true picture 
of school performance. Professor John MacBeath, Chair of Educational Leadership at the 
University of Cambridge, has written that most commentators and policy makers now 
see the ideal as a combination of strong self-evaluation with rigorous external support 
and challenge, sensitive to the school’s context and he told us that this is the model which 
he, himself, advocates.70  He sees true self-evaluation as: 
… a continuing process of reflection which is implicit in the way people (teachers, 
students and administrators) think and talk about their work and what they do to 
make their practice explicit and discussable. … schools that are able to take charge 
of change, rather than being controlled by it, are more effective and improve more 
rapidly than ones that are not.71 
49. At the heart of the New Relationship with Schools agenda for school accountability 
and improvement was the school’s self-evaluation. This was conceived as a process 
integrated into a school’s management systems. A school produces a self-evaluation 
document as evidence for this process, either the standard Self-Evaluation Form (SEF) 
provided by Ofsted or a form of the school’s choosing. The self-evaluation was intended 
to assist the school in managing its own improvement; to form a starting point for Ofsted 
inspection of the school; and to provide a focus for ongoing engagement with the local 
authority-appointed SIP. In essence, the increased emphasis on self-evaluation 
represented the stated intention to make schools more responsible for their own 
improvement and, as such, was central to the New Relationship with Schools agenda.72   
50. An evaluation of the New Relationship with Schools programme published in 2008 
found that improved self-evaluation by schools had resulted in better assessments of 
performance and understanding of the necessary steps to address areas of 
underperformance. The evaluation report found that there was still some need, 
particularly in the primary sector, to develop further skills in relation to data use and self-
evaluation. Some progress had been made towards the engagement of middle managers 
and teaching staff in the improvement process, but more work was required in this area. 
In addition, the evaluation report identified some good progress in terms of engaging 
pupils and parents in the improvement process but, again, more work was needed. It 
concluded that schools should also focus more on developing more accurate judgements 
and producing evaluative rather than descriptive self-evaluation forms.73  
51. Ofsted has also noted sustained improvement in the effectiveness of schools’ self-
evaluation. HM Chief Inspector noted in her report of 2007–08 that the quality of self-
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evaluations was good or outstanding in 72% of maintained schools. This compared with 
only 30% ten years ago.74  She continued: 
Settings that can identify honestly and clearly their strengths and weaknesses are 
likely to be well placed to identify their most important priorities and from these to 
bring about improvement.75 
52. There is considerable support in the evidence for the proposition that self-evaluation 
is a highly effective mechanism for school improvement if it is robust, honest and 
continuous.76  The GTCE believed that, if schools could demonstrate that they were 
adept at self-assessment, they could make an increasingly strong case for taking more 
control in terms of setting their own priorities.77  The GTCE supports the prospect that 
school improvement should, over time, rely less on external inspection and more on the 
self-evaluation process, quality assured with a light touch by Ofsted; and it welcomes the 
progress that has been made in this direction.78  
53. We are persuaded that self-evaluation—as an iterative, reflexive and continuous 
process, embedded in the culture of a school—is a highly effective means for a school 
to consolidate success and secure improvement across the full range of its activities. It 
is applicable, not just to its academic performance, but across the full range of a 
school’s influence over the well-being of the children who learn there and the 
community outside.  
54. However, there is strong evidence that the stated intention of the New Relationship 
with Schools programme to make schools more responsible for their own improvement 
may have been subverted by the standard SEF (self-evaluation form) provided by Ofsted. 
Ofsted’s SEF is not compulsory, but it is used by “the very large majority of schools”.79  
The SEF is intended to make inspection a more collaborative process, yet Professor John 
MacBeath and others argued that it does not amount to true self-evaluation but rather a 
tick-box exercise, top-down, rigid and laborious. Professor MacBeath has expressed 
concern that the SEF has “reinforced the conception of self-evaluation as a major, and 
often disruptive, event rather than an ongoing seamless process”. Many headteachers 
considered the SEF mandatory, despite guidelines stating that schools were free to 
choose their own approach. There existed schools with a long tradition of robust self-
evaluation, but even many of these eventually felt compelled to conform to the Ofsted 
SEF.80  John Bangs, Assistant Secretary for Education, Equality and Professional 
Development of the NUT, reinforced the point that there are only a small number of 
schools with the confidence to move beyond the SEF and be creative in the presentation 
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of the self-evaluation.81  Professor MacBeath has described the contrast between true self-
evaluation and the kind of ritualised process symbolised by adherence to the SEF as 
follows: 
[Self-evaluation] understands the iterative relationship between classroom life and 
school life, and between school learning and out-of-school learning. It recognises 
that students’ learning and teachers’ learning are integrally connected and that 
teachers’ learning feeds from, and feeds into, organisational learning. It is this 
complexity and dynamic that is the missing ingredient in ritualised and formulaic 
approaches to self-evaluation, the box-ticking and form-filling that makes it such 
an onerous and tedious process for teachers and school leaders.82 
55. The National Governors’ Association stated that self-evaluation was becoming 
embedded in school practice but that schools feel that they are required to spend a lot of 
time evidencing their judgements, meaning that they have less time to evaluate impact. 
The NASUWT told us that a significant bureaucratic burden is attached to the collection 
of evidence to justify self-evaluations for the purposes of inspection; and that this gives 
rise to a culture of “self-inspection involving inappropriate, intrusive and unnecessary 
managerial scrutiny of teachers’ professional practice”. The NUT agreed that self-
evaluation has, in effect, become self-inspection according to criteria laid down by 
Ofsted, rather than a liberating and constructive process of gathering information about 
life and learning in school and planning for the future.83  The NUT told us that: 
Such an approach is a long way from the model which has captured the 
imaginations of teachers and local authorities. … 
Whilst appearing to adopt self evaluation, as advocated by the Union, OFSTED are 
using this in a negative and punitive way.84 
56. In a similar vein, the Association of School and College Leaders (ASCL) argued that 
self-evaluation had been undermined by the SEF, which it viewed as having been 
imposed on schools and “increasingly subverted to provide extra accountability”. The 
ASCL stated that: 
Self-improvement has been obstructed by a fixation on categorising schools as 
failing in various ways, leading to a culture of fear which stifles creativity and leads 
instead to mere compliance.85 
Keith Bartley, Chief Executive of the General Teaching Council for England (GTCE) 
explained how he thought the SEF subverted the true goals of self-evaluation and led 
schools down the wrong path: 
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… excessive accountability contains mutually contradictory evaluation criteria, 
and some of the restrictiveness around the SEF starts to go towards that territory. 
It contains performance standards that extend beyond established good practice 
and that invite subversive behaviour and goal displacement. It is that latter area in 
which the restrictive nature of the SEF takes schools towards unintended 
conclusions or an inability to set out their own store in the language that they 
would use.86 
57. In fairness, Ofsted has emphasised in guidance, reiterated by the Chief Inspector in 
public, that the SEF is not a mandatory format for self-evaluation.87  Professor MacBeath 
described to us the work of the children and staff at a school in Sheffield who had 
produced a DVD evidencing the quality of learning, school culture and leadership, and 
he used this as an example of what is possible “when the school has genuine ownership 
of self-evaluation”.88  He was clear that such evidence was acceptable to Ofsted in place of 
the SEF.89  When we asked the Chief Inspector about this issue, she was clear that the SEF 
itself was not a process of self-evaluation, it was the outcome of that process. Schools did 
not have to fill in the SEF. Nevertheless, she did say that 95% do use the SEF and added 
that “I think that it would be a brave decision not to fill it in”.90  The new inspection 
framework specifies that “Schools are strongly encouraged to record the outcomes of 
their self-evaluation in Ofsted’s online self-evaluation form (SEF) for schools, whose 
structure matches that of the evaluation schedule of judgements for school inspections”. 
It seems, therefore, that although the SEF is not mandatory, Ofsted has a strong 
preference for schools to use that format, at least in part because it follows the structure 
of their evaluation schedule. 
58. We are concerned that Ofsted is giving mixed messages about schools’ self-evaluation 
and the role of the standard SEF provided by Ofsted. The SEF may be a useful starting 
point for schools who are not sufficiently confident to create their own form of evidence. 
However, the functional convenience of a SEF constructed to mirror the evaluation 
schedules used by inspectors is not a good enough reason to indulge in wholesale 
distortion of a process which should be fundamental to a school’s internal management 
processes. It is clear to us that schools who are most adept at the self-evaluation process 
and most successful at improving their performance are those who own the self-
evaluation process and make it work for them. 
59. We believe that Ofsted should do more to encourage schools to be creative and 
produce evidence of the self-evaluation process which works for them and speaks to 
the true culture and ethos of their own school. Ofsted should ensure that its own 
inspection processes are flexible enough to accommodate and give appropriate 
weight to alternative forms of evidence of self-evaluation. 
60. Even if the SEF is not a mandatory format in which to submit the self-evaluation, the 
objections to the way in which self-evaluation is treated within the context of an 
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inspection remain. Witnesses have suggested to us alternative approaches, which 
recalibrate the balance between true self-evaluation and Ofsted inspection. Research by 
the National Foundation for Educational Research (NFER) found that schools perceived 
the main benefit of inspection as providing external confirmation of the schools’ self-
evaluations and, indeed, the NFER found a high degree of consistency between schools’ 
views of their own effectiveness and Ofsted’s judgement of the same.91  The NUT stated 
that self-evaluation should be at the heart of the accountability system, fully integrated 
into systems for supporting teaching and learning, with external inspection used as a 
means of evaluating a school’s definitions of its own successes, performance and 
development plan.  
61. The National Association of Head Teachers (NAHT) considered that, if a school’s 
self-evaluation is robust and valued by the inspectorate, then inspections “will become 
effectively moderation procedures with recommendations”. If, on the other hand, self-
evaluation is not trusted and valued by the inspectorate, more time and resources will be 
required to allow for a re-examination of every aspect of a school’s performance.92  The 
NAHT stated that schools find it very disheartening when a self-evaluation, which has 
taken considerable time and effort, is disregarded by inspectors and too much emphasis 
is placed on contextual value-added data (CVA) and test scores.93   
62. The ATL considered that self-evaluation should be validated locally and provide the 
main mechanism for school improvement.94  Martin Johnson, Deputy General  Secretary 
of the Association of Teachers and Lecturers (ATL), emphasised that the ATL saw self-
evaluation as a major factor in effective performance management, but only if it were a 
self-reflective process owned by the whole staff rather than an “exercise conducted for a 
high-stakes external observer”.95  The Local Government Association (LGA) also 
favoured a model which involved local validation of a school’s self-evaluation, but the 
LGA’s vision is perhaps more mechanistic than the ATL would like. The LGA believes 
that performance management should be achieved through simple and robust systems 
based on self-evaluation against standardised data, ratified by the local authority and 
checked by inspection. Standardised reporting to interested parties should be through 
the school report card or similar.96 
63. We are attracted to a model of accountability which encourages and supports 
schools towards a meaningful, continuous self-evaluation process, evidenced in a 
form which the school considers most appropriate and verified through inspection. 
We are persuaded that true self-evaluation is at the heart of what a good school does. 
For a school which is performing at a good level, embedding processes which 
encourage continuous self-improvement are likely to be of far more practical benefit 
than an inspection every few years. The latter is necessary mainly as a check to see 
that a school is performing at the appropriate level. Inspection should be a positive 
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experience, reinforcing good practice and fostering dialogue with schools in relation 
to areas where further improvement can be made. The Government and Ofsted 
should endeavour to do more to help schools which have not yet come to terms with 
the concept of self-evaluation in its fullest sense. 
School Improvement Partners 
64. School Improvement Partners (SIPs) were introduced as part of the New 
Relationship with Schools and the scheme has since been rolled out to all primary and 
secondary schools. As at 1 April 2009, there were 2,890 primary school SIPs, 1,534 
secondary school SIPs and 402 special school SIPs.97  There are two major rationales for 
their appointment. First, in order to deal with the problem of multiple lines of 
communication between schools and local and central government, SIPs are appointed 
as the conduit for what was known as the “single conversation” with schools. Second, it is 
considered that schools needed tailored support and challenge to move the improvement 
agenda forward.  
65. A SIP is “a credible and experienced practitioner” who is in a position to provide 
professional support and challenge in order to secure school improvement.98  SIPs are 
appointed to help school leaders to evaluate their school’s performance, identify 
priorities for improvement and plan effective change. The intention is to: 
• involve experienced serving heads in leading the process of reform; 
• offer every school a searching, professional, supportive challenge from outside in a 
way that was sensitive to the school’s circumstances; 
• build the collective capacity of the school system.99 
66. SIPs are drawn from: headteachers who either continue to run their schools and 
work as a SIP part-time or work out of their school full-time for a period; ex-heads 
working as independent consultants; and some LEA advisers with the correct experience. 
In order to qualify as a SIP, those with the required experience undertake a brief training 
and accreditation administered by the National College for Leadership of Schools and 
Children’s Services.100 
67. The SIP’s goal is to balance challenge and support, focusing on the school’s plans and 
targets in order to: 
• identify the needs of the school, using the school’s self-evaluation and other evidence; 
• moderate the school’s self-evaluation, agree the school’s priorities and targets for 
improvement, assist with preparation of the school plan and help the school to align 
these with national and local priorities; 
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• sign off the School Improvement Grant, offer support and broker access to external 
support, including access to useful networks; and 
• act as the main conduit between the school and the external agencies of local and 
national government.101 
68. An evaluation study of the New Relationship with Schools programme found that 
SIPs had led to “the development of more evaluative and accountable school structures 
and culture”; a more consistent focus on improving outcomes for children and 
addressing under-performance; more challenging but realistic targets; and the 
identification of school support needs and the provision of advice and support for school 
improvement. The SIP role was found to be effective in supporting headteachers and 
senior leaders in data use and analysis, understanding performance issues, prioritising 
areas for improvement, engaging pupils and parents and focusing on outcomes. Further, 
SIPs had enabled greater local authority understanding of school performance and a 
firmer foundation for non-statutory strategies for school improvement.102   
69. On the negative side, the evaluation study found that SIPs in primary schools were 
generally perceived as being less effective and having less impact than those in secondary 
schools. The study also identified a lack of clarity in the role of the SIP and different 
practices across local authorities in brokering support for schools. There were differences 
in the support role played by the different types of SIP: full-time local authority-
employed SIPs; SIPs employed as external consultants to the local authority; and serving 
headteacher SIPs. Generally, local authority-employed SIPs were more involved in 
capacity-building, monitoring, brokering and managing support packages than the 
others. In some local authorities there was a lack of clear definition between the role 
played by SIPs and other local authority staff. The different types of SIP appear to have 
led to differing views of effectiveness, with serving headteacher SIPs viewed as being the 
least effective. Headteacher SIPs “are more constrained than other SIP types to deliver 
additional resource for schools or to be more flexible to emerging demands”.103  The 
evaluation report found that, in local authorities where the SIP is used to channel a wide 
range of issues, monitoring and reporting requirements, the role of the SIP as enabling a 
“single conversation” with schools is in conflict with their support and challenge role as, 
in enabling the former, they inevitably have less time for the latter.104 
70. Many witnesses have been largely supportive of the concept of the SIP as facilitating 
the “single conversation” with schools and providing the support and challenge 
necessary to bring about school improvement.105  The Department points to surveys of 
headteachers by National Strategies indicating that 80–90% believe that the school 
benefits from its SIP and around 90% consider that the SIP has had a positive effect on 
performance management.106  Research by the National Foundation for Educational 
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Research (NFER) has identified a generally positive attitude towards the SIP programme 
and the wish that it should survive the next rounds of policy changes. However, some 
respondents to that study expressed concern over the structure and status of the SIPs 
programme, and certain respondents considered it to be wholly unnecessary.107   
71. Likewise, some of the evidence submitted to this inquiry has been critical of the way 
the system works in practice. The Association of Professionals in Education and 
Children’s Trusts (Aspect) stated that the proportion of practising SIPs who are also 
serving headteachers is significantly below original Government targets. According to 
Aspect, the low level of time commitment to the role required of SIPs and the lack of 
central funding for adequate skills-based training for these postholders have been 
contributory factors. Aspect considered that the SIP role, as originally conceived, “has 
proved of limited value and the resultant trend is rightly towards greater professionalism 
in external school monitoring, support and challenge activity”. It argued that a cadre of 
professionals was needed, who have the ‘soft’ skills necessary to negotiate and influence 
in order to bring about change in the absence of direct line management responsibility. 
Interestingly, it is this ‘power without managerial responsibility’ scenario which 
prompted the Association of School and College Leaders to comment on a “mismatch 
between power and responsibility”, with some SIPs advising schools in the expectation 
that their advice will be followed, perhaps backed up with the threat of sanctions, yet SIPs 
have no direct responsibility for implementation of the advised plan, nor its outcome. 
72. Other criticisms have focused on the variability in the effectiveness of SIPs. Ofsted 
has stated that its evidence suggests considerable variability in the level of challenge and 
support provided by SIPs. Similarly, the National Association of Head Teachers told us 
that SIPs are of variable quality, with some acting as critical friend and supporting 
improvement and others taking “the role of proxy inspectors for the Local Authority, 
placing unnecessary stress on School Leaders and conducting their work in an 
atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust”.108  The National Governors’ Association 
expressed concern at the variability in the extent to which SIPs engage effectively with 
governing bodies, particularly with respect to providing professional guidance on self-
evaluation. 
73. Others have identified the potential for uneasy relationships between SIPs and 
schools due to SIPs’ status as appointees and part of the accountability system.109  The 
NUT argued that SIPs should not be appointed by the local authority; rather, a “critical 
friend” should be chosen by the individual school with funding from the local 
authority.110  In a similar vein, the NASUWT reported feedback from its members which 
indicates that, rather than facilitating the ‘single conversation’ with schools, SIPs focus 
disproportionately on the “achievement of outcomes designed to satisfy the 
requirements of the school accountability system”. However, SIPs appointed by 
Warwickshire County Council told us that they had experienced no undue problems in 
being a “critical friend” to their schools, while facilitating the flow of information back to 
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the local authority. They admitted that there is, to some extent, “a local authority 
perspective on the agenda” and were clear that they would report back to the authorities 
on problems which needed addressing. Nevertheless, they emphasised the need to build 
a relationship of trust which would allow them to ask difficult questions without the 
schools becoming alarmed.111   
74. Against this background, the 21st Century Schools White Paper, published in June 
2009, proposes an enhanced role for SIPs, with their status as the channel for the “single 
conversation” strengthened. The White Paper states that their role as “the single agent 
for challenge and support to schools across all Every Child Matters outcomes on behalf 
of local authorities” will be strengthened. SIPs will be considered the “gatekeepers” for all 
those, including local authorities and central government, who wish to engage with 
schools. An exception would be made in urgent situations such as safeguarding 
situations regarding the intervention of appropriate services.112 
75. SIPs will remain responsible for monitoring and challenge, as well as for brokering 
support for school improvement with external providers. SIPs will: 
• monitor a school’s performance; 
• advise the governing body; 
• ensure school improvement plans are “realistic and ambitious”; 
• support the school’s self-evaluation and the improvement process; 
• broker appropriate support from external bodies; 
• signal when a school does not have the capacity to improve; and 
• take decisions about a school’s specialist status, taking account of its overall 
performance, any partnerships and local pattern of specialist provision.113 
76. The White Paper states that various adjustments will be made to support SIPs’ work 
in these areas, with new legislation being planned where necessary: 
• the role of SIPs as the primary intermediary between schools and local authorities 
will be clarified; 
• the amount of time SIPs spend in schools will be increased, with up to 20 days per 
year for the weakest schools; 
• introduction of a requirement that the weakest schools have their improvement plans 
signed off by their SIPs in order to release the funds for improvement, with 
adjudication by the local authority if the school and SIP cannot agree; 
• movement towards provision of a single SIP for schools in formal partnerships; 
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• the National College for Leadership of Schools and Children’s Services (the National 
College) will be asked to review the SIP accreditation programme in order to ensure 
that it is appropriate for the expanded role of SIPs; 
• all existing SIPs will be required to be re-accredited by the National College under the 
new programme; 
• National College will assure the quality of SIPs by issuing an ongoing licence to 
practice; 
• National College will maintain a national register of SIPs and their specialist 
expertise; 
• governing bodies will be able to choose from a list of appropriate SIPs and to reject 
the SIP proposed by the local authority; and 
• SIPs will be attached to a school for only three years, reduced from the current five 
years.114  
We welcome the fact that the National College for Leadership of Schools and 
Children’s Services is being asked to review its training and accreditation procedures 
to support School Improvement Partners in their new role.  
77. The evidence to our inquiry was prepared before publication of the 21st Century 
Schools White Paper. However, it is clear from the terms of this evidence that some of 
the proposals in the White Paper will not command full support. There may be concern 
about any increased burden in the training and accreditation process, as we have been 
told that the existing system is already found to be “very rigorous and stressful for many 
people” and that it could act as a deterrent to people who might otherwise apply.115  The 
Government must take care that it does not exacerbate the existing problems with 
recruitment of School Improvement Partners by increasing the training burden and 
introducing requirements that existing School Improvement Partners be re-
accredited and that they all carry an ongoing licence to practice. 
78. The reduction from five to three years in the length of time a SIP is attached to a 
particular school may prove unpopular. SIPs themselves told us that schools value the 
ongoing relationship and the trust and understanding of a school’s context that can be 
built up over time.116  Lynda Jones, a SIP in Warwickshire, told us: 
The quality of the relationships is built up over time. Heads have said to us, “Don’t 
change these about. You have just got to understand our context, which we need 
you to do. We don’t want it to change.”117 
79. The strengthened role for SIPs also suggests a considerably increased workload. This 
is potentially problematic for the recruitment and retention of SIPs, especially those who 
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also practice full-time as headteachers, who say that they are already over-stretched.118  
Witnesses told us that the role is already so onerous that many headteachers consider 
that they could not possibly consider becoming a SIP in addition to their duties as a 
head. Even those that are already on the SIP register may turn down work when 
contacted by the local authority because they have no more time available for it.119  The 
Minister painted a different picture, stating that there were currently more people 
wanting to be SIPs than there were places available. He told us that, under the reformed 
system, a SIP would spend up to 20 days each year in a school, but that the number of 
days would be differentiated according to performance and only the lowest performing 
schools would need 20 days of SIP time. He said that there were already a number of 
headteachers doing this level of work in schools under the National Challenge 
programme and that this indicated the presence of a pool of people with the resources 
and experience to do the job.120   
80. Where a SIP is available, with an allocation of only five days per school per year, the 
SIP may well not be the only person to whom schools turn when they need support. 
Other local authority personnel may become involved and this seems to us to be an 
indication that the “single conversation” envisaged in the New Relationship with Schools 
is not, in reality, working as such.121  Lorraine Cooper, a SIP in Warwickshire, told us 
that: 
One of the issues is that very many SIPs, particularly the external consultant SIPs 
and head teachers, are not always able to give more time than that, even if it is 
needed, because they are employed in other work as well. That can be an issue—it 
is one of the constraints. It means that the local authority School Improvement 
Service working absolutely hand in glove with the SIP is essential, because if a 
school really fell into trouble, it might well be that their SIP would not be the 
person who could instantly respond by putting considerably more time in. So, we 
have to look at how that can be managed at local authority level. Generally, that 
sort of increased level of work might have to come from within the School 
Improvement Service as opposed to from just the SIP.122 
81. There is also a potential problem with the widened remit of a SIP’s responsibilities. 
Even before the current proposals for expansion of the role, John Bangs of the NUT told 
us: 
The idea that an individual school improvement partner can be this Olympian 
character through which advice can go two ways, data can pass two ways—that 
they can be the person who provides the judgment about the individual school to 
the local authority—I find extraordinary.123 
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With the proposed White Paper reforms and Ofsted’s new inspection framework, the 
work of SIPs becomes even more crucial in the accountability system. For example, with 
Ofsted increasing the period of inspection to five years for many schools, SIPs are likely 
to be the first of those outside a school in a position to notice a significant dip in 
performance which needs to be addressed with urgent action. Some witnesses saw a 
greater role for SIPs under the new Ofsted inspection regime in providing continuous 
monitoring of a school’s performance, perhaps triggering an inspection earlier than 
otherwise planned.124   
82. We are persuaded that a SIP is ideally placed to assist a school with its self-
improvement processes and identify problems relatively soon after they become visible. 
However, in order to be effective, SIPs need sufficient time and resources. SIPs who are 
overstretched because of an expanded remit and insufficient time to dedicate to the task 
are less likely to notice when a school starts to enter a period of decline and alert the local 
authority and Ofsted to the possibility that intervention may be necessary. We are also 
not convinced that the existence of a pool of headteachers and others giving up to 20 
days to a school each year under National Challenge necessarily indicates that sufficient 
personnel will be available to do the same as SIPs.  
83. The Government appears to be aware of the potential difficulty in recruitment. The 
Secretary of State, when giving oral evidence to the Committee on the 21st Century 
Schools White Paper, acknowledged that it would be “a challenge to ensure that … we 
will have the quality of SIPs that schools will need”; and Jon Coles, Director-General of 
the Schools Directorate at the Department, added that “I think that it is true to say that 
we need to do some significant work to build the school improvement market over the 
next 18 months, so that we are ready to bring this in”.125  
84. We are concerned that the Government proposes to expand the scope and remit of 
SIPs’ role considerably without having in place a clear strategy for recruiting the 
additional SIPs which will be necessary and giving them sufficient time and resources 
with which to perform their functions effectively. We recommend that the Government 
produce clear plans to show how and from where enough School Improvement 
Partners (SIPs) with appropriate skills and experience will be recruited with 
sufficient time to dedicate to the expanded remit for SIPs which is proposed in the 
Government’s White Paper. 
The role of local authorities 
85. Over the last 20 years, the 150 English local authorities have progressively engaged 
less in day-to-day management of schools, but they retain duties for strategic planning of 
education in their areas. They have a duty to promote the fulfilment by every child of his 
or her educational potential.126  The authority must promote the best interests of the 
pupil and listen to the concerns and interests of parents and carers. It must monitor the 
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performance of maintained schools in its area and ensure that, where improvements are 
necessary, these are carried out effectively and expeditiously. 
School performance and improvement 
86. The Local Government Association (LGA) considers that the outcomes for children 
and young people in the local area, their parents, local community services and 
employers are of primary importance, therefore schools should be accountable, first and 
foremost, to these groups for the quality of their service.127  This view puts local 
authorities at the heart of the accountability system. As Councillor Les Lawrence, then 
Chair of the LGA board on children and young people told us: 
At the end of the day, the local authority is the accountability of last resort. It is for 
the local authority, by working in partnership, to seek to ensure—using all sorts of 
performance management techniques that do not interfere, but just provide 
oversight; a comfort blanket if you like—that the trends of attainment and the 
processes of financial management of the school are such that you can detect at an 
early stage if things are going slightly awry, be it at a particular key stage or 
throughout the school as a whole.128 
Other witnesses acknowledged the importance of the local authority’s role in school 
accountability and emphasised that accountability was best achieved through local 
authorities as they are democratically accountable bodies with unique local knowledge 
and relationships.129  The local authority’s role in school improvement, together with its 
School Improvement Partner, was seen as vital, as the contact between a school and its 
local authority was far more frequent than that with Ofsted.130  Martin Johnson, Deputy 
General Secretary of the ATL, took the argument a stage further by advocating the 
relocation of inspection with the local authority, although this aspect of his argument 
was not a view shared by other union representatives. He told us that: 
We need less accountability to Whitehall and more to county hall. We need to put 
local communities back in the driving seat and schools back under local 
democratic control. We need better integration of inspection and support. Since 
Parliament has located the latter with local authorities, it should locate the former 
there, too. 
87. Local authorities are responsible for taking a strategic role in supporting schools’ 
improvement and monitoring progress in schools’ responses to challenges from SIPs and 
Ofsted. The LGA states that a “school is accountable to the inspectorate and local 
authority for devising and implementing improvement plans”.131  Where additional 
assistance is required, local authorities are responsible for designing, commissioning and 
brokering an appropriate and tailored support package. The local authority will then 
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monitor the progress of this intervention.132  The LGA sees school improvement as a key 
local authority function, underpinned by local understanding, expertise and challenge. 
“National bodies may come in and deliver verdicts or support over a short 
timescale or a narrow scope. Local accountability is required because improvement 
actually happens best at the frontline with local professionals supported by those 
with local understanding.”133 
School budget and finance 
88. Schools are funded via the Dedicated School Grant (DSG) from central government 
and this funding may be topped up by further local authority funds.134  Schools are 
therefore accountable in value for money terms to both central and local government.135  
Councillor Les Lawrence, then Chair of the LGA board on children and young people 
said that a school and its local authority should work in partnership, with the local 
authority providing the oversight and financial support to enable the school to manage 
its resources, but the local authority must do so without interfering in day-to-day 
management.136 
89. However, the Audit Commission has criticised the limited amount of involvement by 
local authorities with school budgets and finance. School expenditure represents the 
largest single element of local government expenditure, yet it attracts the least detailed 
scrutiny. Over the past eight years, the number of schools in deficit has remained steady 
at around 2000, although this was reduced in 2007–08. The Commission states that, in 
responding to past requirements from central government to delegate funding to schools 
and support school autonomy, local authorities have been restricted in their capacity to 
monitor, support and intervene in school finance and budgeting: 
Councils have distanced themselves, and been expected to do so, from monitoring 
and challenging schools budgets other than to deal with critical incidents. The 
budget controversy in 2003 revealed that nowhere in the system is there a secure 
picture of the state of school finances and the likely impact of any changed funding 
arrangements on them. Reliable information about how schools’ actual spending 
relates to budget is not available until well after the year end.  
Engagement with individual schools is often very limited. Councils appear to be 
unsure about the extent to which they can and should exercise closer scrutiny and 
challenge in relation to schools’ spending.137 
90. The Audit Commission recommends that local authorities should have robust, 
accurate and current information about the state of school budgets and should adopt a 
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formal budget reporting structure to provide an accurate and up-to-date picture of 
school spending.138  It argued that they should be supportive of strategic financial 
planning in the same way as they are in relation to school performance and 
improvement.139  Although local authorities have statutory responsibilities to monitor 
and challenge resource management and financial decisions, this function is not 
performed consistently and is not integrated into the wider monitoring framework 
within which School Improvement Partners and other school advisers work. The 
statutory power to withdraw the delegated budget is the ultimate sanction, but it is a 
cumbersome mechanism and widely regarded as a last resort.140  The Audit Commission 
considers that there is considerable uncertainty surrounding local authorities’ role in 
financial scrutiny of schools and recommends that the position should be clarified by 
central government. 
91. We agree with the Audit Commission that local authorities should be more 
involved with monitoring, supporting and, where necessary, intervening in school 
budgets and finance. It is indefensible that the expenditure of such vast sums should 
attract so little scrutiny. Central government should make clear that schools must 
make a proper accounting of their expenditure to local authorities; and that local 
authorities should be as engaged with the monitoring of finance as they are expected 
to be with the monitoring of performance and standards. We do not advocate an 
erosion of schools’ autonomy, but we consider it important that the correct level of 
financial support is available to them in order to derive maximum value for money 
from the schools budget. 
Statutory powers 
92. Local authorities have statutory powers of intervention available to them. Section 
60(2) of the Education and Inspections Act 2006 allows a local authority to issue a 
warning notice to a school where: 
• the standards of performance are unacceptably low and likely to remain so unless the 
local authority exercises its statutory powers of intervention; 
• there has been a serious breakdown in management or governance prejudicial to 
standards of performance; 
• the safety of pupils or staff is threatened.141 
Where a school does not comply with a local authority warning notice within 15 days, or 
where Ofsted has placed a school in Special Measures or has judged that it requires 
Significant Improvement, a local authority has recourse to a series of possible statutory 
interventions under Part 4 of the Education and Inspections Act 2006. These are: 
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• requiring a school to work in partnership with another institution for the purposes of 
school improvement; 
• appointing additional governors; 
• replacing the governing body with an Interim Executive Board; and 
• taking back a school’s delegated budget. 
Table 1 summarises the types and purpose of these interventions and, in exercising them, 
a local authority must have regard to any guidance issued by the Secretary of State.142   
Table 1 
Intervention Purpose of 
intervention  
When to be used  Pre-requisites of use  
Require a school to 
work with another 
school, college or 
other named partner  




secure improvement.  
Where a school, or key 
figures within it, 
refuses to collaborate 
with an appropriate 
partner.  
LA must consult the 
governing body of the 
school, plus the 
diocesan or other 
appointing authority. 
The LA must also find 
a willing school, 
college, other 
organisation, or 




To strengthen the 
local authority’s voice 
on the governing 
body and/or to 
provide additional 
expertise to the 
governors in key areas 
to support a school’s 
improvement.  
Where the governing 
body needs additional 
expertise, or the 
headteacher and 
senior management 
team need further 
challenge and 
support.  
None, although it is 
good practice for the 
local authority to 




who are also entitled 
to appoint additional 
governors.  
Replace the entire 
governing body with 
an Interim Executive 
Board (IEB)  
To secure a step-
change in the 
leadership and 
management of a 
school through the 
use of a specially-
appointed governing 
body for a temporary 
period.  
Where the governing 
body is providing 
insufficient challenge 
to the headteacher or 
senior management 
team of the school, is 
providing an obstacle 
to progress, or there 
has been a breakdown 
in working 
relationships that is 
having an impact on 
standards.  
LA must apply to the 
Secretary of State for 
consent to use this 
power.  
Take back the school’s 
delegated budget  
To secure control over 
staffing and spending 
decisions in order to 
secure improvements.  
Where the governing 
body is providing 
insufficient challenge 
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team of the school, or 
where management 
of the budget is 




Source: Research commissioned by LGA from National Foundation for Education Research on the local 
authority role in school improvement 
In addition to these local authority powers, the Secretary of State also has powers under 
Part 4 of the Education and Inspection Act 2006 where Ofsted has issued the school with 
a Notice to Improve or placed it in Special Measures. The Secretary of State may, subject 
to a duty to consult with the local authority and others, appoint additional governors, 
direct closure of a school or replace the governing body with an Interim Executive Board.  
93. Research commissioned by the LGA from the National Foundation for Education 
Research (NFER) has found that warning notices and statutory powers are used only 
rarely by local authorities.143  Although it is generally considered that they are useful 
powers to hold in reserve, local authorities see them very much as a last resort, to be used 
only when non-statutory strategies for supporting school improvement have failed. 
Although practice differs across local authorities, the NFER identified several common 
strategies used by local authorities in order to deal with schools requiring improvement: 
• producing policy statements on school improvement and schools causing concern; 
• regular monitoring and reviewing of the performance of local schools; 
• use of multiple data sources (quantitative data on exam results and attendance 
records; qualitative, contextual data from SIPs, consultants and local authority 
officials working with schools; informal, local knowledge about schools’ 
performance); 
• categorisation of schools, differentiating according to level of need for support; 
• provision of differentiated levels of support; 
• use of an integrated, cross-sectoral policy approach; 
• use of SIPs to challenge schools and feed information back to local authorities; 
• peer support networks; and 
• collaborative approach to school improvement.144 
94. Once a school has been identified as in need of improvement through local authority 
intervention, local authorities typically employ some or all of the following, informal 
strategies: 
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• contacting the school; 
• preparing a flexible and tailored action plan; 
• providing additional expertise to the school; 
• supporting and strengthening school leadership; 
• close monitoring and regular review; 
• working in collaboration with schools.145 
Taken together, these strategies are intended to secure continuous improvement in all 
maintained schools and to deliver tailored assistance to schools in need of improvement. 
The NFER found strong support for these strategies from the local authorities, SIPs and 
headteachers interviewed as part of the study. They considered that early intervention 
strategies were highly effective and significantly reduced the need for statutory 
interventions. The reasons for this success appear to be rooted in, amongst other things, 
a collaborative relationship between local authorities and schools, ongoing 
communication, deep understanding of local context, clear roles and responsibilities and 
support for schools to become self-sufficient.146 
95.   Councillor Les Lawrence emphasised that, as far as the LGA was concerned, there 
was a deliberate strategy on the part of local authorities to use a collaborative approach to 
school improvement. He pointed to the need for local authorities to work in partnership 
with schools, and to encourage schools to work in partnership with each other in order 
to spread good practice.147  However, some School Improvement Partners have noted 
that not all local authorities employ the collaborative approach identified by the NFER as 
prevalent in local government and other witnesses have certainly emphasised the 
variability in local authority practice.148 
96. We approve of the collaborative approach to school improvement taken by some 
local authorities; and we consider that partnership working between local authorities 
and all schools in the local area is a valuable means of providing support and 
spreading best practice. We urge central and local government to work together to 
ensure a more consistent approach across local authorities in this regard. 
97. DCSF guidance from 2007 suggests that statutory interventions should be used as a 
last resort and that local authorities should attempt to secure a school’s voluntary 
cooperation first.149  However, under the Apprenticeships, Skills, Children and Learning 
Act 2009, the Government’s role in intervening in schools causing concern has been 
strengthened. In its proposals for this legislation, the Government stated that: 
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There is evidence that some authorities are not taking the opportunity to use [their 
statutory] powers appropriately. This is important because they are designed to 
prevent future failure and to address issues before they become more serious. The 
Government therefore proposes to take a new legislative power in the 
[Apprenticeships, Skills, Children and Learning Act 2009] to require authorities to 
consider formal warning notices when these are clearly justified by the school’s 
performance. ... It is also proposed to extend the Secretary of State’s current power 
to require authorities to take additional advisory services. It is proposed that in 
future this power may apply to authorities with large proportions of schools with 
low standards, as well as to those with high proportions of schools that have 
formally failed inspections.150 
The 21st Century Schools White Paper re-emphasised this position, stating that, where 
early interventions by the local authority to tackle declining performance are 
unsuccessful, local authorities must “move urgently” to use their statutory powers. The 
White Paper continues: 
Where local authorities fail to take the steps needed, the Secretary of State will use 
the powers available to him to ensure provision is improved, whether in individual 
schools, or across the local authority.151 
Provisions in the Children, Schools and Families Bill introduced in the House on 19 
November 2009 would extend the powers of the Secretary of State yet further, enabling 
him or her to direct a local authority to close a school or issue a performance, standards 
and safety warning notice in certain circumstances.152 
98. As a further example of how central government is taking decision-making powers 
away from local authorities, on 13 November 2008, the Secretary of State announced a 
new strategy to improve performance in “coasting schools” which were achieving GCSE 
targets under National Challenge but were not considered to be fulfilling their pupils’ 
potential. He said that the Government would work with local authorities to identify 
schools which could benefit from the programme with the sanction that, if these schools 
did not improve, the Government would expect the local authority to use their powers of 
intervention. Whilst we understand that the Government’s motivation is to make sure 
that all schools are striving for improvement, it seems to us strange that serious statutory 
interventions should be invoked at the behest of the Secretary of State for schools which 
may have received a perfectly satisfactory inspection grade from Ofsted.  
99. Taken together, the new measures outlined above indicate that the Government is 
increasingly moving towards a centralisation of power over school accountability and 
improvement, despite assertions elsewhere in the White Paper that power is being 
devolved from the centre to the local level.153  Simply put, a strong, collaborative 
approach to school improvement, of the type identified in the NFER report referenced 
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above, is a much more proportionate response to coasting schools which may, 
nevertheless, be providing a perfectly adequate service as judged by Ofsted.  
100. Councillor Les Lawrence, then Chair of the LGA’s board on children and young 
people, said that he did not think that there was sufficient understanding between central 
and local government of their different roles and of what the other was doing. He 
considered that this was as much the fault of local government as of central government 
and said that the LGA was actively seeking to address this issue.154  The Minister sought 
to reassure us that the Government’s position was that it would continue to collaborate 
with local authorities in order to bring about necessary improvements in education; but 
that, where there was continuing failure on the part of a particular local authority to 
address serious issues of underperformance, the Government would step in and bring 
about change. He said that the Government would no longer tolerate a situation where 
“progress is not being made or it is too slow or there is resistance to change because it is 
difficult”.155 
101. We are concerned that the Government is shifting decision-making power in 
relation to schools needing improvement away from local authorities and towards 
central government. Central government is not necessarily best placed to make final 
decisions over, for example, whether or not a school should close. These are properly 
matters for the local community, represented by their local authority, and for Ofsted who 
have the specialist expertise in this area. Whilst we do not dispute that it is appropriate 
for the Government to be able to step in where a local authority has genuinely failed, we 
do not approve of the aspects of the White Paper which tend to suggest that the 
Government is taking to itself more general power in this area. There is little merit in the 
Government’s claims that schools, supported by their local authorities, are being 
empowered to take charge of their own improvement strategies if the Government is to 
create for itself even greater powers to change fundamentally the structure of those 
schools or to close them down altogether. 
102. We urge the Government to recognise the good work done in the local 
authorities which demonstrate a systematic, collaborative approach towards the 
identification of schools in need of improvement and the provision of support in 
raising their standards of performance. We recommend that the Government should 
be sparing in the use of its extended statutory powers to intervene in relation to 
school improvement. We consider that these powers should be used only in cases 
where the relevant local authority has failed in its duty to secure school improvement. 
They should not be used as a mechanism for central government to increase its 
control over the way in which schools are managed. 
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3 The Inspectorate 
Background: the duties of the Chief Inspector and the functions of 
Ofsted 
103. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Schools in England, which eventually evolved into 
Ofsted, was set up in its modern form in the Education (Schools) Act 1992. Since then, 
there have been a number of changes to the remit and functions of Ofsted and the Chief 
Inspector, the most radical of which was the extension of the remit to cover education, 
children’s services and skills under the Education and Inspections Act 2006. The 2006 Act 
established the Office for Standards in Education, Children’s Services and Skills and Her 
Majesty’s Chief Inspector—and Inspectors (referred to as HMI)—of Education, Children’s 
Services and Skills.  
104. We take regular evidence from the Chief Inspector on the full range of her 
responsibilities and it has not been our intention in this inquiry to duplicate some of that 
work by going into the details of how the inspectorate operates.156  This inquiry has focused 
more on whether a school inspectorate is a necessary component of an accountability 
system, what its role should be, and what outcomes should be expected. We are concerned 
here only with that part of Ofsted’s remit which covers the inspection of maintained 
schools. Under the current legislative regime, section 5 of the Education Act 2005 provides 
that, for each school inspected, the Chief Inspector must report on: 
• the quality of the education provided in the school; 
• the extent to which the education meets the needs of the range of pupils at the school; 
• the educational standards achieved;  
• the quality of the leadership and management, including whether financial resources 
are managed effectively;  
• the spiritual, moral, social and cultural development of the pupils;  
• the contribution made by the school to the well-being of its pupils; and 
• the contribution made by the school to community cohesion. 
Such inspections are known as “section 5 inspections”. Pupils’ well-being, referred to in 
this list of requirements, is defined in the Children Act 2004 as: 
• physical and mental health and emotional well-being; 
• protection from harm and neglect; 
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• education, training and recreation; 
• the contribution made by them to society; 
• social and economic well-being.157 
This definition translates into legislation the five Every Child Matters outcomes by which 
children’s services are judged. These outcomes were introduced in the eponymous green 
paper published by the Government in September 2003 and have achieved wide 
significance in children’s services ever since. The outcomes are: 
• being healthy; 
• staying safe; 
• enjoying and achieving; 
• making a positive contribution; and 
• economic well-being.158 
105. In addition to the requirements for a section 5 inspection set out in the 2005 Act, the 
2006 Act requires Ofsted and the Chief Inspector to carry out their work in such a manner 
as to encourage the services they inspect and regulate to improve, to be user-focused, and 
to be efficient and effective in the use of resources. It is, therefore, part of Ofsted’s statutory 
duty to encourage school improvement. 
106. Ofsted has operated under a new inspection framework since September 2009. The 
2009 framework extends the principle of proportionality, so that the frequency of 
inspection is proportionate to need: ‘good’ and ‘outstanding’ schools will be inspected 
approximately every five years, with a ‘health check’ report in the interim (known as an 
“interim assessment”). ‘Satisfactory’ and ‘inadequate’ schools will receive more regular 
inspection and monitoring checks. The majority of schools will receive one or two days’ 
notice, but without-notice inspections will be used for a minority, especially where there 
are particular concerns about provision. Inspections will normally take no more than two 
days. The inspection framework includes particular emphasis on the following: 
• engaging headteachers, staff and governors in the process of inspection so that they 
understand the judgements made; 
• promoting improvement: inspectors will make specific recommendations based on 
their diagnosis of the school’s strengths and weaknesses;  
• inspectors will spend more time in classrooms and emphasise quality of teaching and 
its impact on learning; 
• an increased focus on the quality of partnership working with other education 
providers, with a grade being awarded under this heading; 
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• continued use of ‘limiting judgements’ in key areas, such as pupil progress, 
safeguarding and equality, so that schools must achieve a certain level of performance 
in these areas if they are to achieve a ‘good’ or ‘outstanding’ grade; and  
• evaluating the achievement and well-being of all pupils and of particular groups of 
pupils; and assessing the extent to which schools ensure that all pupils, including those 
most at risk, succeed; 
• assessing how well schools promote equality of opportunity, and how effectively they 
tackle discrimination; 
• gathering, analysing and taking into account the views of parents and pupils;  
• use of more indicators of pupil well-being; 
• checking schools’ procedures for safeguarding children.159 
Ofsted inspectors hold discussions with staff and students during the course of inspections. 
107. The increased emphasis on proportionate inspection according to a school’s need is 
based on the view that inspection drives improvement. The General Teaching Council for 
England (GTCE) has been supportive of the “proportionate approach to inspection of 
schools” developed since 2004 as part of the New Relationship with Schools framework. 
The GTCE considers this approach more effective and cost-effective than the preceding 
inspection regime and approves of the placing of schools in categories.160  Schools 
previously judged ‘satisfactory’ or ‘good’ must, however, be able to demonstrate ongoing 
improvement in order to maintain that grade. It is arguable that, where a school is already 
extremely good, there may be little room for improvement. In the parallel context of school 
report cards, the Committee heard in New York from high-performing schools such as 
Bard High School Early College that, because of the emphasis on progression measures in 
the New York school report card, they found it nearly impossible to achieve the highest 
grade. They considered it counter-intuitive that the highest-performing schools should 
receive a B rather than an A grade. 
108. Ofsted maintains that notice periods under the new regime should be short and that 
this has “been found to reduce the stress of over-preparation”.161  John Bangs, Assistant 
Secretary, Education, Equality and Professional Development at the NUT, told us that 
NUT members felt that between two and five days’ notice of an inspection was fair, 
providing them with sufficient preparation time without allowing the same degree of 
tension to build as under the previous regime where much longer notice periods were in 
operation. Witnesses reported that teachers are not in favour of the without-notice 
inspections which were piloted by Ofsted prior to the introduction of the 2009 
framework.162  The National Association of Head Teachers stated that only sufficient notice 
can allow for a pre-inspection briefing to identify issues inspectors will want to pursue; 
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sufficient time to collate the necessary evidence for inspectors; and time for the 
headteacher to make arrangements to be present for the inspection.163 Mr Bangs said that 
NUT members were alarmed that the Chief Inspector appeared to be pandering to a 
perception that parents were in favour of without-notice inspection. Mr Bangs stated that 
he could find no evidence of such a wish on the part of parents.164  However, a survey by 
the National Confederation of Parent Teacher Associations of its members, which returned 
2,226 responses, showed that over 60% of parents thought schools should receive without-
notice inspections.165  An Ofsted consultation found that 65% of parents would welcome a 
notice period shorter than two days.166 
109. Cambridge Assessment167 believed that formal inspection, which formerly focused on 
the quality of teaching at classroom level, had in recent years been redirected towards 
school-level performance as evidenced by qualification and national test results. 
Cambridge Assessment argued that inspection needed to refocus on interaction between 
teacher and pupil in the classroom in order to address the quality of educational 
provision.168  The 2009 framework will focus more on classroom practice, although it 
remains to be seen whether, over a two-day inspection, this will achieve the rebalancing 
advised by Cambridge Assessment.  
110. Some have claimed that parents’ views have been marginalised in the shorter section 5 
inspection regime and the increasing reliance on test data in forming inspection 
judgements. For example, previously, parents were interviewed by inspectors and were 
given the opportunity to have a full and frank discussion with inspectors. Under the 
current regime, they are sent questionnaires and this may be problematic in schools where 
parents have low levels of literacy, an aversion to filling out forms or where English may 
not be the first language.169  In some cases, parents have found themselves in stark 
opposition to an Ofsted judgement which has had profound consequences for their school, 
but have found that there is little they can do to remedy what they see as an unfair 
judgment. There is a perception that Ofsted’s complaints procedure, much of which is 
handled in-house, offers little hope of redress. On the other hand, the 2009 inspection 
framework does give parents the power to call for an inspection in cases where they have 
serious concerns.170 
111. In general terms, we support the approach to inspection set out in the 2009 
inspection framework. We consider that a frequency of inspection in proportion to a 
school’s current levels of performance is sensible, although some concerns remain 
about identification of schools where there is an unexpected slide in performance. We 
consider that a short notice period for inspection is sensible, but schools must be given 
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sufficient time to collate all the necessary evidence and ensure attendance of key 
personnel. Without-notice inspection is appropriate where there are particular 
concerns about performance, and safeguarding in particular, but this approach should 
not be used without good reason. 
112. If visits to schools are to be as short as two days—and bearing in mind that some of 
those days will be taken up by preliminaries rather than by inspection itself—inspectors 
will need to be highly trained and well qualified if they are to make an accurate 
evaluation of school provision 
113. We note drawbacks inherent in the use of “limiting judgments”, in which a certain 
level of performance in a particular area (such as safeguarding or equality) has to be 
achieved if the school is to receive a “good” or “outstanding” grade overall. This can lead to 
strongly-performing schools being “tripped up” on a seemingly minor criterion, with no 
opportunity for strengths elsewhere in the school’s provision to compensate. Examples 
recently reported by teacher unions and by the press include schools supposedly judged by 
Ofsted to be inadequate or failing overall because inspectors had not been asked for 
identification on arrival (thereby indicating security and safeguarding lapses). In another 
case, a fence surrounding the playground had been deemed by inspectors not to be high 
enough to prevent children from being snatched by outsiders: it was claimed that this had 
caused the school to be judged as “inadequate”.171 We have not, in the time available, 
established the accuracy of these claims; but we remind Ofsted of the need for 
transparency and publicity for the way in which inspection data are combined to form 
final judgments on schools. 
114. We support the principle of increased emphasis on the views of pupils and parents, 
but we have some reservations about the level of responses to questionnaires, 
particularly for schools with a challenging intake. We urge Ofsted to make transparent 
the approach that inspectors will take when forming judgements on schools where 
there has been a low level of response to questionnaires from parents; and it should not 
rule out the possibility of meetings with parents. 
The need for an independent inspectorate 
115. Ofsted stated that “Ofsted inspection provides an objective and independent 
evaluation, by a national body, working to an agreed framework and with no direct interest 
in the outcomes”.172  It not only inspects and regulates individual schools, but also 
produces more general reports which give a national picture of the strengths and 
weaknesses of particular aspects of school provision and inform the advice Ofsted gives to 
the Secretary of State.173   
116. Ipsos Mori polls from both 2006 and September 2008 indicated that 92% of parents 
were in favour of external school inspection.174  Witnesses to this inquiry have generally 
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been in favour of an independent inspectorate, although not necessarily in agreement with 
the way the current inspection regime is run.175  Keith Bartley, Chief Executive of the 
GTCE, stated that “It is vitally important that we have independent, authoritative, secure 
and robust voices offering commentary on the effectiveness of both national policy and its 
local translation into practice.”176  The National Association of Head Teachers was satisfied 
that an independent inspectorate is appropriate in principle, but considered that Ofsted fell 
short of this ideal, on the basis that its independence is compromised by Government 
pressure and inspections are unduly focused on attainment data and Government 
targets.177  We note that the School Report Card Prospectus published alongside the 21st 
Century Schools White Paper in June 2009 was produced jointly by the Department and 
Ofsted. Nevertheless, the Department itself said that it viewed Ofsted as an important part 
of the accountability framework, providing “external validation and challenge, the value of 
which is derived from the inspectors’ independence.”178 
117. There is, then, support for an independent inspectorate in England. However, not all 
jurisdictions have an independent, national inspectorate. For example, when we travelled 
to the United States, we visited the New York City Department of Education, which does 
its own “quality reviews”. These are similar to Ofsted inspection reports, setting out what a 
school does well and where it needs to improve. The reviews are “conducted by 
experienced educators and draw upon each school’s collaborative self evaluation as well as 
conversations with the principal, teachers, staff, students, and parents. The reviewers assess 
student performance results and talk to principals, teachers, students, and parents to find 
out how schools use information about outcomes to guide teaching and learning and set 
goals for improvement”.179  The New York City Department of Education’s description of 
this process looks very similar to the process employed by Ofsted, yet the “inspection” 
process is not independent from the Department of Education. 
118. Much as in New York today, until 1992 Her Majesty’s Inspectorate (HMI) was part of 
the Department for Education, reporting to the Secretary of State on the condition of the 
nation’s education system. Some witnesses considered that this arrangement had had 
merit. John Dunford, General Secretary of the ASCL, told the Committee that, since the 
inspectorate had moved out of the Department, departmental policy had suffered as a 
result because of the lack of regular input from professional inspectors. Nevertheless, he 
considered Ofsted’s independence to be important because of the need for it to stand 
between the Government and the profession. He thought that it should be reporting on 
both the effectiveness of individual schools and the effectiveness of the overall system 
without fear or favour. He argued that the former HMI attached to the Department had 
been much more concerned with reporting to government on the latter, whereas Ofsted 
was overwhelmingly concerned with the former. Dr Dunford thought that Ofsted should 
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now move to a middle position (although it should be noted that Ofsted does still produce 
thematic reports on aspects of the schools system as a whole).180 
119. An alternative view of the inspectorate was that it might work at a more local level. 
Before the creation of Ofsted, HMI had regional divisions and, separately, Local Education 
Authorities employed inspectors to inspect their schools. One of the reasons for the 
creation of Ofsted was the perception that there was too much variation between the 
practices of the different LEAs and that there was a need for national standardisation in 
inspection practices in order to raise educational standards across the board.181  
Nevertheless, some believe that Ofsted has gone too far. John Bangs, representing the NUT, 
told the Committee that the NUT would like to see “a more localised approach to a 
national framework”. Rather than advocating local inspection, the NUT would like to see 
inspection teams more locally based than they are at present, inspecting other local 
authorities’ schools within a national framework for quality assurance.182 
120. We have found no strong evidence to suggest that there is an appetite for the complete 
abolition of Ofsted. When we put the question of abolition to Christine Blower, Acting 
General Secretary of the NUT, she replied, “I think it is important to have an inspector of 
schools, yes, and I think that it is important that there is an inspectorate that can publicly 
give an account of what is going on in schools, but that has to be a proper and genuine 
account that is based on the experience of colleagues in schools”.183  This, together with the 
evidence presented above, leads us to the conclusion that, although there may be some 
widespread concerns about the way the inspectorate operates, there is general support for 
the concept of Ofsted as an inspectorate independent from government. 
121. We are persuaded of the need for an inspectorate, independent of government, 
which can assure the quality of provision in individual schools, as well as producing 
more general reports on aspects of the education system at a national level. We consider 
that the latter are particularly important, not least because they should provide a sound 
evidential basis for policy-making by the Government. 
122. We have yet to see, however, whether the expansion of Ofsted’s responsibilities over 
the years, to encompass not just inspection of schools but also of early years settings, 
colleges, initial teacher education, adult education, children’s social care, and local 
authority children’s services, is sustainable for a single organisation in the long term. The 
pressures placed on Ofsted by such a diverse and demanding range of duties could lead to a 
mass of competing priorities and a loss of direction. Both Ofsted and the Government 
should be alert to any sign that the growth of Ofsted’s responsibilities is causing it to 
become an unwieldy and unco-ordinated body. 
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The role of Ofsted in school improvement 
123. With the introduction of Ofsted in 1992 came a significant shift in the relationship 
between the inspectorate and schools and some argue that Ofsted now takes a more 
forceful role.184  The statutory task of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate (HMI) was not to become 
involved in school improvement but to report to the Secretary of State on the state of the 
nation’s education. School improvement was the duty of the school, its governors and the 
local authority. In 1991, the then Prime Minister, the Rt Hon John Major MP, expressed 
concern about standards in public services and, in relation to education, he was advised 
that inspection could be used as a tool to raise standards in schools. Inspections should be 
more frequent, with inspectors keeping professional distance from schools and teachers 
and focusing on the needs of pupils, parents, employers and taxpayers. It was decided that 
all schools should have a full inspection every four years and, for this reason, many more 
inspectors would need to be recruited. The number of Her Majesty’s Inspectors (HMIs) 
were reduced and the additional numbers were mainly supplied by commercial 
companies.185 
124. Ofsted would not report to the Secretary of State, as Her Majesty’s Inspectorate had 
done; it would be independent and responsible for its own published reports. The practical 
implications of this included the fact that inspectors would no longer stand back from the 
detail of school improvement and report on the state of the nation’s education, but were 
involved in judging individual schools on their performance and plans for improvement. 
They had the power to place schools in ‘special measures’, with significant impact on the 
school and local community.186   
HMI inspectors 
125. Ofsted now employs some 200 HMI inspectors working on schools inspection; 
approximately 1,000 more are supplied by contractors to work full-time or part-time.187 
Longstanding contracts between Ofsted and external providers came to an end in August 
2009. When the contracts for inspection from September 2009 onwards were let, the 
number of external providers was reduced from five firms to three: CfBT Education Trust, 
Serco Education, and Tribal Group.188 Ms Gilbert acknowledged that HMI were generally 
“well respected” but she maintained that “additional inspectors are also good inspectors”,189 
and she insisted that flexibility rather than cost was the reason for employing non-HMI 
inspectors.190 However, we were told that the reduction in numbers of HMIs and the move 
towards inspection services provided by commercial companies was still mourned in some 
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quarters.191 The NUT reported from a recent survey of its members that the approval rating 
of HMI inspectors continued to be “relatively high”;192 and John Dunford, General 
Secretary of the ASCL, said that “we would much rather have a system in which HMI was 
always leading the teams”.193 
126. There seemed to be little direct evidence, however, of any major gulf between the 
quality of HMI inspectors and those supplied by external contractors. Some, such as the 
National Association of Head Teachers, had concerns about inspectors’ experience and 
qualifications but did not explicitly attribute those concerns to the outsourcing of 
inspection.194 A common view was that the quality of inspectors was variable or depended 
heavily upon the composition of the team itself.195 On the other hand, the NFER told us 
that it had collected evidence indicating that those who had been inspected had “a very 
positive view of the professionalism and qualifications of inspectors”.196 
127. Ofsted maintains that additional inspectors—those not employed as HMIs—are 
“trained and extensively mentored, including supervised participation in ‘live’ inspection 
and grounding in ECM outcomes and safeguarding”. It pointed out that no inspectors may 
undertake inspection without supervision until HMI have declared that they fulfil 
requirements. 75% of inspections of secondary schools and 85% of inspections of schools 
causing concern are led by HMIs.197 We believe that Ofsted should aspire to have HMIs 
lead all inspections. Schools causing concern should always be inspected by a team 
headed by an HMI. 
The purpose of inspection 
128. Ofsted describes the purpose of inspection as being to provide an independent 
external evaluation of a school’s effectiveness and a diagnosis of what it should do to 
improve. The inspection report presents a written commentary on the outcomes achieved 
and the quality of a school’s provision, the effectiveness of leadership and management and 
the school’s capacity to improve. Ofsted’s inspections of schools perform three essential 
functions: providing parents with information; keeping the Secretary of State and 
Parliament informed about the work of schools; and promoting the improvement of 
individual schools, and the education system as a whole.198  It has been relatively 
uncontentious in this inquiry that Ofsted’s role includes providing information and the 
evaluation of standards of performance in schools. There has been an ongoing debate, 
however, about the precise role of Ofsted in school improvement.  
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129. Ofsted states that school inspection promotes improvement in a number of ways. The 
criteria for inspection and the guidance issued by Ofsted set expectations for standards of 
performance and effectiveness of schools. Where inspection endorses a school’s assessment 
of its own performance, this increases the school’s confidence; and a “sharp challenge” and 
motivation to act is given where inspectors disagree with the self-evaluation. The 
inspection report recommends priorities for future action and progress will be monitored 
where necessary. Inspection fosters constructive dialogue between inspectors and the 
senior leaders and staff of the school. Finally, Ofsted inspection complements the school’s 
self-evaluation and promotes rigour, thereby enhancing the school’s capacity to improve.199 
130. The research evidence that Ofsted inspection can lead to improvement is mixed. Some 
research has found that, in schools where achievement was already much higher or lower 
than the average, Ofsted inspection was associated with slight improvements in GCSE 
achievement.200  Other research has found a small negative effect associated with Ofsted 
inspection for the year of inspection.201  A joint report by the Institute of Education and 
Ofsted in 2004 states that “inspection is neither a catalyst for instant improvement in GCSE 
results nor a significant inhibitor”.202  The precise effect of inspection on standards does not 
seem to be clear-cut. 
131. Nevertheless, should the inspectorate seek to involve itself in school improvement 
above and beyond its duties to evaluate performance, diagnose problems and suggest 
solutions?  There is support for the view that inspection and school improvement should 
be more closely linked, but this has been combined with the assertion that Ofsted is not 
achieving this link. Christine Blower told us of the NUT’s concern that Ofsted was 
separated from the support for school improvement.203  The inspection and wider 
accountability system “have failed to bring about sustained improvement because of their 
separation from developmental support and from schools’ own improvement work”.204  A 
survey of NUT members revealed that they viewed Ofsted inspection as being separate 
from support for school improvement: inspections did not stimulate support or help from 
external sources to help schools improve.205  Christine Blower thought that Ofsted should 
engage in a dialogue with a school, not only about what needed improving, but also about 
how improvement might be brought about.206  John Dunford, General Secretary of the 
ASCL, was also of the view that there was no coherent relationship between external 
inspection and support for schools: an adverse Ofsted judgement led to several different 
bodies getting involved in supporting the school, which led the school to feel pressurised 
rather than supported.207 
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132. Over the years, different Chief Inspectors have placed a different emphasis on Ofsted’s 
role in school improvement. David Bell, for example, was clear that Ofsted had no role in 
following up on school improvement.208  Professor John MacBeath told us: 
That has been an ongoing issue back and forward: should inspections, should Ofsted 
help to improve schools or should it simply conduct an evaluation and then leave it 
to others? I put that question to David Bell when he was chief of Ofsted—he is now 
Permanent Secretary. I said, “What about your strapline ‘Improvement through 
inspection’?” He said, “Frankly, we don’t.” He said that inspection does not improve 
schools; on occasions, it is a very good catalyst and can help schools to rethink, but 
that is not the function of inspection.209 
Professor MacBeath stated that he agreed that school improvement is not a function of 
inspection on the basis that, once inspection had taken place, it was then the role of others, 
such as local authorities, SIPs, other critical friends and even universities, to step in and 
work over time with the school to address the problems identified by Ofsted. He did not 
think that it was possible for Ofsted to be responsible for both accountability and 
improvement.210  Martin Johnson of the ATL expressed a similar view. He argued that the 
drive for school improvement was often mistakenly conflated with the drive for school 
accountability. He noted the addition to Ofsted’s statutory remit of a duty to encourage 
improvement, but stated that school improvement was not reflected in Ofsted practice, nor 
could it be: “The way to embed school improvement in our schools is not through 
accountability mechanisms, but through growing the culture of a school as a learning 
institution and a reflective one”. 
133. The current Chief Inspector, Christine Gilbert, places considerably more weight than 
her predecessor on the capacity for Ofsted to bring about improvement. The precise term 
used in the Education and Inspections Act 2006 is that Ofsted and the Chief Inspector 
must perform their functions for the general purpose of encouraging the improvement of 
activities within their remit. The Chief Inspector explained her role to us as follows: 
I took the Education and Inspections Act 2006 really seriously. I was new and the Act 
created my post and created the new Ofsted. That charged us with three things: 
regulating and inspecting to secure improvement, which was very different from 
what was there before; regulating and inspecting to secure the engagement of users, 
which meant pupils children and learners, essentially—parents and employers; and 
ensuring value for money. Those three things were set out very clearly in the Act. 
They influenced and informed all our planning and thinking at Ofsted.211 
134. Despite the precise wording of the Act, the Chief Inspector clearly interprets her remit 
as “securing improvement” in schools.212  In its submissions to this inquiry, Ofsted 
presented a variety of evidence to demonstrate its role in school improvement. It stated 
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that teachers and parents agree that school inspection promotes improvement.213  Ofsted 
cited research by the NFER and other statistics which it says provide “evidence that the 
inspection system contributes to improvement”.214  In its recent publication on the 2009 
inspection framework, Ofsted stated that “We know, and independent research has 
confirmed, that regular monitoring of schools has a positive impact on improvement”.215  
The Chief Inspector gave as further evidence that inspection leads to improvement the 
example of schools placed in categories of concern: 
The evidence of schools being placed in the category of concern is really strong and 
has been strong for a number of years. If you look at the speed with which schools 
now go into special measures and come out of special measures, it is quicker than it 
ever was. In our surveys of head teachers, schools in special measures come 
absolutely at the top of the list on how effective the support from Ofsted has been. 
They say that they find the monitoring visits very helpful, not just in keeping the 
pace of progress going, but in helping them to be sharper about assessment, 
evaluation and so on. Our evidence shows that, as does the work done by the 
National Foundation for Educational Research.216 
135. However, a close examination of Ofsted’s position and evidence suggests that the 
reality is not so much that Ofsted secures improvement directly, but that it creates the 
conditions in which the improvement process can start, evolve and be monitored. The 
quotation above contains a statement which makes a very direct link between inspection or 
monitoring visits and improvement, yet it makes no mention of all the local authority 
resources, for example, which are devoted to schools in a category of concern. Diagnosis of 
problems, suggestions for action and discussions with inspectors may well be helpful to 
school leaders, but it is likely that they will receive much more time, detailed advice and 
support from other sources as a result of having been identified as causing concern. 
Despite her claims that inspection secures improvement in schools, the Chief Inspector has 
not, in our view, countered the proposition: that Ofsted identifies the issues which need to 
be addressed and may make suggestions about how they should be addressed, but it is 
mainly others that are addressing those issues directly and are active in improving school 
performance. 
136. The evidence demonstrates that there are problems for schools which cannot access 
the support they need to secure their own improvement. It is certainly true that the variety 
of support available from both national and local sources could be bewildering to an 
already struggling school, still reeling from an adverse Ofsted judgement. School 
Improvement Partners (SIPs) may not have the time to assist in brokering and accessing 
this support to the extent that schools might like. Some schools may not have an ideal 
relationship with their SIP in any event: we saw in the previous chapter that there were 
concerns about the SIP as a local authority appointee, essentially “spying” on the school. 
Although we have received evidence of good practice in many local authorities, this is not 
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universal.217  The process by which schools access help and support certainly needs to be 
addressed and we consider that inspection and support for school improvement could be 
linked more closely. Nevertheless, we remain convinced that Ofsted is not the appropriate 
body to deliver the latter. 
137. We note that Ofsted has a duty to encourage improvement in schools. However, we 
do not accept that Ofsted necessarily has an active role to play in school improvement. 
It is Ofsted’s role to evaluate a school’s performance across its many areas of 
responsibility and to identify issues which need to be addressed so that a school can be 
set on the path to improvement. Ofsted has neither the time nor resources to be an 
active participant in the improvement process which takes place following inspection, 
aside from the occasional monitoring visit to verify progress.  
138. We recommend that Ofsted’s role in school improvement be clarified so that the 
lines of responsibility are made clear to all those involved in the school system. Ofsted’s 
function is a vital one: it is, in the purest sense, to hold schools to account for their 
performance. It is for others—schools themselves, assisted by School Improvement 
Partners, local authorities and other providers of support—to do the work to secure 
actual improvement in performance. The Chief Inspector already has a wide and 
important remit: she should feel no compulsion to make it wider. 
The evaluation of provision: the need for a balanced picture of 
school provision 
Performance data based on test results 
139. School performance is multi-dimensional: academic attainment, happiness, take-up of 
extra-curricular activities, attendance rates, punctuality, health, safety, and levels of deviant 
or criminal behaviour (such as drug-taking), are all examples of things for which a school 
could be held accountable, to a greater or lesser degree. The Government emphasises the 
importance of indicators of pupil attainment, since “pupils’ life chances are to a great 
extent determined by their attainment in school”, but it says that performance data should 
not determine inspection judgements in a simplistic way.218  Ofsted reports on a school’s 
performance across a range of dimensions, including overall effectiveness; achievement 
and standards; personal development and well-being; quality of provision; and leadership 
and management. It has also been working on enhanced indicators of child well-being for 
incorporation into the 2009 inspection framework.  
140. The extent to which Ofsted has been successful in producing a rounded account of 
school performance has been the subject of sustained debate. We have for a long time been 
alert to concern in the school education sector about the Government’s standards agenda 
and the perception that Ofsted inspects in a manner tailored to this agenda.219  This has 
placed a heavy emphasis on educational attainment over and above other aspects of school 
provision. We noted this position in our Report on Testing and Assessment and made 
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recommendations about a move towards a more holistic evaluation of school 
performance.220   
141. Many have claimed that Ofsted attaches overriding importance to statistical evidence 
of academic attainment derived from test and examination results and that this is 
problematic.221  The recent origins of the problem appear to lie in the new ‘light touch’ 
inspection regime, introduced in 2005, as a result of which individual curriculum subjects 
have no longer been specifically scrutinised and schools have been judged chiefly on their 
performance data and self-evaluation. The previous inspection regime was considered 
burdensome, not least because of the length of each inspection. However, longer 
inspections did provide significant opportunities for lesson observation, and account was 
taken of a wide range of a school’s activities. There is concern that, as inspections have 
become shorter, inspectors are forced to rely more heavily on data provided in advance and 
there is far less opportunity to witness the school at work in a more general sense. An NUT 
survey reveals a strong perception that test and examination results are relied on too 
heavily as indicators of quality, in part because inspectors now spend less time in schools. 
Respondents to the survey indicated that a “crude link” between test results and inspection 
grades meant that quality teaching in challenging schools was often marked down.222  The 
Independent Schools Inspectorate emphasised the narrow range of school activity reflected 
in inspection reports: 
Changes in the maintained school inspection framework in recent years have led to 
greater reliance on self evaluation and test and examination results. We would 
question whether the current inspection tariff for maintained schools provides 
sufficient opportunity for inspectors to directly observe practice in schools in order 
to test the validity of self-evaluation and to make a reliable assessment of the 
outcomes for pupils beyond test and examination results.223 
This view has some support in evidence derived from a survey conducted by Phil Goss of 
University of Central Lancashire with the National Association of Head Teachers. A 
reduced emphasis on performance data in determining inspection outcomes was the 
change to the inspection system most commonly requested by respondents. Mr Goss 
thought that this indicated: 
… a strength of feeling about the way data on testing and CVA may pre-determine 
inspection outcomes, particularly in Primary Schools; as well as how inspection 
grades arising from this may overlook the quality of work done with pupils generally, 
and the overall leadership in a school.  
142. The Royal Statistical Society expressed the view that school inspections rely very 
heavily on performance statistics, yet inspectors, in many cases, had limited statistical 
expertise and inadequate statistical training.224  The NFER noted the concerns of some 
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schools inspected between October 2005 and March 2006 about the way performance data 
had been interpreted by inspectors. According to the NFER, this suggested a need for more 
consistency in the use and interpretation of data: it was now time that indicators of aspects 
of performance other than attainment should receive greater emphasis; and for more 
sophisticated indicators of pupil progress and school improvement to be developed.225 
143. In 2006–07, 98% of the 6,331 primary schools inspected and 96% of the 1,281 
secondary schools inspected received the same inspection verdict overall as they received 
for the ‘achievement and standards’ sub-heading. The association between overall verdict 
and other aspects of school life is much weaker. For example, 41% of primary schools 
received the same inspection verdict overall as they received for the ‘enjoyment’ sub-
heading.226  Ofsted has stated that “achievement is arguably the most important of all the 
grades. Other aspects of the report—personal development … leadership and 
management—all contribute to how well learners achieve”.227  From these figures, it seems 
that the method by which schools in need of improvement are currently identified places a 
very strong emphasis on test and examination results.  
144. In our Report on Testing and Assessment, we concluded that we “would be concerned 
if Ofsted were, in fact, using test result data as primary inspection evidence in a 
disproportionate manner because of our view that national test data are evidence only of a 
very limited amount of the important and wide-ranging work that schools do”.228  In its 
response to our report, Ofsted stated that: 
Solid evidence of performance through test and exam results, particularly in English 
and maths, is essential to learners’ future access to employment. Proficiency in these 
subjects is also vital for access to a wider curriculum. Inspection evidence shows that 
the most successful schools focus on national testing and assessment without 
reducing creativity in the curriculum.229   
The question is, “successful” on what terms: in terms of academic achievement or in terms 
of the provision of a balanced and rounded education to pupils?  It was the importance of 
the latter which we have emphasised in our Reports on Testing and Assessment and the 
National Curriculum. 
145. In May 2008, the Committee raised with the Chief Inspector the issue of the 
apparently strong correlation between a school’s test results and its Ofsted category. The 
Chief Inspector responded that the focus on raw test scores shifted considerably with the 
introduction of contextual value added (CVA) scores, which measure the progression of 
pupils’ attainment in the core subjects, taking into account the characteristics of a school’s 
intake. She added that: 
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I do not think you would find a straight line between test results and what we are 
saying about overall effectiveness. I am pretty certain you would not. … I cannot 
stress enough the fact that it is based on the inspectors’ judgments about the data, 
about what they see in the school, the judgments they make on what they see and 
hear, and on progress, which, for me, is absolutely key. The inspectors are looking at 
progress and outcomes and making a judgment using a whole range of indicators.230   
146. The Chief Inspector subsequently provided some further detail. Of the section 5 
inspections carried out between 1 September 2007 and 31 May 2008, 39% of schools were 
graded as satisfactory in relation to the ‘standards reached by learners’. The grades for 
‘overall effectiveness’ (ie the summary judgement on the inspection report) for all those 
schools judged to have satisfactory ‘standards reached by learners’ are set out in Table 2 
below. Just over half the schools received the same grades for ‘overall effectiveness’ as they 
did for ‘standards reached by learners’. Just over 40% received a judgement on ‘overall 
effectiveness’ that was higher than the grade for ‘standards reached by learners’. 3.5% of 
schools had satisfactory ‘standards reached by learners’ but were judged to be inadequate 
overall. 
Table 2 
‘Overall Effectiveness’ grade for schools judged to have 
satisfactory ‘standards reached by learners’  
Percentage 
1 (outstanding) 3.4% 
2 (good) 37.1% 
3 (satisfactory) 55.9% 
4 (poor) 3.5% 
 
The Chief Inspector affirmed that: 
The headline grade ‘how well do learners achieve’ given in inspection reports takes 
into account both standards (comparison with a national norm) and progress (this 
takes into account the value added by the school, and considers a variety of 
contextual factors and a range of first hand evidence gathered by inspectors). In 
reaching this achievement judgement greater weighting is given to the progress 
learners make.231 
147. Despite the considerable evidence to the contrary received by this inquiry, Ofsted told 
us that “schools no longer feel that inspectors are over-reliant on data”.232  Ofsted stated 
that inspections look at more than just test data to assess the performance of a school. 
However, although good data are available to inspectors about standards and progress, 
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Ofsted admits that the same is not true of all the Every Child Matters outcomes. 
Consequently, it told us that it has worked to improve the range of data available for the 
2009 inspection framework.233 
148. The 2005 inspection framework distinguished standards of attainment by learners 
from contextualised progression measures, and Ofsted told us that most emphasis was 
given to the progression measures. Under the 2009 framework, Ofsted proposes that the 
balance will be changed, so that attainment receives more emphasis than under the 
previous framework when judging how “pupils achieve and enjoy”.234  Arguably, this places 
more, not less, emphasis on raw scores as an indicator of performance, although we note 
that Ofsted has said that inspectors will spend much of their time observing classroom 
practice from September 2009.  
149. The continuing focus of the 2009 inspection framework on core subjects during 
inspections is likely to remain unpopular. Respondents to an NUT survey thought that the 
revised inspection framework would do nothing to tackle the fundamental problems of the 
previous regime. Although this survey revealed an increased level of support for the view 
that inspection reports were generally accurate and fair, there was also an increased 
perception that inspection failed to assess accurately the value added by schools.235  Nearly 
two thirds of the written comments submitted to the survey expressed a strong view that 
test and examination results were relied on too heavily as indicators of school quality. The 
NUT summarised the points raised: 
The main arguments used were that pupil performance data was being used 
exclusively by inspectors because of the reduced amount of time in school; that this 
was deeply unfair and inaccurate for small schools, special schools and those serving 
the most disadvantaged communities; that inspectors arrived in school with pre-
conceived ideas because of the focus on data and were often unwilling to consider 
any alternative evidence the school might have to offer; and that crude links between 
these data and the inspection grades meant that provision, particularly quality of 
teaching, would be marked down in order to match the overall grade dictated by the 
data.236 
150. It is likely that, as the 2009 inspection framework moves Ofsted towards attaching 
minimum expected results to inspection judgements and more frequent inspection of 
schools performing less well—judged largely according to test results—test scores and 
CVA measures will become more, not less, central to the inspection process. It is also 
important that inspectors, parents and other interested parties have a good understanding 
of a school’s achievements compared with equivalent schools. To that end we recommend 
a review of the data underlying comparator measures or sets of measures to ensure that 
they accurately reflect the range of factors that can impact on school performance. 
Professor Stephen Gorard has described the dangers of a reliance on current measures of 
school effectiveness based on test scores and CVA: 
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School effectiveness is associated with a narrow understanding of what education is 
for. It encourages, unwittingly, an emphasis on assessment and test scores—and 
teaching to the test—because over time we tend to get the system we measure for and 
so privilege. Further, rather than opening information about schools to a wider 
public, the complexity of CVA and similar models excludes and so disempowers 
most people. 
Indicators of other aspects of provision 
151. The lead inspector prepares a pre-inspection briefing for the school and the inspection 
team using a variety of materials, including: 
• data from the most recent RAISEonline report;237 
• the SEF or other self-evaluation presentation;  
• where relevant, sixth form performance indicators;238 
• the previous inspection report; 
• the reports from any other survey or inspection of the school carried out by Ofsted;239 
• information from any upheld complaints to Ofsted by parents about the school;  
• the results of any surveys showing the views of both the pupils and their parents; and 
• any additional information the school wishes to bring to the inspectors’ attention.240 
This inspection evidence can be categorised as performance data, self-evaluation, previous 
inspection reports and survey results. We have already discussed the issues surrounding 
the performance data and self-evaluation, and the previous inspection reports will have 
relied heavily on that information as it was at the time of the previous inspection. Until the 
inspection team has the opportunity to observe the school at first hand, the only additional 
information outside the closed system formed by the first three elements is the survey 
evidence on the views of pupils and parents. 
152. There has been considerable movement over the years in terms of the extent to which 
parents and pupils are involved in the inspection process. As we have previously noted, 
before the 2005 framework was introduced, parents were invited to meetings with 
inspectors, and those who attended were given the opportunity to have a full and frank 
discussion face to face. Under the shorter Section 5 inspection regime introduced from 
2005, there was no time for interviews in person and parents were sent questionnaires. The 
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2009 inspection framework states that inspectors will give particular priority to, amongst 
other things, gathering, analysing and taking into account the views of parents and pupils. 
In addition, from 2010, parents will be able to “influence the choice of which schools are to 
be inspected” where they have concerns about a school’s performance.  
153. From September 2009, Ofsted is conducting a trial study on the use of parent and 
pupil surveys. Many schools already commission their own surveys for the purposes of 
self-evaluation, but these will be standardised surveys administered nationally.241  The 
Ofsted survey data is being used for a number of purposes, including the development of 
indicators of pupil well-being according to the Every Child Matters framework, and 
indicators of parents’ and pupils’ perceptions of school provision. These indicators will 
complement quantitative indicators derived from the National Indicator Set.242  It is 
expected that these indicators will be used both to inform Ofsted inspection and for 
inclusion in the school report card.243  The indicators of pupils’ well-being and the school’s 
contribution to it currently proposed are extensive and are presented in Box 1. 
Box 1 
The indicators of pupils’ well-being and the school’s contribution to it currently proposed 
are the extent to which the school: 
• promotes healthy eating, exercise and a healthy lifestyle and (for younger children) 
play;  
• discourages smoking, consumption of alcohol and use of illegal drugs and other 
harmful substances;  
• gives good guidance on relationships and sexual health;  
• helps pupils to manage their feelings and be resilient;  
• promotes equality and counteracts discrimination;  
• provides a good range of additional activities;  
• gives pupils good opportunities to contribute to the local community;  
• helps people of different backgrounds to get on well, both in the school and in the 
wider community;  
• helps pupils gain the knowledge and skills they will need in the future;  
• offers the opportunity at 14 to access a range of curriculum choices;  
• supports pupils to make choices that will help them progress towards a chosen 
career/subject of further study; 
• pupils feel safe;  
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• experience bullying;  
• know who to approach if they have a concern;  
• enjoy school;  
• are making good progress;  
• feel listened to and are able to influence decisions in the school. 
Source: Ofsted (June 2009) Indicators of a school’s contribution to well-being 
We are aware of the difficulty of developing a robust methodology for measuring against 
these indicators. If the time taken by the Department to develop satisfactory measures for 
Contextual Value Added scores is any guide, this process of development and refinement 
could take several years. 
154. The Audit Commission highlighted the importance of involving parents in the 
inspection process as having a positive effect on children’s learning; and it considered that 
a parental survey gave a clear message that their engagement was necessary and valued.244  
There are, however, problems with survey evidence and the methodological issues are well-
known: the strength and validity of the indicators will only be as good as the survey 
instrument itself and its administration. In schools where parents have low levels of 
literacy, an aversion to filling out forms or where English may not be their first language, 
there may be low response levels to surveys and this will have a profound impact on the 
representative nature of the views expressed in the responses.245  The NASUWT stated that 
it had no objection in principle to the contribution of parents’ and pupils’ views for 
accountability purposes, but considered that the use of surveys was problematic: 
…views of pupils and parents on the quality of provision in schools may differ 
significantly depending on individual circumstances, such as whether a parent’s child 
has SEN or accesses some other form of specialist service and … not all parents are 
inclined to or well placed to provide feedback in this way. This highlights the point 
that while information gathered in this way may be useful, a degree of caution has to 
be exercised over its use. 
The Royal Statistical Society also urged caution in the use of survey data and it emphasised 
that the proxy nature of measures of well-being was pronounced. It therefore argued that 
“any attempts to use these for school accountability purposes should be viewed with even 
more care and indeed scepticism, than test and exam scores”.246  Professor John MacBeath 
was also concerned about the measurement of pupil well-being. He considered that some 
things defied quantification, and he disapproved of an approach which required well-being 
to be quantified in order to put it on an equal footing with the core curriculum. 
155. Whatever the technical problems with gathering information on parents’ and pupils’ 
perceptions, the question remains: how should emphasis in the inspection judgement be 
balanced between academic attainment and pupil well-being?  Ofsted stated that great 
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importance will be attached to the “other” Every Child Matters outcomes as well as the 
“enjoying and achieving” outcome. Some witnesses thought that they deserved an equal 
emphasis on the basis that they are closely interlinked.247  The National Governors’ 
Association thought that schools should be held accountable for matters such as well-
being, but only in the context of raising the standard of teaching and learning. Others were 
less specific, but approved an increased emphasis on well-being and thought that the 
current system did not reflect the importance of this aspect of school performance.248 
156. We believe that there is a need to rebalance the emphasis of inspection judgements. 
Academic attainment is important for children’s life chances and schools have a clear duty 
to ensure that each child achieves to the best of his or her ability. However, schools do far 
more for their pupils and the wider community than teaching academic subjects. Schools 
provide other learning and development activities, such as sport, music, drama, art and 
community work; and they have an effect on the take-up of extra-curricular activities, 
attendance rates, punctuality, health, happiness, safety, and levels of deviant or criminal 
behaviour. Schools clearly make a contribution to well-being in the sense encompassed by 
the Every Child Matters outcomes.  
157. We consider that the quality of school provision beyond the teaching of academic 
subjects is extremely important and that Ofsted has a duty to reflect this in a fair and 
balanced manner in its inspection reports. 
158. We have noted the concerns expressed by a significant number of witnesses that 
Ofsted places more emphasis on academic attainment, evidenced through test results and 
contextual value added measures, than on other aspects of a school’s provision. Schools 
achieve much in terms of academic attainment that is not measured by test results and 
contextual value added measures, yet there is a perception amongst many schools that only 
attainment measured in this way is given significant weight in the inspection report. We 
have sympathy with the view, often expressed to us, that schools are not judged fairly on 
the full range of their performance. Given that much school activity cannot be measured in 
quantitative terms, it is important that inspectors spend as much time as possible observing 
practice in schools so that they do not rely too much on quantitative data.  
159. We note that the 2009 framework emphasises that much of an inspector’s time during 
an inspection will be spent observing lessons, and we consider this to be a good starting 
point. However, there is a dilemma here: on the one hand, there is a limited amount of 
activity that an inspection team can observe at first hand during a two-day visit; on the 
other hand, we would not wish to see a return to a very lengthy and burdensome 
inspection regime. We believe that the school’s self-evaluation is important in directing 
inspectors’ investigations beyond that which is measurable and this is another reason why 
it is vital for Ofsted to address our concerns about the rigidity of Ofsted’s SEF (self-
evaluation form) and the pressure on schools to use this standard form rather than some 
other form which works better for them.  
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160. An increased emphasis on involving parents and pupils more fully in the inspection 
process and on developing better indicators of pupil well-being are a welcome step in the 
right direction. However, we share the concerns of witnesses who warned that those 
aspects of well-being measured using survey evidence and standard indicator sets are a 
poor proxy for the true contribution made by schools to the well-being of pupils. We 
believe that Ofsted should strengthen its findings in this area by emphasising the 
importance of inspectors seeing for themselves the contribution that schools make in this 
area. 
161. We urge Ofsted to rebalance its inspection framework in two ways, in order to 
reflect better the true essence of the school. First, when evaluating academic 
attainment, we recommend that Ofsted gives less evidential weight given to test results 
and derivative measures and gives more weight to the quality of teaching and learning 
observed by inspectors in the classroom. Second, when evaluating a school’s 
performance in terms of pupil well-being and other non-academic areas, we 
recommend that Ofsted should move beyond the search for quantitative measures of 
performance and that it should focus more effort on developing qualitative measures 
which capture a broader range of a school’s activity.  
 




4 Achievement and Attainment Tables and 
the School Report Card 
162. Achievement and Attainment Tables, formerly known as performance tables, are 
compiled and published by the DCSF. The tables are a major part of the school 
accountability system and provide statistical information on the school cohort, test results, 
a CVA score,249 a series of comparative annual data on test scores, statistics on absence, and 
statistics on pupils with special educational needs (SEN). Tables of one sort or another have 
been the subject of controversy for many years, not least because many feel the information 
they provide gives only a partial view of a school’s overall performance.250  The 
Government’s proposal for a new school report card is an attempt at presenting more 
information on a wider range of performance indicators. We consider the consequences of 
the Achievement and Attainment Tables, how the school report card might change the 
accountability landscape and how useful these tools are for parents and others who are 
interested in a school’s performance. 
Achievement and Attainment Tables 
163. With the introduction of the National Curriculum and National Curriculum testing 
following the Education Reform Act 1988 came the compilation of performance tables 
which permitted the ranking of schools according to their results. In 2004 these 
performance tables became known as Achievement and Attainment Tables and a ‘Value 
Added’ measure was included, which gave some context to a school’s raw test scores. The 
Department expressed the general view that it was important for performance data to be 
publicly available in order that schools could be held accountable for their performance. It 
argued that the data should be accessible to everyone, presented in a comprehensible 
format, and suitable both for informing the general public about the quality of education 
provision in their area and for assisting parents in making school choices.251  The 
Department believed that the current Achievement and Attainment Tables had 
strengthened the accountability of schools through a focus on standards and attainment; 
and that there was a strong positive association, demonstrated by OECD research, between 
public attainment data and stronger results.252   
164. The Achievement and Attainment Tables do not rank schools, but the data presented, 
particularly the raw test scores, are processed by the press and others to produce league 
tables of schools.253  DCSF acknowledged that the press used this information to produce 
ranked league tables but argued that, if the Government did not publish the data it holds, it 
would be forced to do so in any event under Freedom of Information legislation.254    
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Nevertheless, Professor John MacBeath told us that there is precedent for governments 
ceasing to publish accountability data on the internet. He cited the case of Hong Kong, 
where the government has done just that, having recognised that the published 
information was having a demoralising effect on teachers.  
165. The value of these tables in guiding parents in their choice of schools has been 
questioned, for instance on the grounds that the most recently published information on a 
school’s performance relates to a cohort of pupils who entered the school several years 
previously, rather than the current cohort.255 
166. Some witnesses have also argued that public reporting of accountability data in 
performance tables should cease. The NUT and the NASUWT both noted that there are no 
performance tables or national targets linked to test results in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland; they were either not introduced at all or, after some negative 
experiences, subsequently abolished. The NUT believed that they should be similarly 
abolished in England.256  The Royal Statistical Society preferred a ‘private accountability’ 
system under which feedback on strengths and weaknesses would be given directly to 
schools with a view to supporting them towards higher performance, rather than 
identifying failures in public. Any subsequent publication of results should occur only at 
the end of the discussion process and should recognise the provisional nature of any 
judgements, the statistical uncertainties inherent in performance data, and relevant 
contextual factors which may have influenced results.257  The General Teaching Council for 
England stated that it would favour a system where schools would have more responsibility 
for accounting publicly for their performance via the school profile. This, it said, would be 
preferable to the de-contextualised and incomplete picture given in the Achievement and 
Attainment Tables.258  The National Governors’ Association took a pragmatic approach: 
The reporting of school performance is a vexed issue. Governors are largely against 
the current system of league tables and to date are not supportive of any single 
measure that defines a school’s performance. However, there is recognition that it is 
not possible to return to a place where there is no reporting, and so there is support 
for a balanced report card - as long as it measures more than attainment. 
The Government now proposes that the School Report Card should “supersede the 
Achievement and Attainment Tables as the central source of externally verified, objective 
information on the outcomes achieved by schools in England”.259 However, the detailed 
performance data used to prepare the School Report Card would continue to be 
published.260 
167. Performance data have been a part of the educational landscape in England for 
some years. Like it or not, they are a feature of the school accountability system and we 
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recognise the manifest difficulties in retreating from that position, even if a watchful 
eye should be kept on the consequences of the abandonment of performance tables 
linked to test results in other parts of the United Kingdom. If such data is to be 
collected, much can be done to mitigate the more unfortunate aspects of the 
publication. We take a pragmatic view and believe that the focus of debate should move 
towards a more fruitful discussion of the types of data and information collected and 
the method of presentation. 
The effects of Achievement and Attainment Tables on schools 
168. The Association of School and College Leaders summed up concerns about the 30-
year shift in accountability practices to the present day system: 
In the 1970s it became accepted wisdom that schools were not accountable, and that 
there was too little information available about them outside their walls. This may 
have been true, but the subsequent tendencies for ‘naming and shaming’, for the 
publication of misleading ‘league tables’, for accountability systems to become more 
intrusive, and for them to distort educational practice, has been very damaging.261 
Professor Stephen Gorard agreed, stating that schools and teachers were routinely 
rewarded or punished on the basis of flawed performance evidence publicly reported in 
tables. In his view, teachers would focus on, for example, departmental value-added figures 
which would then lead them to focus their attention on particular areas or types of pupil. 
As a result, he believed that teachers’ professional practice was being distorted, pupils’ 
education was being damaged, and parents and pupils were led to judge schools on the 
basis of evidence which, he argued, was largely spurious. He added that these measures 
were “associated with only a narrow understanding of what education is for” and that the 
complexity of measures such as CVA scores were, in any event, largely incomprehensible 
to the public and even some academics involved in school effectiveness research. Even the 
Chief Inspector, Christine Gilbert, has agreed that parents and “people who are really quite 
engaged in the educational debate” cannot understand the contents of the Achievement 
and Attainment Tables.262 
169. The desire of some schools to maintain or improve their standing in performance 
tables can give rise to a variety of other practices which are not necessarily beneficial for 
individual pupils. In our report on Testing and Assessment, we commented at length on 
the perverse incentives, created by performance tables and targets, for schools to teach to 
the test, narrow the taught curriculum, and focus on candidates on the threshold of target 
grades, all in an effort to achieve the best possible test results. We noted that, where they 
occurred, these practices were harmful because pupils were forced to focus on a very 
narrow syllabus, taught in a manner best calculated to get pupils through the test 
successfully. The chances of engaging children’s interest in learning are low with an 
approach which stifles creativity and focuses on assessment output. Moreover, those pupils 
who are achieving either well above or well below the target level set by the Government 
may be given relatively less attention in class compared with those children who are on the 
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target borderline.263  As might be expected, we received much the same evidence as part of 
this inquiry.264  Even Ofsted noted that, although the best schools do not resort to such 
measures: 
The publication of information about schools’ performance through test and 
examination results can lead in some cases to teaching to the test and a narrowing of 
the curriculum in certain year groups.265 
170. This evidence begs the question: why do some schools feel the need to maximise test 
and examination results in ways which involve teaching to the test and other harmful 
practices?  Part of the answer must lie in schools’ perceptions of the way in which 
performance data is used. The Department maintained that parents did not use 
performance tables in isolation and formed judgements based on a range of evidence, 
including inspection outcomes, the views of other parents and other local intelligence.266  
Yet other witnesses asserted that parents and teachers used the published data without any 
understanding of their inherent statistical uncertainty, driving schools to take extreme 
measures to improve their performance data.267  The two views are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive: it is the fear of some schools that the data might be used without 
understanding which drives them to maximise their statistics. The way parents interpret 
performance data is significant because, if a school is unable to boost its standing in the 
league tables, it may face public censure and risk a reducing student population as parents 
seek to send their children to a different school.268  Parents aside, the interpretation of 
performance data by teachers may also have profound consequences for a school. A 
deteriorating reputation can present serious problems for a school in terms of recruiting 
and retaining the talented staff necessary to turn the school around.269 
171. Many of the concerns registered in relation to Achievement and Attainment Tables 
have related to the 14–16, or Key Stage 4, phase of education. There is considerable 
diversity in the range of qualifications on offer in this phase, yet only certain qualifications 
are recognised for the purposes of the Achievement and Attainment Tables. We were told 
that maintained schools are less likely to offer those qualifications not recognised, even 
though they might be more appropriate for certain students, particularly those less engaged 
with academic learning. Witnesses stated that vocational qualifications recognised in the 
Tables have been “forced into alignment with academic qualifications”, thereby reducing 
their usefulness and uptake amongst those learners for which they were originally 
designed. At the more challenging end of the academic spectrum, IGCSE is an example of a 
qualification not recognised in the Achievement and Attainment Tables, and there has 
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been widespread debate about their use and standing in relation to other qualifications, in 
particular the GCSE.270 
172. Once qualifications have been recognised, it is not straightforward to compare 
standards in education across such a diverse set of provision in order that this information 
can be presented in a simple set of tables, so a concept of equivalence has been developed 
over time. In this context, Cambridge Assessment provided a technical analysis and 
referred to some “serious issues” in relation to the compilation and management of the 
Achievement and Attainment Tables.271  The rating process for determining equivalence 
and locating new qualifications within the existing framework of recognised awards is 
detailed, complex and lacks transparency. Cambridge Assessment stated that this process 
“contains substantial elements of judgement [and is] not subject to coherent regulation or 
scrutiny”. A “very small team” in what is now the Qualifications and Curriculum 
Development Agency (QCDA)272 allocates ratings for qualifications based on a flow of data 
from schools and the advice of officers in QCDA and DCSF, “on the basis of ‘fit’ and 
avoidance of anomalies”. Cambridge Assessment added that the rating team was “heavily 
driven by the ‘internal logic’ of previous decisions and allocations” and that they did not 
carry out extensive empirical studies of the effect of ratings system on institutional 
behaviour.273  Cambridge Assessment would like to see the ratings and equivalence process 
allocated to Ofqual, the independent examinations regulator, rather than the 
Government’s QCDA. Cambridge Assessment believes that Ofqual can bring to the 
process a greater degree of transparency, sophistication and sensitivity than it receives at 
present.  
173. These equivalence ratings have practical consequences. The assumption inherent in 
the Achievement and Attainment Tables is that the school is the correct level at which to 
measure performance and direct mechanisms for improvement in order to improve 
individual pupil learning. We were told that this, when combined with the equivalence 
mechanism inherent in the Tables, can give rise to perverse incentives for schools to choose 
‘easier’ qualifications in which it is more likely that their students will achieve higher 
grades. Qualifications which, in the view of Cambridge Assessment, have “different societal 
status and currency for progression” are nevertheless deemed equivalent for the purposes 
of the Tables. Schools looking to improve their standing in the Tables can migrate towards 
those qualifications in which students are more likely to get a higher grade and reject 
qualifications deemed equivalent but which are actually academically more challenging. 
We note that the gap between the proportion of students getting any 5 A*–C grades at 
GCSE and the proportion getting 5 A*–C including English and mathematics has 
broadened from 10% ten years ago to around 20% last year.274 This is likely to be at least 
partly due to schools choosing easier qualifications for some students. Cambridge 
Assessment sees no clear evidence that Achievement and Attainment Tables impact 
beneficially on classroom practice and, indeed, there is evidence to suggest that “more 
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superficial learning approaches have been adopted in a misguided attempt to maximise 
examination performance”.  
Accounting for the full range of a school’s work 
174. Many witnesses have called for a more rounded picture of schools to be presented in 
place of the current Achievement and Attainment Tables.275  A survey of parents by the 
National Confederation of Parent Teacher Associations found that 96% of parents wanted 
to see a wider range of measures used. Ofsted noted that the current tables reflected only a 
narrow picture of a school’s performance and could appear daunting to users: 
Performance tables reflect a narrow although important part of schools’ work. 
Currently, the range of public information on schools’ performance can be confusing 
and in practice, parents may rely more on Ofsted inspection reports than the 
Achievement and Attainment Tables, because the reports provide a more holistic 
evaluation of the school.276 
VT Education and Skills277 made a case for inclusion of a broader spectrum of judgements 
in performance tables in order to do justice to schools which were performing well but 
would not achieve a good rating on the basis of raw test scores or CVA measures. Despite a 
relatively poor showing according to the current criteria, the performance tables would not 
show that such schools may be improving their test results steadily as well as improving 
their performance in areas which were harder to evaluate, such as “inclusion, collaboration 
with other schools, contribution to community cohesion and quality of multi-agency 
working”.278   
175. In a bid to move the Government away from a system which presents such a narrow 
view of school performance, our Report on Testing and Assessment recommended that the 
use of national testing for multiple purposes—measuring pupil attainment, school and 
teacher accountability, and national monitoring—should be stopped. For the purposes of 
national monitoring, we favoured a national sampling approach up to age 14, which would 
be much less burdensome on schools than the saturation testing which was, at the time of 
our Report, carried out at Key Stages 1, 2 and 3. In line with our recommendations, in 
October 2008, the Secretary of State announced that Key Stage 3 testing would no longer be 
compulsory.279  Then, in its response to our report on Policy and delivery: the National 
Curriculum tests delivery failure in 2008, the Government stated that it would bring in 
sample testing for the purposes of national monitoring at the end of Key Stage 3. We 
welcomed these changes as a step in the right direction. The Association of School and 
College Leaders has also expressed its approval, noting that what had seemed a politically 
difficult move was not so difficult in reality: 
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It is politically difficult to move away from some of these measures. The retention of 
the school league tables and the overblown testing regime in particular seemed to 
have become a test of political machismo. Yet when the KS3 tests were abolished in 
2008 there was relatively little adverse comment and a good deal of praise for the 
decision.280 
176. The Achievement and Attainment Tables present a very narrow view of school 
performance and there are inherent methodological and statistical problems with the 
way they are constructed. For instance, they are likely to favour independent and 
selective schools, which have a lower intake of deprived children or of children with 
Special Educational Needs. It is unsurprising, therefore, if such schools consistently top 
the academic league tables. Yet most of those who may wish to use the Tables, 
particularly parents, remain unaware of the very serious defects associated with them 
and will interpret the data presented without taking account of their inherent flaws. As 
a result, many schools feel so constrained by the fear of failure according to the narrow 
criteria of the Tables that they resort to measures such as teaching to the test, 
narrowing the curriculum, an inappropriate focusing of resources on borderline 
candidates, and encouraging pupils towards ‘easier’ qualifications, all in an effort to 
maximise their performance data. There is an urgent need for the Government to move 
away from these damaging Achievement and Attainment Tables and towards a system 
which gives a full and rounded account of a school’s provision.  
School Report Card 
The proposals 
177. The school report card, announced by the Secretary of State in October 2008, will be 
introduced from 2011, with a two year pilot starting in autumn 2009.281  It is intended 
partly to answer criticisms of the narrow evidence base of the current Achievement and 
Attainment Tables, and the Department stated that it “will provide our key statement on 
the outcomes we expect from schools, and the balance of priorities between them, ensuring 
more intelligent accountability across schools’ full range of responsibilities.”  The 
Department told us that: 
The data currently available is heavily weighted towards academic attainment and 
while data which places pupil and student attainment and progress into context - in 
particular, Contextualised Value Added—is published by the Government, it is 
typically not reported by the press, or given much lower prominence than “raw” 
attainment scores. In developing School Report Cards, the Government hopes to 
make sure that accountability arrangements are made sharper and more 
comprehensive.282 
178. The school report card will be published annually, with the results of more recent 
Ofsted inspections being incorporated when they are available. DCSF will compile and 
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publish the school report card nationally and will provide an electronic copy to schools for 
them to publish locally.283  The school report card will set out the key outcomes expected of 
schools, to include pupil attainment, progress and wellbeing; reducing the impact of 
disadvantage; parents’ and pupils’ perceptions of the school and the support they receive; 
and, possibly, partnership working. The progression measure will be contextualised in 
order to account for schools with differing intakes. In line with a recommendation by the 
Expert Group on Assessment, the school report card will supersede the Achievement and 
Attainment Tables as the main source of accountability information and the detailed 
performance data used to prepare the report card will be published.284 
179. It is intended that the report card and Ofsted inspection report will be 
“complementary and different evaluations of the school’s work”.285  DCSF and Ofsted are 
working together to establish a consistent set of priorities for schools which will be 
reflected in the school report card, Ofsted inspection report and school self-evaluation 
form (SEF). The report card will present quantitative information on an annual basis; 
Ofsted’s inspection report, normally less frequent, will present more qualitative 
information resulting from an inspection which is a snapshot of a school’s performance.286 
180. The Department states that the report card is aimed at: 
• Parents and carers: to provide a clearer, balanced, comprehensive account of 
performance, which complements Ofsted’s inspection reports; to inform parent choice 
and improve school accountability to parents; and to provide information in a format 
which is more understandable and accessible than at present. 
• Schools: to provide a single, clear, prioritised set of outcomes against which schools will 
be judged with predictable consequences; to recognise the value of work across all 
outcomes and to hold schools to account for those they can influence; to provide a 
balanced account of outcomes achieved and the degree of challenge faced by a school. 
• Government: to provide a means of supporting the vision for school reforms; to hold 
schools predictably and consistently to account for what is most important; and to 
incentivise schools in the right way and remove perverse incentives. 
• Ofsted: to support the school inspection process.287 
181. The precise links between the school report card and Ofsted’s inspection framework 
are unclear. The joint DCSF-Ofsted publication A School Report Card: Prospectus states 
that a majority of respondents to the consultation on the report card agreed that a common 
set of indicators should be used for the school report card and for Ofsted’s risk assessment 
(previously referred to by Ofsted as a “health check” and, more recently, as an “interim 
assessment”).288  The Prospectus envisages that a common view of the relative importance 
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of different outcomes should be reflected in both the school report card and the inspection 
framework.289  The document goes on to state that: 
Our intention is that the indicators that underpin the School Report Card will form 
the core of the process of risk assessment that Ofsted will use to select schools for 
inspection. … In the short term, Ofsted will use the selection process developed for 
the launch of the new inspection arrangements in September 2009.290 
In both the Prospectus and the White Paper, the Government recognises that the school 
report card will not be the sole source of information Ofsted uses in coming to a final 
decision on whether to inspect a school.291  The Minister, Vernon Coaker MP, was at pains 
to reassure us that the Department had worked “very closely” with Ofsted in producing the 
latest proposals for the school report card. He went so far as to say that, if the final version 
of the school report card did not work for Ofsted as the basis of its risk assessment, then he 
was sure that the Chief Inspector would decline to use it as such.292 
182. In giving evidence to us, Ofsted has been less clear about the role of the school report 
card in its inspection processes, despite the fact that it has joint authorship of the 
Prospectus. The Chief Inspector told us that: 
I do not see [the school report card] as aimed at Ofsted. I see it as primarily aimed—a 
number of people would use it—at parents, the public and pupils themselves.293 
When we questioned Ofsted on its involvement with the development of the school report 
card, we were told that Ofsted’s expertise was being drawn on by the Department, but we 
were certainly not given the impression that Ofsted were in equal partnership with the 
Department, despite the claims made in the Prospectus.294  As part of the 2009 inspection 
framework, Ofsted has developed an “interim assessment” for schools previously judged 
‘good’ or ‘outstanding’ which will not be inspected within three years of the previous 
inspection (inspection for such schools will take place at up to five-year intervals). The 
Department clearly envisages that the school report card will be used by Ofsted for risk 
assessment purposes, yet the Chief Inspector told us in May 2009 that: 
We had been expecting to do our own—we did initially call it a report card or a 
health check—but we would not be doing both. It doesn’t make sense to do both, so 
we felt comfortable working with what was emerging, as long as we could have some 
say in what was emerging.295 
The end of this statement seems to imply that if the eventual form of the school report card 
does not work for Ofsted, inspectors may not use it to replace the existing interim 
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assessment. In the 2009 inspection framework published in July 2009, Ofsted said only that 
“This interim assessment may be superseded by the proposed School Report Card” 
[emphasis added].296 
183. There seems to be some confusion over the links between the school report card and 
Ofsted’s inspection framework. In principle, we see the sense in developing a common set 
of indicators and a common view of the relative importance of different outcomes, leading 
to the potential for Ofsted to use the school report card in place of its current interim 
assessment when deciding which schools to inspect. However, it seems that the 
Department is driving the development of the school report card and that Ofsted is taking 
an advisory role.  
184. We urge the Government to work closely with Ofsted in order to produce a model 
of the school report card appropriate for use by the inspectorate. However, if in 
Ofsted’s view the school report card ultimately takes a form which is unsuitable for the 
purpose of risk assessment, as an independent regulator, Ofsted should not feel 
compelled to adopt the school report card as a replacement for its interim assessment.  
Contents of the school report card 
185. The Prospectus sets out the basis on which the pilot of the school report card will 
commence, with modifications to be made as necessary during the pilot phase. The 
categories to be included in the school report card are: 
• Pupil progress; 
• Pupil attainment; 
• Pupil wellbeing; 
• Pupils’ perceptions; 
• Parents’ perceptions; and 
• Narrowing gaps in pupil performance. 
There will be both a score and a rating for each performance category (e.g. a score of A and 
a rating of 8/10). The intention is to provide both an overall indicator of performance and 
an indication of the priority attached to the different elements of performance. The scores 
attained in each of these categories will go towards calculating an overall score for the 
school’s performance. The Prospectus recognises the tension between recognising the full 
range of a school’s performance and keeping the number of indicators to a manageable 
minimum. The weighting attached to each indicator will be key in this respect.297 
186. The annual data presented in the school report card will be contextualised in certain 
ways. There will be some indication of how a school’s performance in each category has 
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changed since the previous year.298  There will also be some basic information about the 
school on the school report card, such as whether it has a special unit for SEN pupils, and 
information about the particular characteristics of the school, and its ethos statement.299  
The Prospectus states that every school, regardless of its local circumstances, should have 
an equal chance to achieve a good score on the report card. However, it emphasises the 
importance of “absolute outcomes” for children. Indicators of pupil attainment will, 
therefore, not be contextualised. The pupil progress indicator will be the means of 
contextualisation in measuring a school’s academic performance and the pilot will test 
three types of measure: progression, value added and contextual value added.300  As pupils 
start at different levels of attainment, there is a degree of contextualisation inherent in this 
measure. It is noted that the weighting given to absolute and contextualised measures in 
the school report card will be fundamental to the fairness of the system. Later in the pilot 
study, contextualisation of other indicators—pupil well-being, parents’ perceptions and 
pupils’ perceptions—will be considered. 301 
187. In searching for an appropriate well-being indicator, the intention is to capture a 
measure of a school’s contribution to pupil wellbeing. The framework of the five Every 
Child Matters outcomes is commonly used and a range of quantitative and qualitative 
wellbeing measures will be piloted from September 2009. The pilot will draw on work 
being carried out by Ofsted on well-being indicators, including the possibility of deriving 
pupil well-being data from parent and pupil perception surveys.302  The indicators for the 
parents’ perceptions and pupils’ perceptions categories on the school report card will be 
derived from these surveys.303 
188. The school report card will be used as a lever for narrowing the gap in achievement 
between certain under-performing groups and their peers. Factors which correlate closely 
with under-achievement at school include those relating to membership of some ethnic 
groups, levels of household income, special educational needs and being looked after by a 
local authority. The Prospectus states that the accountability system should be used to 
provide “positive incentives” to schools to identify and improve the progress of these 
children. In order to measure the attainment gap, indicators based on established Key Stage 
2 and 4 thresholds304 will be designed to address under-performance correlated with 
poverty or ethnicity. The attainment gap to be measured will be the difference between the 
proportion of disadvantaged pupils reaching target thresholds compared with the 
proportion of their peers reaching the same target. An alternative measure of income 
deprivation will also be tested, which combines eligibility for free school meals with the 
Income Deprivation Affecting Children Index, a postcode-based deprivation indicator 
currently used in the calculation of CVA. 
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189. In a similar vein, the school report card will contain a measure reflecting a school’s 
“success in securing positive outcomes for children with SEN” and reflecting the views of 
children with SEN and their parents. The pilot study will seek a means of identifying 
outcomes for SEN children without creating perverse incentives to over- or under-identify 
SEN as a means of influencing scores.305 
190. Finally, the Prospectus gives a commitment to the inclusion of partnership working 
on the school report card and promises further consultation.306  In line with the increasing 
emphasis on this aspect of a school’s activity, Ofsted’s revised inspection framework for 
September 2009 will also give a judgement for the effectiveness of partnership working. 
191. The school report card will be introduced into mainstream primary and secondary 
maintained schools in the first instance, including Academies. The model will be refined 
and developed for special schools, Pupil Referral Units and alternative provision. It will 
also be developed to reflect early years and sixth form provision and, in relation to the 
latter, how it might reflect the Framework for Excellence report card.307 
Appraisal of the school report card 
192. If witnesses to this inquiry have been largely critical of the current Achievement and 
Attainment Tables and their effect on schools, with some exceptions they have generally 
welcomed, at least in principle, the concept of the school report card.308  We asked Jon 
Coles, Director General of the Schools Directorate at DCSF, what evidence the Department 
had for the effectiveness of the school report card. He said that there was very good 
evidence from New York that the report card there had challenged and raised performance 
in the lowest performing schools.309  However, even those witnesses who welcome the 
school report card in principle have not shared the Department’s confidence in the 
effectiveness of the specific report card model proposed. 
193. First, there has been some concern at the prospect of the Government borrowing a 
policy from another jurisdiction without consideration for social, structural and cultural 
differences which may affect implementation of the policy and its ultimate effects. An 
international comparative analysis of accountability and children’s outcomes in a variety of 
jurisdictions carried out by the School Accountability Review Group310 concluded that: 
There is widespread and increasing interest in monitoring the performance of 
education and children’s service systems and in monitoring performance across an 
increasing range of outcomes. There is extensive policy borrowing. Government 
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needs to recognise that policy structures and cultural practices are different in 
different systems.311 
194. The NUT states that the key purpose of the school report card in the New York 
system is to focus resources on those schools most in need. It observed that The New York 
report card is published with a caveat that it does not provide information about student 
performance on a number of measures which are, nevertheless, valued by the community; 
and it added that these issues do not appear to be recognised in proposals for the English 
school report card.312  Fundamentally, the NUT believes that the English school report card 
proposals are set within the existing “high-stakes, punitive inspection regime which is data 
driven”, rather than being used as part of a revised accountability strategy. Such a revised 
regime should, according to the NUT, effect real change by encouraging schools to focus 
on their wider responsibilities to improve the life chances of pupils with the freedom to 
innovate.313  The NUT considers that the report card proposals fail to take account of 
schools’ self-evaluation work and states that it will merely add to the existing accountability 
burden, rather than reduce or rationalise it, as the Government claims.314 
195. Second, there is a concern about the lack of evidence-based policy making. Professor 
Peter Tymms argued that, although we might consider the New York system and the way 
the report card is said to work in that jurisdiction, it was not possible to know for sure what 
effect the report card had had in New York because there was no way of making an 
evidence-based assessment. There, as here, many reforms and changes had been 
introduced simultaneously and, because of that, it was not possible to draw causal links 
between a single initiative and an outcome or set of outcomes.315  If Professor Tymms’ 
views are accepted, the Department’s claims that there is good evidence for the 
effectiveness of the report card in New York seem hard to sustain. 
196. We welcome in principle the introduction of the school report card as a 
rationalisation of current accountability mechanisms and an attempt at providing a 
broader evidence base for assessing schools’ performance. However, the Government 
must take care in developing its proposals that it tailors the school report card to the 
particular needs of the English schools system. Lessons can be learned from 
international practices and the case of the New York school report card will be 
particularly relevant; but the Government should not assume that what works 
elsewhere will necessarily work in the English system. 
197. We set out below issues raised by witnesses under a variety of headings. The list is not 
necessarily exhaustive, but should be taken as an indication that the school report card 
requires a considerable amount of work before it is suitable for use as a fundamental part of 
the English school accountability system. 
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What is the school report card for and who is it aimed at? 
198. There is a question mark over what the school report card is for and who it is aimed 
at. The National Association of Head Teachers and the Association of School and College 
Leaders welcomed the school report card as having the potential to provide parents and 
others with a holistic view of a school not currently available to the public.316  The National 
Governors’ Association considered that the School Report Card was potentially a sound 
basis for informing parents about a range of measurable outcomes as well as describing the 
school’s priorities. However, the Association warned that overcomplicating the school 
report card would defeat its purpose and make it incomprehensible to parents.317 
199. Both the General Teaching Council for England and the Local Government 
Association (LGA) considered unrealistic the aspiration expressed by DCSF that the school 
report card could be a single accountability tool for all parties, including parents, carers, 
schools, government and Ofsted.318  The LGA also questioned how the current proposals 
for a school report card would fit in with models and processes connected with Ofsted, 
Framework for Excellence and the Comprehensive Area Assessment.319  Edexcel did not 
necessarily approve of the form of school report card currently proposed but saw potential 
for it as a means of rationalising information currently available from a variety of sources, 
some of which may be contradictory and inaccessible to some sections of the community. 
It considered that a school report card should be used to draw together in one place and in 
a coherent form a range of indicators of well-being, progress and achievement. These 
would be represented by a blend of quantitative and qualitative data, including parent and 
pupil surveys and a professional assessment of the quality of services, adjusted to reflect 
local circumstances.320  The Association of School and College Leaders thought that the 
school report card was an attempt to: 
… address some of the weaknesses of the present system by drawing different 
indicators together to offset one perverse incentive against another and to limit 
accountability measures to a single list. As such it is welcome, but ASCL is not 
convinced that it will not simply be added to the existing system rather than 
replacing it, or that it will not also grow without limit as every interest group adds its 
particular favoured element.321 
200. There were also concerns about the likely complexity of the school report card. 
During our visit to New York, we were told that the report card used there was considered 
too complex for many parents to understand. Witnesses representing the Awarding Bodies 
in this country also remarked on this problem with the New York report card. Both Simon 
Lebus, Group Chief Executive of Cambridge Assessment, and Jerry Jarvis, Managing 
Director of Edexcel, said that generating large quantities of data for the purposes of a 
report card can become highly complex and lead to difficulties in making judgements 
 
316 Ev 11; Ev 9 
317 Ev 101  
318 Ev 4–5; Local Government Association; Q 100 
319 Ev 40 
320 Ev 62–63  
321 Ev 11 




about a school’s performance. They both considered that much work had to be done before 
the English school report card would be in a position to work around these complexity 
issues.322  
What should be in the school report card? 
201. Although the principle of a scheme which gives a broader account of school 
performance was welcomed, witnesses have expressed differing views about what they 
want to see in the school report card. Some want it to provide plentiful, in-depth 
information about a school; others want it to provide just a few headline objectives ranked 
on a simple scale.323  The Centre324 suggested that both objectives could be achieved if the 
school report card were presented on a website with a simple front page for each report 
card and the ability to click on a category to access much more detailed information.325  
The Centre welcomed the school report card, but it cautioned that its success would 
depend on the right categories being chosen and the full data on which the report is based 
being made available to parents should they wish to access it.326 
202. The Local Government Association (LGA) considered that the proposed categories of 
performance for the school report card—attainment, pupil progress, wider outcomes, 
narrowing gaps, parents’ views, pupils’ views—seemed sensible. However, the LGA was 
awaiting further detail on how the indicators were to be constructed before passing final 
judgement. The Audit Commission, the General Teaching Council for England (GTCE) 
and others were also positive about the inclusion of wider outcomes and an indicator of 
narrowing gaps in achievement.327  Indeed, the Audit Commission thought the school 
report card should go even further to include comment on out of school activities and 
other services, such as use of the school nurse and therapist.328  However, the Association of 
Teachers and Lecturers (ATL) did not believe that the proposal to collect data on wider 
outcomes and narrowing gaps would be any more valid or reliable than the more 
traditional, and in the ATL’s view flawed, indicators of pupil attainment and progress.329 
203. The Prospectus makes clear the Government’s commitment to the view that raw test 
scores, regardless of a school’s context, are extremely important indicators of a school’s 
performance. Contextualisation is introduced in only one measure on the school report 
card, ‘pupil progress’. The GTCE wished to see all indicators on the school report card 
contextualised, on the basis that the focus on raw scores could negatively impact on schools 
working in challenging circumstances and fail to give them credit for good work.330 The 
National Association of Head Teachers argued that the school report card should be 
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viewed alongside the school’s self-evaluation form and development plan in order to 
provide context.331 
204. The Prospectus gives a commitment to the inclusion of partnership working on the 
school report card and promises further consultation.332  The Youth Justice Board 
welcomed this as a means of promoting partnership working.333  The LGA also approved. 
The GTCE, however, saw a contradiction between, on the one hand, the vision set out in 
the 21st Century Schools consultation document of the school as a community hub, 
involved in a variety of networks and partnerships connected with the wider outcomes for 
children and young people; and, on the other hand, the notion of a school report card 
which may or may not include a description of the partnerships in which the school is 
involved.334  According to the GTCE, further work was needed to explore how partnership 
working should be reported.335  The ATL was concerned about the school report card 
making schools accountable for matters beyond their control, particularly in terms of well-
being. The ATL saw responsibility for children’s well-being as shared between schools and 
other local services and worried that the shared nature of the responsibility would not 
adequately be reflected in the measure of partnership working included in the school 
report card. 
205. It is proposed that the school report card will use a ‘credit system’ in relation to work 
with disadvantaged children. Schools with sufficient numbers of disadvantaged pupils 
would gain credit to the extent that they achieve continuous improvement for all pupils 
whilst at the same time narrowing the gap between disadvantaged groups and others. The 
GTCE supported this focus on a school’s contribution to narrowing achievement gaps.336  
The Government is considering penalties for increasing gaps, but it is acknowledged that 
this may result in unfair penalties for schools due to a change of intake rather than 
performance.337  James Liebman, Chief Accountability Officer at the Department of 
Education in New York, told us that the New York authorities considered it important to 
give credit to schools which make progress with under-performing groups of pupils and to 
ensure that there was no disincentive in the system which would motivate schools to avoid 
taking on challenging pupils. Reflecting this concern, the Youth Justice Board of England 
and Wales urged the Government not to include in the school report card any measure 
which might have the effect of discouraging schools from taking their “fair share” of pupils 
with challenging behaviour and from disadvantaged backgrounds.338 
206. Schools should be strongly incentivised by the accountability system to take on 
challenging pupils and work hard to raise their levels of attainment. To this end, we 
support the proposals to introduce credits on the school report card for narrowing the 
gaps in achievement between disadvantaged pupils and their peers. However, we 
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strongly caution the Government against the introduction of any penalties for 
increasing gaps in achievement. If the Government were to attach such penalties, it is 
likely that schools would seek to deny school places to challenging pupils in order to 
avoid the risk of a lower school report card score. They might also create incentives for 
schools not to push gifted and talented students to reach really high levels of 
achievement. 
The overall score 
207. The Government remains committed to the inclusion of an overall rating on the 
school report card. It recognised in the White Paper that how the score was constructed 
would be crucial to the way it was received.339  The Prospectus states that a summary score 
on the school report card is an important mechanism for ensuring clarity and transparency 
in priorities for school performance and it must be underpinned by a balanced method of 
representing a school’s performance; but it is recognised that developing a scoring model 
that is robust, credible and accepted will be challenging.340 
208. The debate about the inclusion of an overall score in the school report card is 
essentially an argument about complexity. If it is thought that parents and others can 
understand complexity in school performance reporting, then there is no need for a 
summative school report card which provides an overall grade. On the other hand there is 
the view that complexity is not normally grasped by lay users of performance data and it is 
better to take control centrally by presenting one, privileged view of school performance—
one which focuses on a number of measures judged to be the most important and weighted 
according to defined criteria. According to this view, there will always be other ways of 
judging a school, but one formula is chosen over all others for policy reasons and an overall 
grade is awarded on the basis of a single view of what should be prioritised. A possible 
middle way would be to grade performance in the chosen categories, say on a scale of 1–10, 
and leave it at that, so that no overall grade is awarded and parents and others can choose 
the measurements that are most important to them. Individuals do this routinely in other 
areas. For example, when buying a car consumers have a range of information on which to 
base their choice. They prioritise what is important to them—price, NCAP rating,341 engine 
size, fuel type and consumption—and make their choice without recourse to an overall 
rating. 
209. John Bangs, representing the NUT, expressed another view of the complexity issue. 
He thought that the overall score was more about providing simplicity to government than 
to parents: 
We have to understand where the single grade comes from. It comes from the 
Government’s approach to public sector reform. It is a flight from complexity. It is 
about giving Ministers simple solutions to complex problems, but … those are often 
wrong solutions. A single grade does not drive up motivation for institutional 
improvement. What it does is tell the best people in the institution to leave, especially 
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if it is a really bad grade, because it can’t differentiate between those who are effective 
in the institution and those who are not. It is a crude blunderbuss approach that can 
lead to the best people leaving the institution. Perhaps [a balanced school report 
card] is a holy grail, but it is achievable: the key issue is to have a simple summary of 
the effectiveness of the institution, looking at the key concerns and issues, without 
having a single grade bracketed into four separate tiers that actually has the effect of 
demoralising individual people who are really making a difference in the 
institution.342 
210. There was little support in the evidence for an overall score on the school report card. 
A survey of parents by the National Confederation of Parent Teacher Associations found 
that 56% favoured the inclusion of both an overall score and individual scores for each 
measure used to assess performance.343  However, many witnesses thought that an overall 
score would be misleading or risk an over-simplification of a complex set of data.344  The 
Audit Commission stated that the school report card should include only measures which 
gave a balanced view of school performance. Parents could then prioritise for themselves 
which indicators they thought were most important for their child and focus on the 
relevant part of the report card. Both the General Teaching Council for England and the 
National Association of Head Teachers strongly opposed the overall rating and were 
concerned that it may undermine the legitimacy and usefulness of the school report card.345  
Edexcel expressed concern that, without an appropriate explanatory narrative 
underpinning the report card, there was a danger that over-simplification “could easily 
provoke public and media over-reaction to a single summative grade, as has been the case 
in the US”.346  The LGA was against the inclusion of an overall score on the basis that it 
risks gross over-simplification of a complex set of indicators. The Advisory Centre for 
Education was also opposed, arguing that the overall score could be misleading. The 
Association of Teachers and Lecturers focused on problems inherent in the data on which 
the overall score would be based, stating that the school report card would “replicate the 
problems of the current accountability system. Individual grades will be allocated based on 
an accumulation of flawed data, but will be reported as if they offer meaningful 
information and comparison”.347     
211. We have been struck by the weight of evidence we have received which argues 
against an overall score on the school report card. It is true that Ofsted comes to an 
overall judgement on a four point scale, but this judgement is meant to be the result of 
a very extensive analysis of a school’s provision across the board, relying on 
quantitative and qualitative evidence and first-hand experience of the school at work. A 
school report card is not, and in our view never can be, a full account of a school’s 
performance, yet the inclusion of an overall score suggests that it is.  
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212. The range of discrete measures proposed for inclusion in the school report card 
certainly present a broader picture of a school than the current Achievement and 
Attainment Tables; but they cannot be the basis for a definitive judgement of overall 
performance in the same way as we are entitled to expect an Ofsted judgement to be. 
On balance, we think that parents and others should be able to decide for themselves 
those measures of performance most important to them. We approve of the proposal 
both to grade and rate performance in each category on the school report card, but we 
are not persuaded of the appropriateness of and need for an overall score.  
Consistency 
213. There are at least two types of consistency which are relevant to the school report card. 
First, in order to allow for a meaningful analysis of a school’s year-on-year progress, it 
should be an instrument which is consistent over time, so far as possible. The White Paper 
certainly presents the school report card as a means of providing a consistent picture of 
schools’ performance. However, we heard from the Office of Accountability in the New 
York Department of Education that the reporting mechanisms for the New York report 
card were constantly being modified and refined as a result of challenges from schools who 
considered them unfair. James Liebman, Chief Accountability Officer, admitted that the 
system was not perfect, but he maintained that it could be constantly improved and he 
considered the report card was still fundamentally useful in that it concentrated the minds 
of school leaders on improving performance. Nevertheless, serial changes to reporting 
criteria present a barrier to tracking year-on-year performance of schools on the basis of a 
consistent set of indicators. 
214. Second, the school report card should be consistent with wider elements of the 
accountability system so that conflicting judgements and priorities are not perpetuated 
from the existing system into the reformed system. The overall score on the school report 
card is intended to be complementary to the Ofsted judgement.348  Although the 
Prospectus envisages that a common view of the relative importance of different outcomes 
should be reflected in both the school report card and the inspection framework, 349 the 
NUT had some objections to this. The alignment of the school report card with Ofsted 
inspection criteria suggested, according to the NUT, that Ofsted would be following 
Government policy on ‘standards’ and school intervention which, in turn, suggested an 
erosion of Ofsted’s independence from Government.350 
215. The Government accepts that there will be times when the school report card score 
and Ofsted inspection judgement do not give the same message about a school’s 
performance.351  Ofsted also accepts this will happen, explained by the fact that the school 
report card will present backwards-looking data, whereas an Ofsted inspection judgement 
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represents a real-time snapshot of the performance of a school which takes into account a 
different set of performance indicators.352 
216. We recommend that the Government guards against serial changes to reporting 
criteria for the school report card once it is introduced nationally. The ability to track 
school performance on a range of issues over time is potentially a valuable feature of 
the reformed system, but this will not be possible if the reporting criteria are in a 
constant state of flux.  
217. There is potential for substantial confusion to be introduced if the reasons for 
differences between scores on the school report card and Ofsted judgements are not 
clear, leading to a perception of incoherence in the accountability system. This would 
be unfortunate, as the success of any accountability system depends on the extent to 
which users have confidence in it. We recommend that DCSF and Ofsted work together 
to find a way to eradicate, or at least minimise the impact of, this problem. If the 
Government accepts our recommendation not to include an overall score in the school 
report card, the potential for conflicting accounts of school performance would be 
greatly reduced. 
Suitability of proposed indicators as a proxy for underlying performance 
218. According to the White Paper and Prospectus, three of the measures proposed for the 
school report card—pupil wellbeing, parents’ perceptions and pupils’ perceptions—may be 
based wholly or largely on responses to ‘perception surveys’ and, in the case of well-being 
indicators, nationally collected data on attendance, exclusions, post-16 progression, the 
amount of sport provided and the uptake of school lunches.353   
219. There is no indication of what thought has been given to the possibility that response 
rates for some schools, particularly from parents, might be quite low and we have noted in 
Chapter 3 some serious methodological concerns with survey evidence.354  Witnesses such 
as Aspect have certainly expressed concern about the validity of conclusions drawn from 
unrepresentative samples.355 
220. We are also concerned about the well-being indicators and the extent to which they 
can really be accurate, based as they are on a limited set of loosely-related quantitative data 
and problematic survey evidence. Beyond the recent Ofsted consultation on well-being 
indicators, there is very little evidence to indicate just how accurately such indicators can 
represent a school’s true performance in relation to pupil well-being. The Association of 
Teachers and Lecturers did not believe that the proposal to collect well-being indicators 
was sound.356  The Independent Schools Inspectorate found the proposals for including 
“qualitative judgements in numeric form” alarming. It thought that the evidence may be 
thin, it was not clear how the views of pupils and parents would be reported appropriately, 
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and yet such evidence could have a significant negative impact on a school.357  The 
NASUWT pointed to the possibility that views of pupils and parents on the quality of 
school provision may differ significantly depending on their individual circumstances and 
urged caution over the use of survey evidence. 
221. Professor Stephen Gorard of the University of Birmingham has considered the 
current model of school effectiveness, dominant in research, policy and practice in 
England, which is based on assessment results. He has noted that there is a need for more 
research on school effectiveness in terms of wider outcomes for children: 
Schools are mini-societies in which pupils may learn how to interact, what to expect 
from wider society, and how to judge fairness (Gorard and Smith 2009). Schools 
seem to be a key influence on pupils’ desire to take part in future learning 
opportunities, and on their occupational aspirations (Gorard and Rees 2002). All of 
these outcomes have been largely ignored in three decades of school effectiveness 
research. It is time to move on.358 
222. The Government must address the methodological problems inherent in basing 
important indicators on survey evidence. It is unacceptable that schools with the most 
challenging intakes might suffer skewed performance scores because of a low response 
rate to surveys for the purposes of the school report card.  
223. Academic research in the field of school effectiveness is lacking in the field of pupil 
well-being and wider outcomes beyond assessment results. In the absence of robust, 
independent research evidence, the Government should exercise great caution in 
pursuing its otherwise laudable aim of widening the accountability system beyond 
simple test scores. 
224. We do not believe that the indicators based on parent and pupil surveys, together 
with data on attendance, exclusions, the amount of sport provided and the uptake of 
school lunches, provide a balanced picture of a school’s performance. In the absence of 
a set of performance indicators which are able to provide a fully rounded and accurate 
picture of how well a school is supporting and enhancing the well-being and outcomes 
of its pupils, the school report card should not purport to give a balanced view of a 
school’s overall performance in this or any other area. The Government should make 
clear on the face of the school report card that its contents should only be considered as 
a partial picture of the work of a school. This is not to say that we do not consider the 
inclusion of well-being indicators to be a welcome development: we are merely 
concerned that parents and others should understand the limits of the information 
which is presented to them on the school report card. 
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Summary conclusions on the School Report Card 
225. We are pleased that the Government is now moving away from the Achievement 
and Attainment Tables based on a narrow set of measures of academic achievement 
derived from test results. We believe that the move towards the broader evidence base 
proposed for the school report card is a step in the right direction. However, we 
reiterate our warning to the Government that it should not make claims for the school 
report card which do not stand up to scrutiny. It will never constitute a definitive view 
of a school’s performance but it might, if properly constructed, be a useful tool in 
assessing a broader range of aspects of a school’s performance than is possible at 
present. 
226. At the start of the pilot study of the school report card, it is too early for us to make 
detailed recommendations about its precise contents. At this stage, we simply urge the 
Government to take account of the concerns raised by witnesses to this inquiry. There 
is still much work to be done in developing the school report card into a workable 
format. 
 




5 Conclusion: complexity, consistency and 
coercion 
227. Having considered the major elements of the accountability system, a number of 
inter-related messages have emerged. First, complexity: the school accountability and 
improvement system has become extremely complex, with layer upon layer of new 
initiatives being imposed on schools. Second, consistency: linked to the complexity issue is 
the impression that some major elements of the accountability system are giving 
conflicting messages. This leads schools, parents and others to worry about the consistency 
of the various mechanisms which are supposed to hold schools to account and support 
them towards better performance. Third, coercion: the Government and Ofsted are giving 
mixed messages about whether schools themselves are driving school improvement or 
whether they must simply submit to improvement programmes imposed on them by 
others. We examine these issues in further detail below. 
Complexity 
228. The New Relationship with Schools was intended to simplify and make more 
coherent the school accountability and improvement process.359  The Government 
acknowledged that schools complained of a ‘bidding culture’, in which there were too 
many programmes and initiatives which distracted them from the task of school 
improvement. The ‘single conversation’ with schools was, therefore, meant to remove from 
schools the need to take account of multiple initiatives from a variety of different sources 
and have a single conversation with a School Improvement Partner (SIP) about 
development priorities, targets and support needs.360   
229. However, witnesses have complained that the vision of the ‘single conversation’ is not 
a reality for schools. The Association of Schools and College Leaders stated that “the  single 
conversation has suffered from the top-down target setting culture of the DCSF and its 
agency the National Strategies”.361  Local authorities, School Improvement Partners and 
headteachers have said that one of the biggest problems facing schools is the number and 
frequency of new initiatives emanating from central government. They have also expressed 
concerns about a lack of understanding by the Government of how new programmes 
would work in practice and the possibility of adverse, unintended consequences.362  VT 
Education and Skills363 pointed to a need for simplification, agreeing with others that there 
were too many initiatives and adding that information for parents was either too widely 
spread or not presented in a comprehensible format.364   
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230. Councillor Les Lawrence, representing the Local Government Authority (LGA), gave 
as a reason for the frequency of policy initiatives the Government’s “unfortunate 
misunderstanding” of the length of time between a policy being set by Government, 
implemented in a school or across a local authority and the manifestation of an outcome 
from that policy. He thought that Government had a tendency to rush and, in doing so, did 
not allow sufficient time for policies to run their course from inception, through 
implementation to outcomes. He thought that, over the last 20 or 30 years, governments 
had tended to pursue goals which were not always compatible with the requirements of 
sound policy delivery.365 Councillor Lawrence emphasised the need for a period of stability 
so that schools and local authorities could focus on improvement, free from the pressure of 
constant change: 
… we have had this constant change, dare I say it, ever since the Baker curriculum 
reforms. …  A period of stability would be very helpful to enable us to bring about 
the type of improvements that we are beginning to achieve now, simply because we 
have the data to hand and the powers to intervene.366 
231. Anastasia de Waal, Director of Family and Education at Civitas, a thinktank, found 
the frequent succession of new ideas frustrating. The net result was that educationalists 
were never in a position to consolidate and use the knowledge gained from experience 
because a policy was dropped or changed before its true effects could be discerned. New 
policies simply brought new problems, not solutions to the problems which already 
existed.367  Professor Peter Tymms has also stated that, with so many national initiatives 
being rolled out simultaneously, it is impossible to establish which ones are leading to 
better accountability and school improvement and which ones are not.368  Professor 
Tymms said that he would like to see the Government testing policies systematically in 
order to generate solid evidence about the effectiveness of policies. He argued that the 
Government should formulate policy with the explicit aim that it would be updated in the 
light of the evidence which emerges.369 
232. Jon Coles, Director General of the Schools Directorate at DCSF, told us that, through 
the policy-making process, the Government was trying to understand the factors that affect 
children’s educational success and to identify policies that would be effective in bringing 
about that success. He said that the White Paper proposals were an attempt “to reduce the 
pressure of centrally driven reform programmes” and to move towards a system more 
tailored to the needs of individual schools.370  He did not, however, explain why the pace of 
change in Government policy needed to be so relentless and so centrally directed. 
233. As the strategic commissioning authority for schools in the maintained sector, local 
authorities are at the heart of the school accountability and improvement system and are, 
therefore, acutely aware of the complexities of that system. An excellent example of this 
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complexity is provided by the arrangements for supporting school improvement at the 16–
19 phase of education. For all education providers, the LGA states that the “key agency for 
driving improvement is the institution or provider itself, supported as appropriate by other 
providers working in local delivery consortia”.371  Support and challenge is provided by the 
sponsoring agency and, where this is ineffective, the sponsoring agency has duties to secure 
improvement. The sponsoring agency for schools and sixth form colleges is the local 
authority; but for academies it will soon be the Young People’s Learning Agency (YPLA); 
and, for general further education colleges, the Skills Funding Agency, with the local 
authority and YPLA identifying underperformance and commissioning the Learning and 
Skills Improvement Service as necessary. This is clearly a very complex network of agencies 
operating at the 16–19 level of education.372  Councillor Les Lawrence said that the LGA 
had some concerns about this “plethora of bodies” and worried that it was a “mechanism 
for exercising greater centralised control than is necessary to exercise the new powers for 
the commissioning of 16–19 provision”.373 
234. Furthermore, there are a variety of existing and proposed measures for performance 
management, including the school report card pilot study to record schools’ performance 
in relation to children up to age 16, Achievement and Attainment Tables, the Data 
Dashboard for school sixth forms, Framework for Excellence for the further education 
sector, the new Ofsted inspection framework, Comprehensive Area Assessments, and self-
regulation. The LGA stated that “unless these are brought together into a single integrated 
system there is likely to be both public and professional confusion and inefficient use of 
resources”.374   
235. Once local authorities have strategic commissioning responsibility for all education 
and training for children and young people up to the age of 18, there may be a stronger 
argument for placing greater emphasis on performance across 14–19 provision within a 
more coherent and integrated framework. The LGA, in its response to the Department’s 
consultation on 21st Century Schools and A School Report Card, questioned why the focus 
was exclusively on schools and not on other types of provider who are engaged in the 
education and training of young people up to the age of 19. The LGA noted that the 
Education and Skills Act 2008 and the Apprenticeships, Skills, Children and Learning Bill 
(which has since passed into law) both require collaboration between local authorities and 
providers of all types of education and training up to 19 and considered that a harmonised 
accountability framework would promote such collaboration. 
236. Instead, there remains some confusion about the status of partnership working and 
how account should be taken of the work schools do with other partners. The Government 
has strongly emphasised schools working in partnership with others, both in the White 
Paper and in the proposals for the school report card.375  Ofsted also makes a judgement on 
partnership working under the new inspection framework and states that it is working with 
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the Department “To refine ways of evaluating partnerships more securely within the 
accountability framework. … Common principles are being developed which will enable 
inspectors to evaluate the impact of collaborative working in schools, early years’ settings 
and colleges”.376  The Association of School and College Leaders (ASCL), however, argued 
that “The accountability system is predicated on, and encourages, competition between 
schools at a destructive level, since it is wholly predicated on the performance of the 
individual school”.377  The Association of Teachers and Lecturers saw more benefit in a 
community-based approach to accountability, with increased focus on partnerships and 
collaborations between schools, other education providers (early years and 14–19) and 
other children’s services.378 
237. Another manifestation of the complexities raised by the evaluation of partnership 
working has been in connection with the Diploma. The Diploma has the potential to 
transform the way schools operate at the 14–19 level. Not only is it meant to combine the 
academic with the vocational, but schools are generally required to collaborate with each 
other and with other education providers in order to provide Diplomas. This means that 
the achievements of pupils in a school at Diploma level may be due, not only to the efforts 
of that school, but also to the efforts of other education providers involved. 
238. Edexcel, one of the Awarding Bodies providing the Diploma, states that open 
competition between schools has been encouraged over many years, impeding trust and 
collaboration at local level. It considers that “Collaboration in provision is yet to be 
translated into collaboration over outcomes, not least because colleges are central to such 
partnerships for learners aged 16 and under, but are not included in the current proposals.”  
Edexcel does not consider that the Department has yet produced a workable model for 
accountability demonstrating collaboration between various providers.379 
239. The complexity of the school accountability and improvement system in England 
is creating a barrier to genuine school improvement based on the needs of individual 
schools and their pupils. We support the message in the 21st Century Schools White 
Paper, that schools should be empowered to take charge of their own improvement 
processes. However, the Government’s continuing tendency to impose serial policy 
initiatives on schools belies this message and the relentless pace of reform has taken its 
toll on schools and their capacity to deliver a balanced education to their pupils. We 
urge the Government to refrain from introducing frequent reforms and allow schools a 
period of consolidation. 
Consistency 
240. The Government stands by the current accountability system as a coherent and 
effective approach to holding schools to account and driving improvement. The 
Department stated that “the current school accountability system plays an effective role in 
raising standards, enabling schools to drive their own improvement, identifying excellent 
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performance and underperformance, keeping parents informed and ensuring resources are 
directed to where they are most needed.”380  However, the NUT believed that the current 
accountability system was muddled and that, contrary to the Government’s claim, there 
was no evidence that tests, targets and performance tables had improved standards over the 
past decade.381  Moreover, teacher initiative and creativity was undermined by uncertainties 
created by multiple and often conflicting lines of accountability.382  The NUT stated that: 
“The Government in England has failed consistently to adopt a coherent approach to 
school accountability. Current systems for evaluation, from individual pupils to the 
education service at national level, are extraordinarily muddled. There is no clear 
rationale of why various systems of summative evaluation and accountability exist. 
Consequently, schools experience over-lapping forms of high stakes evaluation 
systems … which are often in contradiction with each other. These over-lapping 
systems of accountability are made worse by Government national targets for test 
results and examination results and by the publication on an annual basis of school 
performance tables.”383 
241. The ASCL made a similar point, claiming that the present system had evolved 
haphazardly over generations, placed progressively less trust in schools and teachers, and 
was no longer fit for purpose.384  The ASCL stated that reducing levels of trust in schools 
and teachers has led to an expanding accountability system which has become over-
burdensome because schools are held accountable in too many ways to too many different 
individuals and bodies. These include children and parents as individuals, those groups 
collectively, the governing body, the local authority, members and officers of the local 
authority, school improvement partners (SIPs), advisers appointed by National Strategies 
or the National Challenge, Ofsted, the Children’s Commissioner, Children’s Trusts, the 
Learning and Skills Council, the press, and partnerships set up to address behaviour, 
diplomas or other locally agreed issues. The ASCL stated that these accountabilities often 
conflict, looking for different priorities and demanding incompatible behaviours. For 
example, different plans and different targets have to be agreed with different bodies.385  
The ASCL would like to see a new system designed with a limited number of elements 
which are not burdensome and which accurately reflect the performance of schools.386 
242. Edexcel described the current accountability system as “fragmented” and, like the 
ASCL, referred to the multiple bodies to which schools were accountable. According to 
Edexcel, inconsistency was a feature of the system at a number of levels. It argued that 
Ofsted reports used CVA data inconsistently so that account was not necessarily taken of 
school context. It added that light-touch inspection for high-performing schools could 
reinforce funding advantage and encourage ‘coasting’; yet close scrutiny of low-achieving 
schools could reinforce funding disadvantage, undermine professional confidence and lead 
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to problems with recruitment and retention of skilled and experienced teachers. 
Furthermore, Edexcel argued that league tables based on raw test and examination scores 
also failed to account for a school’s context, particularly in terms of a challenging intake. It 
said that such measures tended to increase the demand for places at schools perceived as 
‘high-performing’ and reduce demand for places at ‘low-performing’ schools, with 
damaging consequences for the local community.387  According to this view, there is an 
inconsistent approach to accountability and outcomes for schools, depending on a 
judgement of their performance based on raw test and examination scores.  
243. An often-quoted example of inconsistency in the school accountability system stems 
from the National Challenge, administered through the Government’s National Strategies 
agency. The Government set a target for secondary schools of 30% of pupils achieving 5 
A*–C grades at GCSE, including English and maths. The target for primary schools is 65% 
of pupils achieving level 4 or above in Key Stage 2 English and maths.388  The Government 
launched the National Challenge in June 2008 to provide increased resources and 
assistance to schools failing to meet the threshold targets. Various interventions are 
possible, including school closure; replacing the school with an academy; teaming the 
school with a high-performing school as part of a federation; encouraging the school to 
acquire a trust in order to secure external involvement in its governance; or replacing the 
governing body with an interim executive board. 
244. Although the additional resources for school improvement associated with National 
Challenge were welcomed, there was concern about a number of aspects of the 
programme. The emphasis on examination results did not take account of the wider 
activities and context of the school, including the characteristics of the intake. National 
Challenge schools expressed anxiety that they would be perceived as failing, leading to a 
spiral of decline as some parents moved their children to other schools. It was argued that 
the list of National Challenge schools was misleading as some had received favourable 
Ofsted judgements and, indeed, some were mentoring other schools to help them improve. 
Witnesses including Edexcel and the Independent Schools Inspectorate noted the apparent 
conflict between some National Challenge outcomes and Ofsted judgements and Edexcel 
considered that this raised questions as to whether there existed, in fact, a coherent 
accountability ‘system’.389  National Challenge also seemed incongruous next to CVA 
scoring as some National Challenge schools actually scored very highly in CVA terms.390 
245. We put the problem of inconsistency between Ofsted judgements and schools judged 
as failing under the National Challenge programme to HM Chief Inspector. She responded 
that the Government was considering only raw examination results under National 
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Challenge, whereas inspection judgements were based on a much wider range of 
performance measures. The Chief Inspector said that, when she reviewed the reports of 
schools judged outstanding or good by Ofsted which had failed to meet the National 
Challenge threshold target, she found that inspectors had felt sure that those schools were 
improving and their capacity to improve was apparent.391 
246. In other areas, the Department appeared to agree that a range of performance 
measures was preferable to an undue focus on raw scores and this principle underpinned 
proposals for the new school report card. Nevertheless, as we have already noted, even the 
school report card will continue to place great reliance on test and examination results. 
Moreover, the potential for the overall score on the school report card to appear to conflict 
with Ofsted’s judgement of the school’s performance has been admitted by both the 
Government and Ofsted. A further problem will arise if Ofsted decides that the school 
report card is not suitable as a replacement for the interim assessment for schools who are 
judged ‘good’ or ‘outstanding’ under the new inspection framework. Not only will this be 
an additional burden on schools, but it would also introduce another area in which the 
potential for inconsistency, this time between the interim assessment and the school report 
card, is clear.  
247. There is a broader debate on accountability which considers whether accountability 
should be to the centre or to local communities. This is connected with the evidence from 
the NFER study on local authority use of statutory powers which highlighted differences in 
approach to accountability and improvement between central and local government, with 
the former putting increasing emphasis on the use of statutory powers to change radically 
the structure of a school judged to be failing, and the latter often relying on non-statutory, 
collaborative means of supporting schools and promoting improvement. The LGA 
confirmed that the collaborative approach to school improvement was a deliberate strategy 
on the part of local authorities.392   
248. The Association of Teachers and Lecturers (ATL) considered that “the current system 
gives undue weight to central government, particularly through national test data and 
Ofsted inspection”, leading to the undesirable consequences of narrowing the curriculum 
and stifling innovation and creativity. The ATL and the GTCE argued in favour of a 
rebalancing of accountability in favour of parents, governing bodies and the local 
community.393  The proposals for a school report card and continuation of individual 
accountability, the ATL said, would perpetuate an insular approach by schools as each does 
what it can to climb the league tables. The ATL saw more benefit in a community-based 
approach to accountability, with increased focus on partnerships and collaborations 
between schools, other education providers (early years and 14–19) and other children’s 
services. This evidence underscores a generalised view of an inconsistent approach between 
levels of government, with central government perceived as coercive and local government 
as collaborative (as we explore in greater detail in the next section). 
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249. Inconsistencies in the approach to school accountability and improvement and 
inconsistencies in the judgments which are made in different parts of the accountability 
system are both confusing and damaging. Confusion undermines the credibility of the 
accountability system and schools which find themselves pulled in different directions 
are unlikely to be able to give their full attention to the fundamental task of providing 
their pupils with a broad and balanced education. 
Coercion: are schools really free to drive their own improvement? 
250. The language of self-evaluation and schools taking charge of their own improvement 
processes permeates the Ofsted inspection framework and many recent publications by the 
Government, including the White Paper. Yet the reality is that schools in need of 
improvement are still subject to programmes devised and applied by central government 
through its agencies.  
251. Once again, National Challenge is a good example of how schools, who may be 
performing at a high level according to Ofsted, find themselves constrained by the 
structure of a national programme imposed by the Government. The ASCL and others 
pointed to the use of statistical indicators and targets throughout the system as a major 
reason for schools bending to perverse incentives rather than necessarily doing what was 
best for their pupils.394  It argued that “There may be a place for such approaches, but there 
is at present little room for anything else.”  The ASCL gave the example of the National 
Challenge target of 30% of pupils gaining five or more GCSEs, including English and 
maths, at grades A*–C. This led to schools focusing their attention on pupils who were 
close to the threshold, to the detriment of those performing either well above or well below 
the threshold. 395  This is not necessarily how a school would choose to operate in the 
absence of a programme such as National Challenge. 
252. Recent research by the National Foundation for Educational Research (NFER) 
detected tension between local and central government when the National Challenge 
programme was introduced. Local authorities did not necessarily oppose the programme 
as such—indeed, many welcomed the additional resources being made available for school 
improvement—but many were dismayed at what they saw as a political gesture with 
harmful consequences for schools. The overwhelming perception of those taking part in 
the NFER research was that the “naming and shaming” approach to school improvement, 
based on raw test scores, was unfair, demoralising for staff and potentially damaging to the 
school and its pupils. The approach taken by central government appeared unilateral in 
nature and was not approved of at local level. 
253. We have also noted above our concern about the Government’s proposal to enable the 
Secretary of State to direct local authorities to use their statutory powers in relation to 
schools which are struggling.396  This would give the Secretary of State power to intervene 
in schools causing concern and to circumvent some of the good practice developed by local 
authorities which are successfully using non-statutory strategies to support school 
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improvement. It is also further evidence of the Government’s centralising tendencies when 
it comes to school improvement and it runs directly contrary to the message in the White 
Paper that schools are responsible for their own improvement.397  
254. Throughout this series of inquiries, we have encountered concern about the effect of 
targets and thresholds on schools and their pupils. In schools which are struggling to meet 
targets based on tests in the core subjects, many will feel powerless to put appropriate time 
and resources into meeting the genuine needs of pupils whose greatest potential lies 
elsewhere than in academic attainment. The LGA provides a further example of how 
targets and thresholds can have a distorting effect on school practice. In its response to 
Ofsted’s consultation about the proposal to impose minimum standards for pupils’ 
attainment, the LGA expressed concern that such requirements could have serious 
implications for schools and their pupils. It stated that: 
Defining minimum standards for learners’ outcomes may be attractive, but also 
raises highly complex questions of realism, reasonableness and equity. …  There are 
quite profound philosophical problems about the extent to which people, who are all 
different, can all reasonably be expected at all times and in all circumstances to 
achieve a particular standard. Equally, clearly everyone wishes to be ambitious in 
seeing each child achieve his or her educational potential, but these are not by any 
means necessarily the same thing. We must be careful that in any setting of 
minimum standards, of whatever variety, we do not create perverse incentives which 
adversely impact on institutions or on individual children and young people. 
255. Ofsted categorisation of schools as ‘causing concern’ has also been described as 
damaging to schools. The National Association of Head Teachers (NAHT) argued that the 
current mechanisms for identifying ‘under-performing’ schools, based on targets and 
thresholds of attainment in tests and examinations, were inadequate in recognising the 
broader achievements of a school. The process of categorisation used by Ofsted did 
nothing to support school improvement and may hinder progress by reducing the 
reputation of a school. The NAHT wished to see the additional support which is offered to 
schools as a result of being placed in a category of concern by Ofsted being made available 
without the stigma which attaches to that categorisation.398 
256. School self-evaluation was meant to epitomise the New Relationship with Schools 
concept of schools taking responsibility for their own improvement.399  Yet the ASCL told 
us that self-evaluation has been undermined by the current accountability system: 
… the self evaluation form has been imposed on schools and has been increasing[ly] 
subverted to provide extra accountability. Self-improvement has been obstructed by 
a fixation on categorising schools as failing in various ways, leading to a culture of 
fear which stifles creativity and leads instead to mere compliance. … 
Too little account is taken of progress, improvement or performance over time; so 
that teachers and their leaders can find that they are only as good as their most recent 
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results. This has led to an increasing number of school leaders being dismissed, often 
in ways more redolent of the football club than the classroom, contributing to the 
sense of threat and compliance culture mentioned … above.400 
The NUT was also concerned about what it saw as a distortion of the self-evaluation 
process by Ofsted. It thought that, whilst appearing to adopt self-evaluation, Ofsted was 
actually using it in a negative and punitive way. The NUT argued that the approach 
embodied in Ofsted’s Self-Evaluation Form (SEF) was far removed from the model 
propounded by Professor John MacBeath which had met with the enthusiasm of many 
teachers and local authorities. The NUT compared the SEF approach unfavourably with 
‘true’ self-evaluation by which a school “takes time to think through its own priorities and 
values and … tests the fulfilment of these in practice” becoming, as a consequence, a better 
school. 
257. Consistent with a coercive view of the accountability system, many witnesses have 
stated that performance reporting and inspection in England are used as punitive 
mechanisms.401  The stigmatisation of individual schools, leading to a spiral of decline as 
morale is compromised, recruitment and retention of good teachers becomes increasingly 
problematic and parents move children to other schools, could be avoided with a less 
punitive approach based on support and challenge.402 School Improvement Partners told 
us that the top-down pressures on headteachers by means of cumulating initiatives, 
including threshold targets, were discouraging teachers from applying for headships. 
Existing headteachers felt unable to do their job as they wished because they were 
increasingly occupied with the “volume of initiatives that fall on their desk”. Some 
headteachers felt distanced from the business of teaching and learning because of the 
breadth of their management responsibilities, particularly in relation to the extended 
schools agenda.403  Anna Fazackerley, representing The Policy Exchange, thought that the 
Government should move towards a model more like that in Ontario or Alberta in 
Canada, where the punitive approach was avoided and more emphasis was placed on 
supporting school improvement and maintaining a dialogue with schools about the best 
means of achieving that end.404 
258. Dr John Dunford, General Secretary of the ASCL, summed up the way schools and 
their leaders feel about the accountability and improvement mechanisms to which they are 
subject. He accepted that schools should be accountable and that accountability should 
feed into the processes of school improvement. However, an effective school accountability 
system was one where schools owned the processes of accountability and improvement. 
Schools had difficulty with the current system because they did not have ownership of it 
and it was being “done to them”. This chimes with a concern expressed by Professor John 
MacBeath, who stated that, at a European level, the UK was peculiar because of the lack of 
reciprocity between schools, the Government and local authorities. The pressures on 
 
400 Ev 10  
401 Ev 13; Ev 15; Ev 16; NUT response to the DCSF/Ofsted consultation on the School Report Card; Q 13; Q 38; Q 196; Q 
261 
402 Mathematics in Education and Industry; Ev 180; Ev 10; Ev 62; Ev 63; Ev 15  
403 Q 144 
404 Q 196 




schools were very much top down, but there was no mechanism by which schools could 
evaluate the work done by, for example, Ofsted or the Government. He thought that the 
“pressure-down, accountability-up” structure of the school accountability and 
improvement system was wrong and needed to be addressed.405 
259. The NUT urged the Government to review current accountability measures—
inspection, national targets and school performance tables—with the aim of achieving 
public accountability of schools without the “warping and distorting effects” of the current 
system.406  It states that performance tables and targets should be abolished and that the 
need for an account of the performance of the education system at national level should be 
met by sample testing.407  The ATL agreed and added that reporting of school-level data, 
encouraging “crude parent choice” and triggering major interventions such as National 
Challenge, were the major reasons for narrowing of the curriculum taught in schools. Only 
those schools already doing well felt secure enough to innovate and teach creatively.408 
260. We recommend that the Government revisits the proposals for reform of the 
school accountability and improvement system set out in the 21st Century Schools 
White Paper with a view to giving more substance to its claims that schools are 
responsible for their own improvement. We have received strong evidence that schools 
feel coerced and constrained by the outcomes of Ofsted inspection and programmes set 
up by central government, such as National Challenge. We have consistently noted the 
adverse effects that targets have had on the education of children and young people. 
The Government should seek means of delivering support and challenge to schools 
without what many witnesses perceived as a harmful ‘naming and shaming’ approach 
endemic in the current system. 
Conclusion 
261. The Government told us that: 
The principles of school self-evaluation, light-touch Ofsted inspection and the School 
Improvement Partner, established through the New Relationship with Schools, have 
been widely welcomed and have supported schools in taking ownership of their own 
improvement. The accountability system is flexible in allowing central Government 
to shift priorities and respond both to individual school needs and to emerging 
national policy, for example through the introduction of progression targets and 
deprivation targets. The current accountability framework does not only take 
account of hard data, but also of valuable qualitative information through self-
evaluation and Ofsted inspection.409 
262. The problem with the Government’s assessment of the accountability system is 
that it implies that schools welcome the opportunity to take “ownership of their own 
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improvement” but then provides the perfect example of how they have been prevented 
from doing just that. The “flexibility” of the system, allowing a constant shift in 
priorities by central government, is precisely the reason why schools are struggling to 
engage with the accountability regime and myriad school improvement mechanisms. 
The Government refers to the flexibility of the accountability system as if this is an 
inherent benefit. The opposite is true. Schools and, indeed, local authorities are in sore 
need of a period of stability so that they can regroup, take the necessary time to identify 
where their priorities lie and then work, with appropriate support, to secure the 
necessary improvements. 
263. Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Schools told us that “I have … said [in my Annual 
Report] for two years that the number of children going from primary to secondary school 
who can’t read is far too high, and that we are letting down generations of children”.410  
This is a damning judgement of a system of education in England which is failing some 
pupils at a fundamental level.  
264. Our series of three inquiries, of which this is the last, has sought to uncover the 
reasons why some children are not receiving a rounded education which is appropriate to 
their needs. In our report on Testing and Assessment, we found that the testing and 
assessment system and targets culture disseminated from central government had the 
effect of distorting the education of many children. There was too much emphasis on high-
stakes testing in the core subjects and too little on the needs of individual children. Our 
National Curriculum inquiry found that teachers were constrained by an over-specified 
curriculum which takes up almost all of the school week, leaving little room for innovation 
and an individualised approach. This, final, report in the series has identified deep flaws in 
an accountability system which is intended to provide the gateway to school improvement 
but whose complexity and inconsistency provides a real barrier to that improvement. 
Schools cannot be coerced into improving: it is a process which they must own for 
themselves if it is to be successful. 
265. It is time for the Government to allow schools to refocus their efforts on what 
matters: children. For too long, schools have struggled to cope with changing priorities, 
constant waves of new initiatives from central government, and the stresses and 
distortions caused by performance tables and targets.  
266. The Government should place more faith in the professionalism of teachers and 
should support them with a simplified accountability and improvement system which 
challenges and encourages good practice rather than stigmatising and undermining 
those who are struggling. In doing so, it is vital for effective accountability that the 
independence of HM Inspectorate be safeguarded and maintained at all times. We 
believe that the Government should revisit the plans set out in its 21st Century Schools 
White Paper and simplify considerably the accountability framework and 
improvement strategies it proposes.  
 
410 Q 284 





Monday 30 November 2009 
Members present: 
Mr Barry Sheerman, in the Chair 
Annette Brooke 







Draft Report (School Accountability), proposed by the Chairman, brought up and read. 
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph. 
Paragraphs 1 to 266 read and agreed to. 
Summary agreed to. 
Resolved, That the Report be the First Report of the Committee to the House. 
Ordered, That the Chairman make the Report to the House. 
Written evidence was ordered to be reported to the House for printing with the Report, together with written 
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Archives.  
Ordered, That embargoed copies of the report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of 




[Adjourned till Wednesday 2 December at 9.15am 
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